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l)EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON FINANCIAL MARKETS:
PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE BONDS AND EMERGING MARKETS
This dissertation consists of five empirical studies on financial markets. Each study can
be read independently and covers a specific subject. The first three studies add to the
literature on emerging markets. There are two aspects that make emerging markets
research interesting. First, they provide a natural `out-of-sample' test for both established
and new theories that initially are tested for developed markets. The study on stock
 selection strategies in emerging markets in Chapter 2 provides an example of this use of
emerging markets data. Second, emerging markets have their own specific characteristics
such as severe crises and limited regulations. The study on analysts' earnings forecasts, in
Chapter 3, clearly looks at the specific characteristics of emerging markets. Finally, the
study on emerging currency markets, in Chapter 4, gives a new perspective on investment
strategies for both emerging as well as developed currency markets. The last two chapters
cover corporate bonds and private equity respectively. To the best of our knowledge,
Chapter 5 is the first study that incorporates both individual corporate bonds and US
corporate bond mutual funds to address anomalous patterns in corporate bond returns.
The last chapter aims providing guidance to institutional investors to maintain a constant
portfolio allocation to private equity. Despite the enthusiasm from institutional investors
for private equity, the formal research into private equity investment strategies for these
investors appears to be limited. Chapter 6 fills this gap.
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5Voorwoord (Preface)
‘Dit paper overbrugt het veelvoorkomende gat tussen praktijk en wetenschap’. Met deze
uitspraak startte Michael Melvin, editor van het Journal of International Money and Fi-
nance, de discussie over Hoofdstuk 4 tijdens de tweede emerging markets conferentie van
de Cass Business School in Londen in mei 2008. Hiermee verwoordde hij precies waar ik de
afgelopen vier jaar aan gewerkt heb: wetenschappelijk onderzoek met een praktische inslag.
Concreet betekende dit vier dagen per week werken in de praktijk en e´e´n dag aan mijn
proefschrift op de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. Dit proefschrift vormt het eindresul-
taat waarbij de variatie van onderwerpen voortkomt uit de onderzoeken naar verschillende
financie¨le markten waar ik in de praktijk aan gewerkt heb.
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek is net iets anders dan onderzoek in de praktijk. Grote
dank ben ik dan ook verschuldigd aan de lessen en suggesties van mijn promotoren. Beste
Dick, vanaf het eerste moment waarop ik je mijn promotieplannen voorlegde hebben we
bijzonder prettig, maar ook efficie¨nt, samengewerkt. In de 30 treinminuten van Leiden
naar Rotterdam en vice versa hebben we heel wat nieuwe ideee¨n en resultaten besproken.
Beste Marno, in de begeleiding stond je iets meer op afstand, maar juist jouw frisse blik
op voorlopige versies van de verschillende hoofdstukken leverde een heel andere kijk op
het onderzoek. Ik heb het erg op prijs gesteld dat je mij de kans hebt gegeven om e´e´n
dag per week op de Rotterdam School of Management door te brengen. Samen vormden
jullie een goed team en hebben jullie een belangrijke rol gespeeld in mijn ontwikkeling op
wetenschappelijk gebied. Ik hoop daarom dan ook dat we in de toekomst kunnen blijven
samenwerken. Ook wil ik hier Peter Ferket danken voor het feit dat hij mij vanaf het begin
af aan uitgedaagd, gestimuleerd en gesteund heeft om dit promotietraject door te zetten
en af te ronden. Beste Peter, de manier waarop jij altijd uitkomt voor je eigen mening en
ideee¨n verdient veel respect! Ik ben dan ook erg blij dat je deel uitmaakt van de grote
commissie.
De leden van de kleine commissie, Angelien Kemna, Allaudeen Hameed en Frans de
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Roon, wil ik bedanken voor het evalueren van dit proefschrift en hun suggesties. Ingolf
Dittmann en Mathijs van Dijk wil ik ook bedanken voor het plaatsnemen in de grote com-
missie en hun suggesties voor hoofdstuk 3. Hiernaast wil ik mijn andere co-auteurs, Jeroen
Derwall, Brian Frieser, Jaap van der Hart, Joop Huij, Thijs Markwat en Laurens Swinkels
bedanken voor hun bijdragen aan dit proefschrift. Ik heb genoten van het onderzoek, onze
discussies en de conferentiebezoeken. Iedere nieuwe versie voelde weer als de beste, totdat
we de volgende versie hadden geschreven...
Ook wil ik mijn (voormalige) collegae bij de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Robeco
en ING bedanken. Met het gevaar dat ik iemand vergeet te noemen, wil ik hier met naam
noemen: David Blitz, Ronald van Dijk, Johan Duijvesteijn, Frank van Etten, Marshall Fi-
lart, Carl Ghielen, Wilma de Groot, Daniel Haesen, Paul van Homelen, Patrick Houweling,
Kees Isendoorn, Willem Jellema, Maarten Jennen, Tjeert Keijzer, Erik Kole, Niels Kyl-
stra, Marcel de Koning, Martin Martens, Ranjit Nelissen, Ad van den Ouweland, Michiel
de Pooter, Martin Prins, Meenu Sahi, Carina Schlosser, Ben Tims, Tatjana Ulicevic, Eddy
Verbiest, Pim van Vliet en Mikan van Zanten.
Ik wil mijn vrienden en medebestuursgenoten en leidingsleden van de Katwijkse Zeever-
kenners danken voor hun begrip en de nodige afleiding in de afgelopen vier jaar. Hoogtepun-
ten waren onder meer de vele diners met de vrienden en het KaWaKa met 150 zeeverkenners
en welpen tijdens ons 75-jarig jubileum! Ik ben ook erg blij dat twee van mijn vrienden
tijdens de verdediging naast mij staan, Jaap-Meinert en Klaas Jan. In de afgelopen 15 jaar
hebben we al erg veel samen meegemaakt en kon ik altijd op jullie rekenen.
Het laatste dankwoord is bestemd voor mijn familie. Jullie hebben steeds belang-
stelling getoond in mijn bezigheden, al was het vast even schakelen om te begrijpen wat ik
nu precies deed. Lieve papa en mama, jullie hebben hebben mij het doorzettingsvermogen
meegegeven dat nodig was om dit proefschrift te starten en af te ronden. Dank voor jullie
steun. Veruit mijn grootste dank gaat uit naar Annemiek. Lieve Annemiek, dank voor al
je steun en liefde in de afgelopen jaren. Heel wat avonden en weekenden kon ik rekenen op
je begrip als ik nog ‘even’ aan de slag ging. Nu, bijna acht jaar na onze trouwdag en 16
jaar na onze eerste ontmoeting kijken we uit naar de geboorte van onze baby in augustus.
Hiermee staan we samen aan de vooravond van een totaal nieuwe uitdaging waaraan dit
proefschrift niet kan tippen.
Gerben de Zwart
Rijnsburg, mei 2008
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of five empirical studies on financial markets. Each study can be
read independently and covers a specific financial market, either private equity, corporate
bonds or emerging markets. This introductory chapter provides a brief description of each
of these markets and gives an overview of the subsequent chapters.
1.1 Emerging markets
The term ‘emerging market’ was originally introduced by the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC) of the World Bank. The term ‘emerging’ refers to the interphase between
less-developed and developed. The emerging markets include low and middle income coun-
tries with stock markets in which foreigners can buy and sell securities, like Mexico or South
Africa. In addition high income economies that still have a high political risk or less devel-
oped regulations, like Israel and Korea respectively, are also classified as emerging markets.
Emerging markets are extensively analysed especially since the early 1990’s, because only
then the relevant data, compiled by amongst others IFC, became available. Bekaert and
Harvey (2002, 2003) provide a good overview of the ‘big picture’ in emerging markets re-
search. Naturally the high returns and strong economic growth of emerging markets also
contributed to the investor’s interest.
There are two aspects that make emerging markets research interesting. First, they
provide a natural ‘out-of-sample’ test for both established and new theories that initially
are tested for developed markets. The study on stock selection strategies in emerging
markets in Chapter 2 provides an example of this use of emerging markets data. Second,
emerging markets have their own specific characteristics such as crises and limited regu-
lations. Therefore they need their own (new) models. The study on analysts’ earnings
11
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12 Corporate bonds
forecasts, in Chapter 3, clearly looks at the specific characteristics of emerging markets.
Finally, the study on emerging currency markets, in Chapter 4, gives a new perspective on
investment strategies for both emerging as well as developed currency markets.
Chapter 2 examines competing explanations for the profitability of stock selection
strategies in emerging markets. We document that both emerging market risk and global
risk factors cannot account for the significant excess returns of selection strategies based
on value, momentum and earnings revisions indicators. The findings for value and mo-
mentum strategies are consistent with the evidence from developed markets supporting
behavioral explanations. In addition for value stocks, the most important behavioral bias
appears to be related to underestimation of long-term growth prospects, as indicated by
above average analysts’ forecast errors and earnings revisions for longer post-formation
horizons and by quite rapidly improving earnings growth expectations. Furthermore, we
find that overreaction effects play a limited role for the earnings revisions strategy setting
this strategy apart from momentum strategies.
Chapter 3 presents empirical evidence that security analysts do not efficiently use pub-
licly available macroeconomic information in their earnings forecasts for emerging market
stocks. Analysts completely ignore forecasts on political stability. They do incorporate
output growth forecasts, but these actually bear no relevant information for firm-level
earnings growth. Inflation forecasts are taken into account correctly. In addition, the
information environment appears to be crucially important in emerging markets, as we
find evidence that analysts handle macroeconomic information in a better way for more
transparent firms.
Chapter 4 measures the economic value of information derived from macroeconomic
variables and technical trading rules for emerging markets currency investments. Using a
sample of 23 emerging markets with a floating exchange rate regime over the period 1995–
2007, we document that both types of information can be exploited to implement profitable
trading strategies. In line with evidence from surveys of foreign exchange professionals
concerning the use of fundamental and technical analysis, we find that combining the two
types of information improves the risk-adjusted performance of the investment strategies.
1.2 Corporate bonds
Usually, companies use a mix of financial resources to achieve an optimal capital structure,
where debt and equity are the most important sources of financing. Today, firms very often
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raise debt directly from the capital markets by issuing their own bonds. In its simplest
form these corporate bonds are a financial obligation by the company to pay interest at
specified future dates during the lifetime of the bond and the notional at maturity. For
bearing the risk of bankruptcy of the issuing firm during the lifetime of the bond, investors
require a higher compensation than for government bonds. Furthermore, the holder of a
corporate bond has priority over the claims of stockholders in the case of a bankruptcy.
During the last 15 years the analysis of corporate bonds has expanded substantially,
although the first study by Fisher (1959) dates back much longer. This growing interest is
due to the enormous growth of the corporate bond market in both the US and Europe as
well as from the introduction of derivatives on corporate bonds, like credit default swaps.
Nevertheless, empirical research from an investor’s perspective is limited due to the lack of
reliable historical data on corporate bond prices and returns. To the best of our knowledge,
Chapter 5 adds to the literature by being the first study that incorporates both individual
corporate bonds and all US corporate bond mutual funds to address anomalous patterns
in corporate bond returns. Prior studies either focus on individual corporate bonds (see
Gebhardt et al. (2005) among others) or mutual funds (see Elton et al. (1995) or Huij and
Derwall (2007) among others).
Chapter 5 documents that common risk factors do a good job in explaining the cross-
section of returns on corporate bond portfolios with medium to long maturity, but signifi-
cantly underestimate the returns on corporate bonds with a short maturity. A substantial
portion of short-term corporate bond returns is independent of risk premiums associated
with market risk, term and default risk, yield curve dynamics, liquidity risk and premiums
associated with macro-economic variables. Comparable evidence of a short-term corpo-
rate bond anomaly also shows up in portfolios of corporate bond mutual funds, indicating
that the anomaly withstands important practical issues, such as short-selling restrictions,
transaction costs, and trade impact.
1.3 Private equity
Private equity covers the entire spectrum of investments in securities of companies that
do not have a listing on a stock exchange. The asset class became widely known to the
general public only in the 1980s, when several US private equity firms were frequently in
the news because of the large takeovers they did. Nevertheless the origins of private equity
date back to the 1940s in both the US and Europe. Since then the asset class has grown
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significantly. This growth was driven by governmental stimulations on the availability of
capital for small private businesses in the 1950s, the introduction of the limited partnership
as a legal structure in the 1970s and regulatory changes for pension funds and banks in
the early 1980s. In the 1980s large institutional investors took over the role of leading
investors in private equity from private individuals. This spurred a further growth of the
private equity asset class. Of course the success of several companies that were initially
funded through private equity such as Microsoft, Google, Starbucks, Apple Computers
and Hewlett-Packard also contributed. The late 1990s showed a substantial increase in
the number of independent private equity firms. This was partly based on the successes of
the private equity segment that provided money to start-up companies during the initial
phase of the ’internethype’ and the subsequent successful initial public offerings (IPO) in
the public market. The industry experienced a correction when the end of this hype was
combined with a global macroeconomic downturn. Driven by the recovery of global macro
economic growth the private equity market recovered. Fueled by low interest rates and a
high level of liquidity in the financial markets, the segment focusing on buying existing
companies experienced high growth during the past three years.
Today, the interest in private equity from institutional investors is still growing. For
example, Cumming and Johan (2007) survey the attitude of Dutch institutional investors
towards private equity and find that currently 29% of the respondents are investing in
private equity, while another 6% of the respondents intends to invest in private equity over
the next two to five years. Furthermore, the respondents who already invest in private
equity expect an increase of their private equity portfolio allocation in the near future.
Despite this enthusiasm from institutional investors there is not much formal research into
private equity investment strategies for these investors with a long-term horizon. Chapter
6 fills this gap.
Chapter 6 develops a reinvestment strategy for institutional private equity investors.
The strategy aims to keep the private equity portfolio weight equal to a desired strategic
asset allocation, while taking into account the illiquid nature of private equity. Historical
simulations (1980–2005) show that this dynamic strategy is capable of maintaining a stable
investment level that is close to the target. This result does not only hold for unrestricted
portfolios, but also for investments limited to buy-out or venture capital, a specific region
(Europe or US), or fund manager experience. This finding is of great importance for insti-
tutional investors like pension funds or insurance companies, because private equity funds
have a finite lifetime and uncertain cash flows, forcing investors to constantly maintain
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their private equity portfolio.
To summarize, this dissertation consist of five studies that can be read independently.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 concern different aspects of emerging markets and discuss stock selec-
tion, analysts’ earnings forecasts and currencies, respectively. Chapter 5 is concerned with
asset pricing in corporate bonds. Chapters 6 studies investment strategies for institutional
investors in private equity.
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Chapter 2
The Success of Stock Selection
Strategies in Emerging Markets: Is it
Risk or Behavioral Bias?∗
2.1 Introduction
Research in emerging markets finance has been rapidly expanding over the past two
decades, see Bekaert and Harvey (2002, 2003) for comprehensive surveys of the past,
present and future of the area. Relatively few studies exist that investigate individual
stock selection for emerging markets, see Claessens et al. (1998), Fama and French (1998),
Patel (1998), Achour et al. (1998, 1999b,c,a), Rouwenhorst (1999), Barry et al. (2002),
and Van der Hart et al. (2003). The general conclusion from these studies appears to be
that stock selection strategies that work well in developed markets also generate signifi-
cant outperformance in emerging markets. The most recent analysis by Van der Hart et al.
(2003), based on almost 3000 securities from 32 countries and an extensive set of selection
strategies, finds that in internationally diversified (but country-neutral) portfolios, value
stocks outperform growth stocks, past winners (based on six-month momentum) outper-
form past losers, and stocks with (relatively) high analysts’ earnings revisions outperform
stocks with low revisions.
There is an ongoing debate concerning the underlying reasons for (or the appropriate
interpretation of) the profitability of value, momentum and revisions strategies. Roughly
speaking, on the one hand, the excess returns of these stock selection strategies are believed
∗This chapter is based on the article by Van der Hart, De Zwart and Van Dijk (2005) in the Emerging
Markets Review. We thank an anonymous referee and participants at the Inquire Europe meeting held in
Prague, October 2004, for useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Willem Jellema for excellent
assistance in collecting the data.
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to be compensation for risk involved, whereas on the other hand they are attributed to
behavioral biases, with investors either under- or overreacting to the release of new firm-
specific information. To add to this discussion, in this paper we perform an ‘out-of-sample’
test of these competing explanations, by examining whether they can account for the
profitability of stock selection strategies in emerging markets. As most research in this
area has been conducted for developed markets, emerging markets provide an excellent
opportunity to study the source of return premiums on a relatively independent sample.
We find that both emerging market risk and global factor risk (using a four-factor model
including market, book-to-market, size and momentum factors) cannot explain the excess
returns of the selection strategies in emerging markets. Relatively few factor loadings are
found to be significant, while excess returns of the strategies remain of the same magnitude
and significant after accounting for risk. We find more convincing evidence in favor of
behavioral explanations for value and momentum anomalies put forward in the context
of developed markets. In addition, we present new results supporting an underrreaction
effect for the earnings revisions strategy.
For value strategies, our findings are in accordance with the underreaction or extrapola-
tion hypothesis developed in Lakonishok et al. (1994), which posits that the outperformance
of value stocks arises because investors systematically underestimate the earnings growth
prospects of such stocks. We find that the actual earnings growth of value stocks in emerg-
ing markets equals the average earnings growth after just a few years, indicating that the
difference in valuation between value and growth stocks indeed is not justified by subse-
quent earnings developments. At the same time, we find that the evidence for emerging
markets is also in line with the results of Doukas et al. (2002), who document that analysts
in fact are more optimistic about value than growth stocks, seemingly contradicting the
behavioral interpretation of Lakonishok et al. (1994). We suggest a possible reconciliation
for these contrasting views, based on the idea that the most important behavioral bias is
related to underestimation of long term earnings growth prospects for value stocks. This
hypothesis is supported by our finding that analysts’ forecast errors (defined as actual
earnings minus the corresponding earnings forecast) and earnings revisions for value stocks
are below average only up until approximately one year after portfolio formation. After
this initial period, analysts indeed become less optimistic about value than growth stocks.
In addition, we observe that the expected earnings growth for value stocks improves quite
rapidly and exceeds the average expected growth within two years after portfolio formation.
For the momentum strategy, we find elements of both underreaction and overreaction,
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in agreement with the evidence from developed markets. On the one hand, stocks with high
past returns have higher earnings forecast errors and earnings revisions for about one year
after portfolio formation, indicating an underreaction effect, similar to the findings of Chan
et al. (1996) for the US. On the other hand, in line with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and
Nagel (2002), we also find that momentum strategies have a pronounced reversal in excess
returns between three and five years after portfolio formation, indicating an overreaction
effect.
For the earnings revisions strategy, our results lend unequivocal support to an underre-
action explanation. In line with the US evidence of Chan et al. (1996) and our own findings
for the emerging markets momentum strategy, stocks with high past earnings revisions con-
tinue to have earnings revisions (and earnings forecast errors) above average for about one
year after portfolio formation. Contrary to the momentum strategy, we find no return
reversal for the earnings revisions strategy up until five years after portfolio formation,
indicating a distinct difference between these strategies. To the best of our knowledge,
return reversals for earnings revisions strategies have not been examined before, even for
developed markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and stock selection
strategies. Section 2.3 summarizes the results concerning their profitability and the ro-
bustness thereof. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 explore the competing explanations for the excess
returns of the strategies in terms of risk and behavior, respectively. Finally, Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Data
Stock returns, earnings and book value data are drawn from the S&P/IFC Emerging
Markets database. Monthly total stock returns are measured in US dollars, and account
for dividends, stock splits and other capital adjustments, cf. Rouwenhorst (1999). The
returns contain some extreme observations, which are at least partly due to data errors. To
avoid a potentially disrupting impact from large data errors, we compare the total returns
from S&P/IFC with corresponding total returns from the Factset Pricing database, as well
as with price returns from both sources. In case of extreme return observations with large
differences between the data sources, we use the smallest absolute value to err on the side
of caution. In addition, we cap monthly returns at 300% or 150%, depending on whether
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or not the S&P/IFC data is confirmed by Factset Pricing.
We exclude stocks that are not included in the IFC Investable Composite index1 and
stocks that have a real investable market value less than 100 million in December 1998 US
dollars, applying a 10 percent annual inflation rate. This makes the selection strategies
feasible for a large international investor, while it also mitigates the problem of survivorship
bias in the Emerging Markets database, due to backfilled data for some countries in the
period before inclusion in the IFC Investable Composite index, see Harvey (1995) for a
detailed discussion. In addition, we omit countries with less than four stocks and countries
for which the data necessary for the particular selection strategy is available for less than 30
percent of the stocks. We discard these “small” countries because the selection strategies
construct local return factor portfolios from the top and bottom 15 percent stocks in each
country separately.
The data from S&P/IFC are supplemented with analysts’ earnings forecasts from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). These are used to compute earnings re-
visions, defined as the number of analysts with upward revisions minus the number of
analysts with downward revisions divided by the total number of analysts providing an
earnings forecast in a particular month, following Achour et al. (1998).
Combining the different databases, we implement the stock selection strategies de-
scribed below over the period from December 1988, the inception month of the IFC In-
vestable Composite index, until June 2004. The number of stocks that are used for testing
the strategies starts at about 100 in December 1988, grows quite rapidly to about 700 in
1994 and varies between 600 and 900 stocks in the remaining years.
2.2.2 Stock Selection Strategies
We investigate stock selection strategies based on the value indicators book-to-market
(B/M) and earnings-to-price (E/P), based on momentum as measured by the total return
1The IFC Investable Composite Index consists of stocks from the following countries, with the first
month of inclusion in parenthesis. In case two months are provided, the second indicates the last month of
inclusion. Latin America: Argentina (Dec 1988), Brazil (Dec 1988), Chile (Dec 1988), Colombia (Feb 1991
- Nov 2001), Mexico (Dec 1988), Peru (Jan 1994), Venezuela (Jan 1990 - Nov 2001); Asia: China (Oct
1995), India (Nov 1992), Indonesia (Sep 1990), Korea (Jan 1992), Malaysia (Dec 1988), Pakistan (Mar
1991 - Nov 2001), Philippines (Dec 1988), Sri Lanka (Jan 1994 - Nov 2001), Taiwan (Jan 1991), Thailand
(Dec 1988); Europe: Czech Republic (Jan 1996), Greece (Dec 1988 - Apr 2001), Hungary (Apr 1994),
Poland (Apr 1994), Portugal (Dec 1988 - Mar 1999), Russia (Nov 1997), Slovakia (Nov 1997 - Nov 2001),
Turkey (Aug 1989); Africa & Middle East: Egypt (Nov 1997), Israel (Dec 1996), Jordan (Dec 1988 - Nov
2001), Morocco (Nov 1997), South Africa (Apr 1995), and Zimbabwe (Apr 1994 - Nov 2001). Malaysia
was not included during the period Oct 1998 - Oct 1999.
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over the previous six months (6MR), and based on analysts’ earnings revisions, measured
by the past three-month average earnings revisions for the current fiscal year (ER FY1).
The methodology underlying the portfolio construction is described below.
All strategies are applied without a delay between the moment of ranking and the
moment of portfolio formation. As the IFC and IBES databases contain data as published,
all sorting characteristics would have been available to investors at the time of ranking and,
hence, the selection strategies do not use any future information.2 At the beginning of each
month, we rank the stocks by country on each of the above characteristics in descending
order. For each country in the sample, equally weighted ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ portfolios
are formed from the 15 percent stocks ranked highest and lowest, respectively.3 These
country portfolios are then combined into internationally diversified portfolios, in which
each stock receives an equal weight. Each month, new portfolios are constructed which
are held for a period of six months. After formation, the portfolios are not rebalanced,
except to account for stocks leaving the IFC Investables index. These stocks exit the
relevant portfolio and the weights of the remaining stocks are adjusted proportionally. As
we construct new portfolios every month and use a six-month holding period, at any point
in time the strategies effectively hold stocks from six portfolios, each formed one month
apart. To handle the problems concerned with overlapping returns, we calculate monthly
returns for a particular strategy as the average of the returns on the six similar portfolios,
cf. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Rouwenhorst (1998).
2Apart from worries about the timely availability of the sorting variables, another reason to implement
momentum strategies with a delay (usually of one-month) is to attenuate the effects of bid-ask bounce,
see Achour et al. (1998) and Rouwenhorst (1999), among others. Because of the minimum capitalization
requirement that we impose, the smallest, and probably least liquid, stocks are not included in our sample
and, hence, bid-ask bounce is less important at the monthly frequency. Therefore, we also implement the
momentum strategies without delay, such that, for example, the 6-month momentum factor that is used
to rank the stocks at the beginning of month t is based on the average return from the beginning of month
t− 6 to the end of month t− 1.
3Stocks are selected in each country separately to avoid any implicit country allocation. We examine
the added value of country selection by ranking stocks globally and forming equally weighted portfolios
consisting of the top and bottom 15 percent stocks in this alternative ranking. We find that such ‘global
ranking’ adds considerably to the profitability of the stock selection strategies. The excess returns due to
country selection are, however, much more volatile than the excess returns due to stock selection.
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Table 2.1: Returns of Univariate Stock Selection Strategies
Factor # Stocks Top EWI Bottom TMI t(TMI) TMB t(TMB)
B/M 576 1.46 0.93 0.74 0.53 3.76 0.73 3.39
E/P 576 1.26 0.93 0.58 0.32 3.04 0.68 3.76
6MR 576 1.30 0.93 0.58 0.36 3.51 0.74 3.75
ER FY1 489 1.03 0.79 0.45 0.24 3.13 0.59 4.80
Note: At the beginning of each month between December 1988 and June 2004, all stocks
for which the necessary information is available are ranked by country in descending order
according to the value of the factor indicated in the first column. B/M is the book-to-market
ratio; E/P is the earnings-to-price ratio; 6MR is the average return over the previous six
months; ER FY1 is the past three-month average earnings revisions for the current fiscal
year. For each country equally weighted portfolios are formed from the top and bottom
15 percent of stocks, which are combined into equally weighted internationally diversified
portfolios (Top and Bottom). EWI is the equally weighted index of all stocks in the sample.
Positions are held for six months and are not rebalanced. Monthly, non-overlapping returns
are computed as the average return on the six similar portfolios which are held during each
month. Column 2 reports the average number of stocks in the different samples. Columns 3-5
report the average returns of the Top, EWI and Bottom portfolios, expressed as percentage
per month. Columns 6-7 and 8-9 report the average excess returns and the corresponding t-
statistics of the Top Minus EWI (TMI) portfolio and the Top Minus Bottom (TMB) portfolio,
respectively.
2.3 Profitability of Stock Selection Strategies
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the stock selection strategies based on value,
momentum and earnings revisions. Table 2.1 shows the average monthly returns during
the six-month holding period for the top portfolio, an equally weighted index consisting
of all stocks in the relevant sample (EWI) and the bottom portfolio, as well as the excess
returns of the top portfolio versus the equally weighted index (TMI) and versus the bottom
portfolio (TMB).
All four selection strategies prove to be successful, in the sense that the excess returns
of the top portfolio are positive and strongly statistically significant. Compared to the
EWI, the average monthly excess returns of the top portfolio vary from 0.24% for the
earnings revisions strategy to 0.53% for the B/M strategy. The average returns for the
top versus bottom portfolio range between 0.59% and 0.74% per month, with the highest
average return for the momentum strategy and the lowest again for the earnings revisions
strategy. These magnitudes of the strategies’ excess returns are similar to those found in
Van der Hart et al. (2003), as well as the results reported in Rouwenhorst (1999) for B/M
and momentum and in Achour et al. (1998) for earnings revisions.
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Table 2.2: Subsample Returns of Univariate Stock Selection Strate-
gies
1989.7-1994.6 1994.7-1999.6 1999.7-2004.6
Factor TMI t(TMI) TMI t(TMI) TMI t(TMI)
B/M 0.84 2.66 0.36 1.71 0.43 2.59
E/P 0.44 1.81 0.33 2.10 0.44 3.82
6MR 0.26 1.43 0.38 2.28 0.43 2.16
ER FY1 0.30 2.12 0.27 2.78 0.29 2.73
Note: The table reports the average excess returns, expressed as percentage
per month, and the corresponding t-statistics of the Top Minus EWI (TMI)
portfolio over the indicated five-year subsample periods. See Table 2.1 for
further details on the portfolio construction methodology.
It is worth noting that in case the performance of the top portfolio is measured relative
to the bottom portfolio, the excess returns generated by the B/M, E/P and 6MR strategies
are very close. In contrast, when the top portfolio is compared with the EWI, the B/M
strategy markedly outperforms the other two strategies, by approximately 0.2% per month.
Hence, for the E/P and 6MR strategies a substantial part of the profits from a zero-
investment strategy based on the TMB portfolio would come from the sell side, while
this is not the case for the B/M strategy. Because of short sales restrictions in emerging
markets, implementing the TMB strategy as a zero-investment strategy may not be feasible
in practice; see Bekaert and Urias (1996), Alexander (2000) and De Roon et al. (2001).
The E/P and 6-month momentum strategies therefore are mostly relevant for avoiding or
underweighting ‘bad’ stocks, see Achour et al. (1998).
To analyze the stability of the strategies’ performance, Figure 2.1 plots 12-month mov-
ing average excess returns of the top portfolios relative to the EWI, while Table 2.2 shows
the TMI excess returns for three five-year subsample periods. All strategies have positive
excess returns in all three subperiods, and most excess returns are statistically significant.
For the B/M strategy, the average excess return decreased considerably over time, from
0.84% over the period July 1989-June 1994 to 0.39% over the period July 1994-June 2004.
In contrast, for the E/P and earnings revisions strategies the excess returns were quite
stable across sub-periods, while the performance of the momentum strategy even improved
notably over time. Finally, Figure 2.1 reveals that the B/M strategy was heavily affected
by the Asia crisis in 1997 during which it underperformed relative to the EWI, while the
momentum and earnings revisions strategies had negative excess returns following the Rus-
sia crisis in 1998. In contrast, the performance of the E/P strategy was affected to a much
lesser extent during these periods.
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In the following sections we explore the different explanations for the apparent success
of stock selection strategies in emerging markets as documented above, in terms of exposure
to risk and in terms of behavioral biases.4
2.4 Risk-Based Explanations for the Profitability of
Selection Strategies
If the selection strategies tended to select stocks with high sensitivity to overall movements
in emerging equity markets, their excess returns would possibly only be a reward for this
additional risk. To examine this possibility, we use the regression
Rp,t −Rf,t = α + βEM(REM,t −Rf,t) + εt, (2.1)
where Rp,t is the monthly return on the equally weighted top or bottom portfolio of a
particular strategy, RM,t is the corresponding benchmark return on the equally weighted
index consisting of all emerging market stocks in our sample (EWI), and Rf,t is the 1-month
US T-bill rate.
The estimation results presented in Table 2.3 show that for all strategies the betas
of the top and bottom portfolios are close to one. Only the B/M strategy appears to
bear higher ‘emerging market risk’, as the betas of its top and bottom portfolios are
significantly greater and less than one, respectively. We find significant deviations from
one for the betas of portfolios of the other three strategies as well, but these are of the
opposite sign as expected under a risk-based explanation. For the E/P and 6MR strategies,
the betas of their bottom portfolios are significantly greater than one, while the beta of the
top portfolio of the earnings revisions strategy is significantly less than one. The excess
returns after correcting for emerging market risk, as measured by the intercept α in (2.1),
remain statistically significant for all portfolios except the bottom portfolio of the B/M
strategy. They in fact are very close to the raw excess returns reported in Table 2.1. In
sum, the excess returns of the stock selection strategies do not appear to be compensation
for excess emerging market risk.
Next, we investigate whether the return and risk properties of the selection strategies
depend upon whether the emerging markets as a whole go up or down. This is motivated
4Figure 2.1 shows the 12-month moving average of monthly excess returns of the top portfolio relative
to the equally weighted index for strategies based on book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P), past
6-month return (6MR), and past three-month earnings revisions for the current fiscal year (ER FY1). The
dashed line indicates the mean monthly excess return.
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Table 2.3: Emerging Market Risk of Top and Bottom Portfolios in Stock
Selection Strategies
Strategy Portfolio α t(α) βEM t(βEM − 1) R2
B/M
Top 0.53 3.64 1.07 3.05 0.92
Bottom −0.17 −1.52 0.96 −2.36 0.94
E/P
Top 0.34 3.04 1.00 0.12 0.95
Bottom −0.35 −3.22 1.07 4.02 0.95
6MR
Top 0.38 3.49 1.00 0.20 0.95
Bottom −0.36 −3.15 1.06 3.22 0.95
ER FY1
Top 0.25 3.16 0.98 −1.82 0.97
Bottom −0.34 −3.93 1.01 0.96 0.97
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the regression
Rp,t −Rf,t = α+ βEM(REM,t −Rf,t) + εt,
where Rp,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted top or bottom portfolio,
REM,t is the EWI benchmark return, and Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill return.
t(α) is the t-statistic of α, and t(βEM − 1) is the t-statistic of βEM minus one.
The regression R
2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
by the finding of Ang et al. (2006) that the cross-section of US stock returns reflects a
premium for downside risk; see also Estrada (2000, 2001) for a downside risk analysis in
emerging markets. This is reflected in the model
Rp,t −Rf,t = α−I{REM,t−Rf,t<0} + β−EM(REM,t −Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t<0}+
α+I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + β
+
EM(REM,t − Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + εt, (2.2)
where the returns Rp,t, REM,t and Rf,t are defined as before, and I{A} denotes the indicator
function for the event A, such that I{A} = 1 if A occurs and 0 otherwise. Hence, β+EM and
β−EM measure emerging market risk when the market goes up and down, respectively, while
α+ and α− measure the corresponding excess returns. Table 2.4 presents the results from
estimating (2.2) for the top and bottom portfolios of the four strategies. It is seen that the
difference between upside and downside betas generally is very small, indicating that the
strategies do not bear excessive downside (or upside) emerging market risk. This being
said, we do find more substantial differences in excess returns in up and down markets.
For example, α− and α+ for the top portfolio of the B/M strategy are equal to −0.05%
and 0.65%, respectively, indicating that the outperformance of this strategy is attained
completely in months when emerging markets as a whole go up. This contrasts quite
sharply with results for the US in Lakonishok et al. (1994), who document that value
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Table 2.4: Downside and Upside Emerging Market Risk of Top and Bottom Portfolios
in Stock Selection Strategies
Strategy Portfolio α− t(α−) β−EM t(β
−
EM − 1) α+ t(α+) β+EM t(β+EM − 1) R
2
B/M Top −0.05 −0.15 0.99 −0.25 0.65 2.28 1.07 1.48 0.93Bottom 0.08 0.31 1.00 −0.05 −0.16 −0.73 0.95 -1.42 0.94
E/P Top 0.18 0.68 0.98 −0.55 0.36 1.65 1.00 0.08 0.95Bottom −0.60 −2.34 1.02 0.63 −0.48 −2.21 1.10 2.82 0.96
6MR Top 0.53 2.06 1.02 0.62 0.32 1.54 1.01 0.21 0.95Bottom −0.23 −0.87 1.07 1.65 −0.52 −2.34 1.08 2.24 0.95
ER FY1 Top 0.23 1.31 0.98 −0.68 0.40 2.47 0.95 -1.81 0.97Bottom −0.34 −1.76 1.01 0.22 −0.47 −2.60 1.04 1.21 0.97
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the regression
Rp,t −Rf,t = α−I{REM,t−Rf,t<0} + β−EM(REM,t −Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t<0}+
α+I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + β
+
EM(REM,t − Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + εt,
where Rp,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted top or bottom portfolio, REM,t is the
EWI benchmark return, Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill return, and I{A} is the indicator function
for the event A. t(α) is the t-statistic of α, and t(βEM − 1) is the t-statistic of βEM minus one.
The regression R
2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
stocks outperform glamour stocks especially in negative market return years. For the
E/P and earnings revisions strategies, we also find that excess returns of the top portfolio
relative to the market are larger in positive market return months. Note, however, that for
the E/P strategy the bottom portfolio also performs relatively better in upward markets,
such that the outperformance of the top versus bottom portfolio is not sensitive to the
direction of the overall market. The same holds for the momentum strategy, although
in that case we find that |α+| < |α−|. In sum, the evidence in Table 2.4 indicates that
the selection strategies do not expose investors to greater downside (or upside) emerging
market risk.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the excess returns are rewards for exposures
to global risk factors by using the four-factor regression model developed by Fama and
French (1993, 1996) and Carhart (1997). This model explains portfolio returns in excess of
the risk-free rate (Rp,t −Rf,t) by sensitivities to the excess return on the market portfolio
(RM,t − Rf,t) and the difference between the returns on portfolios of stocks with high and
low book-to-market values (RHML,t, HML=High-Minus-Low), on portfolios of stocks with
small and large market capitalization (RSMB,t, SMB=Small-Minus-Big), and on portfolios
of stocks with high and low momentum (RUMD,t, UMD=Up-Minus-Down). That is, the
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Table 2.5: Four-Factor Regressions for Top and Bottom Portfolios in Stock Selection Strategies
Using Global Factor Portfolios
Portfolio α t(α) βM t(βM − 1) βHML t(βHML) βSMB t(βSMB) βUMD t(βUMD) R2
B/M Top 0.89 1.99 0.89 −0.97 0.19 1.22 0.49 3.83 −0.13 −1.48 0.36
EWI 0.33 0.85 0.85 −1.50 0.13 0.99 0.42 3.82 −0.11 −1.37 0.40
Bottom 0.11 0.29 0.86 −1.46 0.05 0.37 0.36 3.35 −0.06 −0.73 0.41
TMI 0.54 3.53 0.03 0.77 0.06 1.06 0.06 1.51 −0.03 −0.85 −0.00
TMB 0.78 3.39 0.02 0.34 0.14 1.82 0.13 1.96 −0.07 −1.59 0.02
E/P Top 0.64 1.55 0.86 −1.29 0.18 1.27 0.45 3.87 −0.10 −1.22 0.38
EWI 0.33 0.85 0.85 −1.50 0.13 0.99 0.42 3.82 −0.11 −1.37 0.40
Bottom 0.03 0.06 0.91 −0.78 0.11 0.77 0.42 3.49 −0.14 −1.63 0.39
TMI 0.31 2.66 0.01 0.25 0.05 1.15 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.31 −0.01
TMB 0.68 3.58 −0.07 −1.35 0.07 1.01 0.02 0.45 0.04 1.03 0.02
6MR Top 0.55 1.34 0.89 −1.04 0.18 1.28 0.44 3.82 0.01 0.14 0.37
EWI 0.33 0.85 0.85 −1.50 0.13 0.99 0.42 3.82 −0.11 −1.37 0.40
Bottom 0.14 0.34 0.88 −1.10 0.09 0.63 0.42 3.62 −0.23 −2.82 0.42
TMI 0.22 2.13 0.04 1.47 0.05 1.30 0.02 0.64 0.11 5.58 0.13
TMB 0.50 2.63 0.01 0.10 0.09 1.38 0.01 0.26 0.24 6.28 0.18
ER FY1 Top 0.33 0.84 0.91 −0.92 0.22 1.58 0.39 3.49 −0.08 −0.98 0.39
EWI 0.13 0.32 0.90 −0.99 0.21 1.51 0.40 3.53 −0.09 −1.20 0.39
Bottom −0.19 −0.47 0.92 −0.75 0.16 1.13 0.40 3.46 −0.09 −1.16 0.40
TMI 0.22 2.68 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.21 −0.01 −0.51 0.02 1.08 −0.01
TMB 0.58 4.41 −0.02 −0.67 0.05 1.16 −0.01 −0.36 0.02 0.67 0.01
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the four-factor model
Rp,t −Rf,t = α+ βM(RM,t −Rf,t) + βHMLRHML,t + βSMBRSMB,t + βUMDRUMD,t + εt,
where Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill return, RM,t is the US market return, and RHML,t (High-Minus-Low),
RSMB,t (Small-Minus-Big), and RUMD,t Up-Minus-Down) are returns on US book-to-market, size and mo-
mentum factor portfolios. Rp,t is the return on the top or bottom portfolio of a particular strategy, the
corresponding sample of emerging market stocks (EWI), or the excess return on the top portfolio relative to
the equally weighted index (TMI) or bottom portfolio (TMB). The risk-free interest rate is not included on the
left-hand side in regressions involving the TMI and TMB excess returns. t(.) is the t-statistic for the regression
coefficients. t(βM[−1]) is the t-statistic of βM minus one for the regressions with Rp,t being the return on the
top or bottom portfolio or the equally weighted index; t(βM[−1]) is the t-statistic of βM for the regressions
involving the TMI and TMB excess returns. The regression R
2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
model is given by
Rp,t−Rf,t = α+βM(RM,t−Rf,t)+βHMLRHML,t+βSMBRSMB,t+βUMDRUMD,t+ εt. (2.3)
The four-factor model is estimated with Rp,t being the returns on the top and bottom
portfolios in the different strategies, the returns on the equally weighted index of the
corresponding samples of emerging market stocks (EWI), and the TMI and TMB excess
returns. For the TMI and TMB excess return regressions, the risk-free interest rate is not
included on the left-hand side of (2.3). As proxies for the global risk factors, we use the
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US returns data available on the website of Kenneth French.5
The estimation results in Table 2.5 show a number of interesting features. First, the
estimates of βM are significantly less than one for all top and bottom portfolios and indexes
of emerging market stocks. This finding can probably be attributed to the fact that the
emerging markets were not completely liberalized and integrated with global equity markets
during our sample period, especially during the first part; see Bekaert and Harvey (2000a,b)
and Edison and Warnock (2003), among others.6
Note that for all selection strategies the betas for the top portfolios are not significantly
greater than the betas for the corresponding EWI and bottom portfolios. The resulting
estimates of beta when the excess returns of the top portfolio relative to the EWI or bottom
portfolio are used as dependent variable therefore are close to zero for all selection strategies
considered. Second, the returns for the emerging market portfolios are positively correlated
with the returns for small versus big stocks, as evidenced by the positive and statistically
significant estimates of βSMB for the top, index and bottom portfolios of all strategies. In
contrast, the emerging market portfolios are virtually insensitive to the HML and UMD
factors. The estimates of βHML are never significant (at the two-sided 5% significance level)
for the top, EWI and bottom portfolios, while the estimate of βUMD is significant only for
the bottom portfolio of the momentum strategy. Third, the sensitivities of the TMI and
TMB excess returns are never significantly different from zero, except for the SMB and
UMD factors in case of the B/M and momentum strategies, respectively. Fourth, and
perhaps most important, the estimated intercepts α for the TMI and TMB excess returns
are significantly different from zero for all strategies, and are very close to the raw excess
returns reported in Table 2.1. The only exception appears to be the momentum strategy,
for which a sizeable part of the excess return is accounted for by global momentum risk.
Overall, however, global book-to-market, size and momentum risk factors cannot explain
5http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
6Van der Hart et al. (2003) investigate the effects of financial market liberalization on the performance of
stock selection strategies. Estimating the four-factor model separately for returns on portfolios consisting
of stocks from liberalized or non-liberalized countries only, no significant differences in factor loadings are
found. Alternatively, estimating (2.3) with a five-year rolling sample indicated that liberalization did affect
the risk properties of the selection strategies, in the sense that the estimates of βM show a tendency to
increase over time. The exposures to the other factors in the model, as well as the intercept α, also show
substantial variation. However, there are no easily discernible patterns. For example, it is not the case
that α gradually declines over time or becomes insignificant. A more thorough investigation of this issues,
using models that allow the factor loadings to vary with conditioning variables, as in Ferson and Harvey
(1999), or that allow for time-varying integration, as in Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997), is interesting
for further research.
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the outperformance of stock selection strategies in emerging markets. This corroborates
the results obtained by Rouwenhorst (1999) using a two-factor model with only the HML
factor included next to the market portfolio return.
We close this section by noting that whether the HML, SMB and UMD factors are
indeed proxies for risk is subject to discussion and interpretation. Instead of being risk
proxies, these factors could also capture certain market inefficiencies themselves. Conse-
quently, finding an insignificant alpha in multi-factor models such as (2.3) does not neces-
sarily imply that the sorting characteristic upon which the particular strategy is based is
just proxying for risk. The alpha also goes to zero in case the inefficiencies captured by the
factors are correlated with the inefficiencies captured by the strategy. In sum, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between the risk-based and behavioural explanations using multi-factor
models. Note that our results are not subject to this caveat, given that we find highly
significant estimates of alpha in (2.3) for strategies considered; hence for our purposes, we
can leave this discussion aside. However, we would like to remark that one could interpret
the regression results more neutrally by speaking for example of developed market style
returns instead of global risk factors. This would still give relevant information on whether
the emerging markets strategies move in tandem with developed markets, or that they
have their own dynamics.
2.5 Behavioral Explanations for the Profitability of
Selection Strategies
In this section we explore whether behavioral explanations can account for the success of the
stock selection strategies in emerging markets. We discuss value strategies and momentum
and earnings revisions strategies separately. Although momentum and revisions strategies
prove to have different features in some respect, they are treated together as the same
characteristics are examined.
2.5.1 Value Strategies
Lakonishok et al. (1994) provide a behavioral explanation for the significant excess returns
of value strategies. They argue that investors are excessively pessimistic (optimistic) about
future earnings growth of value (growth) stocks, because they extrapolate past growth
rates too far into the future. Using a sample of US stocks and various measures of growth,
including earnings, Lakonishok et al. (1994) demonstrate that glamour stocks grow much
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faster than value stocks before portfolio formation. During the post-formation period,
earnings growth rates continue to be lower for value stocks than for glamour stocks for
the first two years, but this pattern is reversed over the following three years, resulting
in approximately equal growth rates over the complete five-year period. Hence, actual
post-formation earnings growth of value stocks relative to growth stocks turns out to be
substantially higher than what they were during the pre-formation period or than what
investors expected them to be according to multiples such as the E/P ratio. Buying and
selling stocks with low and high expected earnings growth, respectively, then produces
excess returns.
To examine whether this behavioral explanation may account for the excess returns of
the value strategies in emerging markets, we examine how earnings of the stocks in the
B/M and E/P top portfolios and in the complete sample of stocks develop after portfo-
lio formation. Figure 2.2 shows the earnings yield, defined as the average earnings as a
percentage of the initial invested capital, for the first five years after portfolio formation.
By construction, for the E/P portfolio the earnings yield is higher at formation date.
Over the next 18 to 24 months, average earnings of the E/P top portfolio fall, whereas
earnings of the average stock in the sample increase gradually. However, the earnings
level of the value portfolio remains above that of the average stock in the sample. More
importantly, after approximately 24 months earnings growth rates are about equal, such
that the difference in earnings levels remains fairly constant thereafter. For the B/M
strategy, we find similar results. Although the difference in initial earnings yield is much
smaller, we do find negative growth during the first 18 months after portfolio formation.
This is followed by above average growth in the subsequent period, such that after three
and a half years the stocks in the B/M portfolio again have higher earnings levels than the
average stock. The improvement in earnings growth may lead to valuation ratios for the
value portfolios that are more in line with the market average. This is indeed the case.
The average fall in earnings is more than compensated for by a rise in the stock price,
leading to an improvement in the price-to-earnings ratio. Concluding, the differences in
valuation ratios between value and growth stocks are not justified by subsequent earnings
developments. After two years, the earnings growth rate of value stocks is equal to the
growth rate of the average stock. Hence, our findings for value strategies in emerging
markets correspond with the evidence for this behavioral explanation in Lakonishok et al.
(1994).
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of earnings after portfolio formation.
Earnings, expressed as percentage of initial investment, after portfolio formation for the top portfolio of
the B/M and E/P strategies and the equally weighted index of all stocks in the sample.
More recently, Doukas et al. (2002) argue that the results of Lakonishok et al. (1994)
do not imply that investors actually underestimate the growth prospects for value stocks.
To the contrary, using analysts’ earnings forecasts for the next three years, they find that
analysts are on average more (over)optimistic for value stocks than for growth stocks. In
addition, they find that value stocks have larger negative revisions of earnings estimates
than growth stocks. Based on this evidence they conclude that the superior return perfor-
mance of value stocks cannot be explained by excessive pessimism about future earnings
growth.
In our view, the evidence from Doukas et al. (2002) is not necessarily at odds with the
evidence from Lakonishok et al. (1994). It may be argued that long-term developments are
most important for equity valuation and that, hence, the three year post-portfolio formation
period considered by Doukas et al. (2002) is too short. Analysts might overestimate the
short-run earnings developments of value stocks, but at the same time underestimate the
potential for earnings growth to revert to the mean at longer horizons. The improvement
in the earnings growth rate and the strong recovery in P/E ratio for value stocks discussed
above indicate that their long-term earnings prospects improve sharply after just a few
years. We put this hypothesis to the test using analysts’ earnings forecast errors, earnings
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revisions and earnings growth forecasts, during the five years after portfolio formation.
For an individual stock, the earnings forecast error in month t, denoted FEt, is defined
only once a year, namely eight months prior to fiscal year end. In that case, FEt is equal
to the difference between the actual earnings in the current fiscal year (FY0t+8) and the
consensus analysts’ forecast issued in month t (FY1t), expressed as percentage of the stock
price at the time of the forecast (Pt); that is FEt = 100 × (FY0t+8–FY1t)/Pt. We define
the consensus forecast as the median forecast reported by IBES. The eight month horizon is
adopted from Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Doukas et al. (2002) and is chosen to ensure
that the previous year’s annual report was available to analysts at the time they issued
their forecasts. We also follow Easterwood and Nutt (1999) in eliminating observations for
which the forecast error is greater than 100 in absolute value. Figure 2.3 plots the three-
month moving average mean earnings forecast errors for the top and bottom portfolios of
the value strategies. Note that these graphs truly concerns the post-formation period, in
the sense that the leftmost point corresponds with the error for analysts’ earnings forecasts
issued in the first three months following portfolio formation. For the B/M strategy, we
observe that immediately following portfolio formation, earnings forecast errors for the top
and bottom portfolios are substantially below and above average, respectively.7 In fact, this
continues to be the case until 18 months after portfolio formation. Hence, analysts indeed
appear to be more optimistic about the earnings prospects of value than growth stocks,
as reported in Doukas et al. (2002). In the remaining post-formation period, however, the
pattern is reversed. While the earnings forecast error for growth stocks remains close to
the average, it becomes substantially larger than average for value stocks, implying that
analysts are relatively pessimistic about value stocks’ earnings in the longer term. For the
E/P strategy, we observe a similar reversal in earnings forecast errors, although in this case
the error for growth stocks dips below average around 18 months after portfolio formation,
while for value stocks it remains at par. The implication is however the same, namely that
7Notice that for the EWI, the forecast error is negative for each month in the post-formation period.
This demonstrates the notion that analysts are (too) optimistic about future earnings for the average
stock in the sample. In addition to systematic positive bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts (see Easterwood
and Nutt (1999) for recent evidence), the extent of this bias has also been found to be predictable from
observable firm characteristics, see Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), among others. Analysts’ forecasts are
therefore usually dismissed as being irrational or inaccurate. A recent study by Lim (2001) shows that
positively and predictably biased forecasts may in fact be optimal if the incentive structure of analysts is
taken into account. If analysts balance forecast accuracy and improved access to management information,
such biased forecasts are rational. Furthermore, Hong and Kubik (2003) document that optimistic analysts
promoting stocks are more likely to experience favorable job separations. Hence, career concerns may also
lead to upward biases in analysts’ forecasts.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of earnings forecast errors after portfolio formation.
(a) B/M strategy
(b) E/P strategy
The figure shows the three-month moving average of earnings forecast errors after portfolio formation for
top and bottom portfolios of the (a) B/M strategy and (b) E/P strategy and for the relevant equally
weighted index.
analysts are relatively optimistic (pessimistic) about growth (value) stocks.
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The above analysis is corroborated by the development of analysts’ earnings revisions
after portfolio formation, as shown in Figure 2.4. Analysts’ revisions are more negative for
stocks in the B/M and E/P top portfolios until 10 and 15 months after portfolio formation,
respectively, again indicating that they were too optimistic about the earnings prospects for
value stocks.8 For the B/M strategy, earnings revisions for these stocks rise (substantially)
above average between one and four years after portfolio formation. During roughly the
same period, earnings revisions for growth stocks fall below average. For the E/P strategy,
the differences are smaller, but the earnings revisions for the top portfolio do remain above
the revisions for the bottom portfolio during the period between 15 and 48 months after
portfolio formation.
Finally, the improvement in earnings prospects is also confirmed by looking at the
developments of the earnings growth expected by analysts after portfolio formation for
each of the portfolios. Figure 2.5 depicts the difference between the consensus earnings
forecast for the next fiscal year (FY2) versus the most recent actual earnings (FY0). Like in
the earnings figures in Figure 2.2, the expected earnings change is normalized by calculating
this number as a percentage of the initially invested capital at portfolio formation. For the
E/P strategy, the expected earnings change is much lower for the top portfolio, as to be
expected. However, it reverts to the mean quite rapidly. The expected earnings change for
the top portfolio exceeds those for the equally weighted index and for the bottom portfolio
within two and three years, respectively. For the B/M strategy, the starting point differs
as the expected earnings change at portfolio formation is already slightly higher for the
top portfolio. What is the same, however, is that the expected earnings change increases
more strongly for the top portfolio. The growth characteristics of expensive stocks based
on E/P and B/M appear to be rather short-lived.
Concluding, just like Lakonishok et al. (1994), we find that the relative cheapness
of value stocks is not justified by subsequent earnings developments. For value stocks,
earnings as percentage of the initial investment remain well above the averages for the
complete sample and for growth stocks, while both the actual earnings growth and its
forecast revert to the mean quite rapidly. Like Doukas et al. (2002), we do find that analysts
appear too optimistic about the earnings prospects for value stocks in the short term. We
also find that this reverses in the longer term as value stocks have above average earnings
forecast errors and earnings revisions after about one year after portfolio formation. This
8Notice that for the EWI, forecast revisions are negative for each month in the post-formation period,
confirming that analysts are (too) optimistic about future earnings for the average stock in the sample.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of earnings revisions after portfolio formation.
(a) B/M strategy
(b) E/P strategy
The figure shows the monthly earnings revisions after portfolio formation for top and bottom portfolios
of the (a) B/M strategy and (b) E/P strategy and for the relevant equally weighted index, expressed as
percentage.
indicates that analysts are too pessimistic about the long term growth perspectives
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of estimated earnings minus actual earnings after portfolio formation.
(a) B/M strategy
(b) E/P strategy
The figure shows the difference between estimated earnings for the next fiscal year and the most recent
actual earnings for top and bottom portfolios of the (a) B/M strategy and (b) E/P strategy and for the
relevant equally weighted index, expressed as percentage of initial investment.
for value stocks.
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2.5.2 Momentum and Earnings Revisions Strategies
A number of studies have tested behavioral explanations for momentum strategies in de-
veloped markets (see amongst others Chan et al. (1996), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001),
Lee and Swaminthan (2000), Hong et al. (2000), Nagel (2002), and Cooper et al. (2004)).
Underreaction and overreaction effects are part of these explanations. In this section we
investigate whether these effects are present in the emerging markets momentum strategy
as well, by examining three variables that might serve as indicators for under- or overreac-
tion: analysts’ earnings revisions, analysts’ forecast errors and cumulative excess returns
after portfolio formation.
Chan et al. (1996) put forward a behavioral explanation for the profitability of momen-
tum and earnings revisions strategies, based on the idea that financial markets respond only
gradually to new information, to earnings-related news in particular. Using a sample of US
stocks, they find empirical evidence that stocks with high price momentum or high past
earnings revisions have higher returns around earnings announcements, higher earnings
revisions and higher earnings surprises for some time after portfolio formation. Momen-
tum and earnings revisions strategies thus are successful because they exploit the initial
underreaction of investors to the information in past returns and past earnings revisions.
Figure 2.6 shows how earnings revisions for the top and bottom portfolios in the mo-
mentum and the earnings revisions strategies and for the complete sample of emerging
market stocks develop during the five years after portfolio formation. For both strategies,
earnings revisions of the top (bottom) portfolio remain higher (lower) than earnings re-
visions for the complete sample until 18 months after portfolio formation.9 This agrees
with the behavioral explanation of Chan et al. (1996) that the market does not incorporate
news in earnings revisions promptly.
Alternative interpretations of the observed pattern in earnings revisions are possible as
well. For example, one can argue that analysts are slow in adjusting their estimates and
that earnings revisions therefore are not a good proxy for market surprises. We therefore
examine analysts’ forecast errors, defined as before, in Figure 2.7. The patterns in this
variable confirm the underreaction hypothesis: despite higher past returns and earnings
revisions, stocks in the top portfolios of the momentum and revisions strategies continue
to show above average, and in fact positive forecast errors until more than a year after
portfolio formation.
9The difference in earnings revisions is significant for each of the first 12 months after portfolio formation,
for both the earnings revisions strategy and the momentum strategy.
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Figure 2.6: Evolution of earnings revisions after portfolio formation.
(a) 6MR strategy
(b) ER FY1 strategy
The figure shows the monthly earnings revisions after portfolio formation for top and bottom portfolios of
the (a) 6MR strategy and (b) ER FY1 strategy and for the relevant equally weighted index, expressed as
percentage.
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Figure 2.7: Evolution of earnings forecast errors after portfolio formation.
(a) 6MR strategy
(b) ER FY1 strategy
Three-month moving average of earnings forecast errors after portfolio formation for top and bottom
portfolios of the (a) 6MR strategy and (b) ER FY1 strategy and for the relevant equally weighted index.
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Behavioral models, such as the ones in Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and
Hong and Stein (1999), imply that excess returns of momentum portfolios should become
zero or negative after the initial holding period. These theoretical models do not offer any
guidance, however, regarding the length of the post-holding period over which these return
reversals should occur. To further support their underreaction hypothesis, Chan et al.
(1996) show that there is no evidence of a return reversal during the first three years after
portfolio formation. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), among others, find that
a return reversal does occur when extending the post-portfolio formation period to five
years. For emerging markets, Figure 2.8 shows the cumulative excess returns during the
first five years after portfolio formation, both for the momentum and the earnings revisions
strategies.
For the momentum strategy, we observe a return reversal for the top portfolio after
approximately three years. Its magnitude is, however, not large enough to completely
annihilate the excess returns within the five year period considered. However, the excess
return on the bottom portfolio reverses after one year already, such that after three and a
half years the bottom portfolio outperforms the equally weighted benchmark and after four
years its cumulative performance is comparable to the top portfolio. Hence, although we
do not observe a return reversal as strong as documented by Nagel (2002) for momentum
strategies in the UK, we do find that four years after portfolio formation past winners
and losers can no longer be distinguished. The results for the revisions strategy are rather
different. High earnings revisions stocks continue to outperform the market average after
the six-month holding period, and a return reversal does not occur during the first five
years after portfolio formation.
Concluding, the momentum strategy seems to have elements of both overreaction and
underreaction effects, as the analysts’ earnings revisions and forecast errors suggest an
underreaction, while the five-year post-formation returns suggest an overreaction. A possi-
ble solution may be found in Lee and Swaminthan (2000), who investigate the interaction
between momentum and turnover, and find different behavior for high turnover momen-
tum stocks versus low turnover momentum stocks in the US. Nagel (2002) finds similar
results for the UK and relates them to implicit value effects. An interesting topic for
further research would be to test these results for emerging markets. For the earnings
revisions strategy, both the earnings revisions by analysts after portfolio formation as well
as the five-year excess returns point towards an initial underreaction. This shows that the
revisions strategy has different characteristics than the momentum strategy.
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of cumulative excess returns after portfolio formation.
(a) 6MR strategy
(b) ER FY1 strategy
The figure shows the cumulative excess returns on top and bottom portfolios of the (a) 6MR strategy and
(b) ER FY1 strategy over the relevant equally weighted index during 60 months after portfolio formation.
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2.6 Conclusions
Stock selection strategies based on value, momentum and earning revisions prove to gen-
erate significant excess returns in emerging markets. In this paper, we investigate different
explanations for the success of these strategies, using stocks included in the IFC Investable
Composite Index over the period December 1988 - June 2004.
We find little if any evidence for risk-based explanations. The excess returns remain
significant after correcting for (potentially different upside and downside) emerging market
risk, as well as after correcting for global market risk, value, size and momentum factors.
Only the performance of the momentum strategy can partly be attributed to a global
momentum risk factor.
We do find that the emerging markets results are consistent with the evidence from de-
veloped markets concerning behavioral explanations. For value stocks, our findings are in
accordance with an overreaction explanation, as the actual and expected earnings growth
of these stocks reverts to the mean in a few years and the earnings as percentage of initial
investment remains well above average. The overreaction explanation seems to be contra-
dicted by the finding that value stocks have below average (and substantially negative)
earnings forecast errors and earnings revisions up to a year after portfolio formation. As a
possible solution we suggest that the most important behavioral bias could be related to
underestimation of long-term growth rates for value stocks. This conjecture is supported
by the observation that earnings forecast errors and earnings revisions for these stocks be-
come above average for longer post-formation horizons and by the finding that estimated
earnings growth becomes above average within two years after portfolio formation. For
the momentum strategy, both underreaction and overreaction effects appear to be at work.
High upward earnings revisions by analysts after portfolio formation suggest an initial
underreaction. However, in the five-year post-formation period, we also observe a strong
return reversal, indicating an overreaction effect. In contrast, the evidence does support
an underreaction explanation for the earnings revisions strategy. Stocks with high past
earnings revisions continue to have high upward earnings revisions for twelve months after
portfolio formation, while there is no return reversal until at least five years after portfolio
formation. As the earnings revisions strategy seems to have no or limited overreaction
effects, this sets it apart from momentum strategies.
Still, our results do not prove that the risk-based explanation is incorrect. The analysis
shows that the excess returns are not simply due to higher beta, more exposure to global
factors for value, size and momentum or higher downside risk, but it still might be the
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case that other, yet unidentified risk measures would be able to explain the results. Also,
although the data is consistent with behavioral explanations, it does not prove it. Other
explanations might be feasible as well. It therefore remains difficult to reach a clear verdict
on the competing explanations. However, our conclusion is that the circumstantial evidence
in the current literature and in our study points towards the behavioral explanation as the
most probable one. Investors in emerging markets are more likely to get a better risk/return
reward by incorporating value, momentum and revisions strategies.
Such further research could involve using a broader set of risk indicators to test whether
the strategies lead to portfolios bearing more risk in dimensions not measured by the value,
size and momentum factors. A specific possibility would be to account for macroeconomic
risk explicitly, see Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Griffin et al. (2003). However,
one should be aware that it might be difficult to separate the risk-based and behavioral
explanation, as proposed risk factors might also be correlated to the inefficiencies them-
selves instead of just being a proxy to risk. Preferably, risk factors have a direct link to
the likelihood and magnitude of undesirable situations for investors. At the same time, a
broader set of indicators that would correlate with investor sentiment could be tested to
provide further evidence for behavioral explanations. Another source of data that could
provide interesting indicators of sentiment concerns company policies. Overoptimism of
investors might be interrelated with overoptimism of management, which could be tested
by looking for example at investment policy of the company and subsequent return on
these investments. Finally, the most direct way to test behavioral explanations is to study
the actual behavior of market participants, like in Odean (1998) for example. This would
give important complimentary evidence.
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Chapter 3
The Inefficient Use of Macroeconomic
Information in Analysts’ Earnings
Forecasts in Emerging Markets∗
3.1 Introduction
This study provides evidence on the role of macroeconomic information in analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts in emerging markets. Specifically we investigate whether analysts incorporate
forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as output, inflation and political stability
into their firm-level earnings forecasts in an efficient way. Finding that this is not the case,
we examine two competing explanations: either whether analysts actually ignore valuable
information for corporate earnings provided by these macroeconomic forecasts, or whether
they include irrelevant information.
Security analysts are potential intermediaries in the process of information disclosure.
Their role as producers of firm-specific information has been widely investigated for de-
veloped markets, see Brown (1978) and O’Brien (1988), among many others. In emerging
markets, the availability of firm-specific information is hampered for a variety of reasons,
such as the limited set of regulations on information disclosure or the lack of enforcement
thereof, see Morck et al. (2000), Bae et al. (2006) and Bae et al. (in press), among others.
In that light it is perhaps not surprising that Chan and Hameed (2006) find that, through
their earnings forecasts for emerging market stocks, analysts actually produce market-wide
∗This chapter is based on the ERIM working paper by De Zwart and van Dijk (2008). We thank
Kees Isendoorn for excellent research assistance. We are grateful to Mathijs van Dijk, Ingolf Dittmann,
Allaudeen Hameed, Jaap van der Hart, Angelien Kemna, Randall Morck and Marno Verbeek for helpful
suggestions. We would also like to thank seminar participants at the Erasmus University.
52
48 Introduction
information instead of revealing firm-specific news. This naturally leads to the question
whether analysts base their earnings forecasts on firm-specific information only, or whether
they also make use of macroeconomic information. The use of the latter type of information
can be justified if the difficulties associated with the collection of firm-specific information
also apply to security analysts. If this is the case, a natural follow-up question would be if
analysts use the publicly available macroeconomic information in the best possible way.
In this paper we examine the role of macroeconomic information in analysts earnings
forecasts as follows. We start with investigating whether earnings forecast errors are un-
correlated with publicly available information in forecasts for important macroeconomic
variables. This should be the case if analysts incorporate such information in their earnings
forecasts efficiently. While a large number of empirical studies document that analysts’
earnings forecasts are biased, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of macro-
economic information in explaining this bias. Notable exception is O’Brien (1994), who
finds that US macroeconomic news explains a significant part of the variation in US corpo-
rate earnings and that macroeconomic news that arrives after the earnings forecast issuance
is reflected in analysts’ forecast errors. More recently Basu et al. (2006) find that analysts
do not fully include inflation survey forecasts in their earnings forecasts for US stocks.
Our study is the first to comprehensively investigate the relationship between earnings
forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts in emerging markets. Furthermore, in addition to
inflation forecasts as in Basu et al. (2006), we include forecasts of real output growth and
the outlook on political stability, in order to capture a more comprehensive assessment of
the overall macroeconomic situation in a given emerging market. In our analysis we con-
trol for well-documented “micro”-information determinants of analysts’ earnings forecasts,
including market capitalization (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Lim, 2001), analyst coverage
(Lim, 2001; Chan and Hameed, 2006) and, in particular, prior-year earnings (Abarbanell
and Bernard, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999).
Our analysis provides convincing evidence that analysts do not make efficient use of
macroeconomic forecasts for their earnings forecasts of emerging market companies. Con-
trolling for firm characteristics, we find that the earnings forecast error is significantly
related to forecasts of output growth and political stability, which are available at the time
when the earnings forecast was made. Earnings forecast errors are not related to inflation
forecasts, suggesting that the information in this variable is correctly incorporated in the
earnings forecasts.
The finding that analysts do not exploit macroeconomic forecasts in an optimal way
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can arise for two different reasons: Either analysts ignore valuable macroeconomic infor-
mation or they take irrelevant information into account when producing their earnings
forecasts. In the second step of our analysis, we distinguish between these competing ex-
planations by examining how actual earnings growth and earnings forecasts are related to
the macroeconomic forecasts. We find that the political stability forecasts do contain useful
information for realized earnings, but this is ignored completely by the analysts. Although
we find a positive association between actual corporate earnings growth and actual output
growth, there is no such relation between earnings growth and output growth forecasts.
Hence, the quality of these forecasts does not seem sufficient to provide a useful source of
information for firm-level earnings. Analysts, however, overreact and adjust their earnings
forecasts in the opposite direction.
In addition, we document the importance of the information environment in emerging
markets by distinguishing between companies with high and low transparency. This is done
according to two transparency measures: the availability of an ADR listing, following Lang
et al. (2003) and Baker et al. (2002), and the time that it takes a company to release its
annual report, where stocks releasing their annual report within three months after the end
of the prior fiscal year are labeled as ‘fast reporting’ and all other stocks as ‘slow reporting’.
Our results clearly demonstrate that analysts handle macroeconomic information in a bet-
ter way for more transparent firms. This confirms the finding of Lim (2001) for US stocks
that analysts’ earnings forecast bias is related to the information uncertainty environment,
and in fact expands it by documenting this effect for macroeconomic information.
Our findings contribute to earlier research on emerging markets in several ways. First,
concerning the role of analysts in the information production process in emerging markets,
our study provides a possible explanation for Chan and Hameed’s (2006) finding that ana-
lysts produce market-wide information by showing that analysts incorporate both inflation
and output forecasts in their earnings forecasts. Our study also shows that it is in fact
rational for analysts to include such market-wide information in their forecasts as we find a
direct relationship between earnings growth and macroeconomic developments in emerging
markets. Second, regardless of the role of macroeconomic information, our results show
that firm transparency is still key for analysts to come up with accurate earnings forecasts.
This should stimulate policy-makers in emerging markets to further improve their regula-
tions concerning information disclosure, and should also provide an incentive for companies
to increase their transparency. Third, our findings provide evidence on the importance of
political stability in emerging markets. Prior studies by Claessens et al. (in press), among
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others, uncover a negative relationship between political connections and output growth for
one specific country. Our study demonstrates for a large cross-section of emerging markets
that countries benefit from increased political stability in terms of higher earnings growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we lay out our
research methodology in detail and describe the data set. In Section 3.3 we report our
main empirical findings. In Section 3.4 we provide additional results that demonstrate the
robustness of our results. Finally, we conclude in Section 3.5.
3.2 Methodology and Data
We investigate the role of macroeconomic information in analysts’ earnings forecasts for
individual companies in emerging markets. In particular, we examine whether analysts
make efficient use of forecasts concerning key macroeconomic variables when producing
their earnings forecasts. In this section, we first describe and motivate our methodology
to address this issue. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the variables used in our
analysis.
3.2.1 Methodology
Our analysis is focused on the analysts’ earnings forecast error FEit, which we define as a
percentage of the stock price at the time the forecast is made, following Abarbanell and
Bernard (1992), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Lim (2001), among others, that is
FEit =
Eit − Êit
Pit
, (3.1)
where Eit is the realized earnings per share in local currency for firm i in fiscal year t, Êit
is the consensus analysts’ earnings forecast made six months prior to the end of the year,1
and Pit is the local stock price at the time the forecast is made. The consensus earnings
forecast is defined as the median forecast reported for a specific company in a given month.
If analysts efficiently incorporate macroeconomic information into their earnings fore-
casts, the forecast error FEit should be uncorrelated with any such information available
to the analysts at the time their forecasts are made. This macroeconomic information
may, for example, come in the form of the actual values of variables such as output growth
and inflation in the previous fiscal year t − 1. However, it is quite likely that analysts
1The reasons for choosing a six month forecast horizon are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
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would attempt to incorporate more timely information, for example by considering fore-
casts of these same variables for the current fiscal year t, for which they are supposed
to produce earnings forecasts. Hence, in the analysis below we specifically consider the
question whether analysts efficiently handle information that is available in forecasts for
macroeconomic variables for the current year.
In examining this issue, we account for the fact that various company characteristics
may explain part of the systematic variation in earnings forecast errors, as documented by
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Lang and Lundholm (1996), Easterwood and Nutt (1999),
Lim (2001), and Chan and Hameed (2006), among others. As we use the consensus forecast
we ignore analyst characteristics such as age and experience, which also have been shown
to be correlated with earnings forecast errors, see Jacob et al. (1995) and Mikhail et al.
(2003), for example. Hence, we estimate the following regression model:
FEit = α+
∑
j
βjM̂jt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit, (3.2)
where M̂jt is the forecast of the j-th macroeconomic variable for fiscal year t and Sjt is
the j-th stock specific variable. The particular variables we use for the macroeconomic
forecasts and company characteristics are discussed in detail below. Here it is useful to
note that we make sure that both M̂jt and Sjt are available to the analysts six months
prior to the end of fiscal year t, when the earnings forecasts are made. Efficient use of the
information in the macroeconomic forecasts by security analysts for their earnings forecasts
is equivalent to the null hypothesis that the coefficients βj in (3.2) are equal to zero.
It is important to note that finding a relationship between the earnings forecast errors
and macroeconomic forecasts in (3.2) does not necessarily imply that analysts actually ig-
nore valuable macroeconomic information. Systematic forecast bias may also occur because
analysts incorporate irrelevant macroeconomic information into their earnings forecasts.
We attempt to distinguish between these competing explanations by examining how the
actual earnings growth as well as the earnings forecasts are related to the macroeconomic
forecasts. Specifically, we estimate the following regressions:
Eit − Ei,t−1
Pit
= α+
∑
j
βjM̂jt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit, (3.3)
Êit − Ei,t−1
Pit
= α+
∑
j
βjM̂jt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit. (3.4)
Obviously the models in (3.3) and (3.4) are identical to (3.2), except that the actual
change in earnings and the earnings growth forecast, respectively, replace the earnings
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forecast error as dependent variable.2 The model in (3.3) measures whether the available
macroeconomic forecasts are relevant for actual earnings growth and, hence, whether an-
alysts should take this information into account in their earnings forecasts. The model in
(3.4) assesses to what extent analysts do indeed incorporate the macroeconomic forecasts
into their earnings forecasts. If the coefficients βj are equal to zero in (3.3) but differ from
zero in (3.4), the analysts ignore valuable information in the macroeconomic forecasts. In
the opposite case, the analysts do take the macroeconomic forecasts into account, but this
information actually is irrelevant for earnings growth. This noise should be ignored by
analysts in their forecasts.
Although the models in (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) are linear regressions, we do not use
ordinary least squares (OLS) for parameter estimation. Especially due to the occurrence of
emerging markets’ crises, outliers in both the realized earnings change and the forecast error
as well as in the macroeconomic forecasts are present. OLS estimates are unduly influenced
by such aberrant observations, which are extremely large and quite pervasive in samples
such as ours. At the same time, given the more erratic behavior of emerging markets, we do
not want to follow the common practice of trimming or removing outliers from the sample
altogether. Instead we use a robust estimation method similar to Chan and Lakonishok
(1992) to estimate (3.2) and all subsequent regressions. Specifically, we use Huber (1981)’s
Generalized M-estimator, which downweights observations with extremely large values of
the residual, the regressor, or both. We refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of
this estimation method. Throughout we compute heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors and corresponding t-statistics to account for variation in uncertainty of the forecast
(errors) across firms and over time.
3.2.2 Analysts’ earnings forecasts
We obtain consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts and the corresponding actual earnings
from Institutional Brokers Estimate Systems (I/B/E/S) International Inc. This data source
has been used in the majority of studies on analysts’ earnings forecasts in developed mar-
kets. The consensus forecast is defined as the median of all individual analysts’ forecasts
reported by I/B/E/S six months before the end of the fiscal year.
2In fact, the three models are closely related in the sense that the regression in (3.2) equals (3.3) minus
(3.4). The main reason for considering all three models is our use of an outlier robust estimation Method,
as discussed in detail below. If least squares were used, the coefficient estimates of the coefficients in (3.2)
would be exactly equal to the difference between the coefficient estimates in (3.3) and (3.4). This is not
the case, however, for the robust estimation method.
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Our sample consists of all listed firms included in the S&P/ International Finance
Corporation (IFC) Investable Composite index during the period 1991 - 2005.3 All stocks
in the S&P/IFC Investable Composite Index are open to foreign investors. For each country
in the index Standard & Poor’s selects stocks in order of liquidity until a coverage of 70-
80% of the total market capitalization is reached. A review of the index constituents is
conducted once per year.4
For each company forecast to be included in our data set we require the availability of
(i) a six month ahead consensus forecast of the annual earnings per share in local currency
for the current fiscal year t, (ii) actual earnings per share for years t − 2 through t, and
(iii) stock prices in local currency from the end of year t − 1 to six months prior to the
end of year t. For several reasons our sample selection rules differ somewhat from those
typically applied in comparable studies for the US and other developed markets. First and
foremost, we adopt a six month forecast horizon in order to be reasonably certain that the
security analysts have access to the previous year’s earnings figures when they make their
forecast for the current fiscal year. For developed markets a longer horizon of eight months
is often used, see Easterwood and Nutt (1999), among others. However, we observe that
four months into the current fiscal year, the previous year’s earnings are reported in the
I/B/E/S database for only 62 percent of the firms included in our sample. This increases
to an acceptable 89 percent after six months.
Second, we do not require a minimum number of analysts providing an earnings forecast,
which is customary for developed markets. Requiring analyst coverage to be at least four,
as in Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Loh and Mian (2003), among others, would reduce
the number of observations in our sample with no less than 21 percent. More importantly,
3The S&P/IFC Investable Composite Index consists of stocks from the following countries, with the
first month of inclusion in parenthesis. In case two months are provided, the second indicates the last
month of inclusion. Countries can be removed from the index when S&P/IFC no longer classifies a stock
market as ‘emerging’. Countries can also be added to the index when they become ‘emerging’. Latin
America: Argentina (Dec 1988), Brazil (Dec 1988), Chile (Dec 1988), Colombia (Feb 1991 - Nov 2001),
Mexico (Dec 1988), Peru (Jan 1994), Venezuela (Jan 1990 - Nov 2001); Asia: China (Oct 1995), India
(Nov 1992), Indonesia (Sep 1990), Korea (Jan 1992), Malaysia (Dec 1988), Pakistan (Mar 1991 - Nov
2001), Philippines (Dec 1988), Sri Lanka (Jan 1994 - Nov 2001), Taiwan (Jan 1991), Thailand (Dec 1988);
Europe: Czech Republic (Jan 1996), Greece (Dec 1988 - Apr 2001), Hungary (Apr 1994), Poland (Apr
1994), Portugal (Dec 1988 - Mar 1999), Russia (Nov 1997), Slovakia (Nov 1997 - Nov 2001), Turkey (Aug
1989); Africa & Middle East: Egypt (Nov 1997), Israel (Dec 1996), Jordan (Dec 1988 - Nov 2001), Morocco
(Nov 1997), South Africa (Apr 1995), and Zimbabwe (Apr 1994 - Nov 2001). I/B/E/S data is not available
for Jordan and Zimbabwe.
4Stocks that have a trading volume below US$ 15 million or an investable market capitalization that
falls below US$ 75 million are dropped from the index.
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we do not observe a clear difference in the properties of forecast errors for firms with analyst
coverage above and below four.
Third, we do not impose any minimum stock price restrictions, like Lim (2001), as this
would exclude complete countries due to high inflation in the past, while these low prices
generally do not lead to extreme forecast errors.
Finally, on purpose we do not narrow the sample by default restrictions on the maximum
forecast error, as it is likely that not all extreme forecast errors originate from data errors
but also from stock market crises and bankruptcies. Our approach to deal with these
observations is as follows. All absolute forecast errors larger than 100 percent are flagged
as ‘extremes’ and checked manually with the help of additional pricing data from Factset
and Worldscope and price-to-earnings data from IFC and Worldscope. Only if an extreme
value can clearly be explained in terms of data errors it is adjusted, otherwise it is kept
unchanged. This leads to a maximum forecast error of 320 percent and a minimum of
−910 percent. In general, the extremes are observed during stock market crises when the
substantial drops in stock prices ‘blow up’ earnings forecast errors, and during bankruptcies
when, often unexpectedly, the actual losses are severe. We deal with the remaining extremes
by using robust regression methods, as explained before.
Our final sample consists of 10,102 firm-year observations, for 1973 unique firms from
29 different countries. Each firm is on average (median) 5 (4) times included in the sample.
A total of 78 percent of the firm-year observations have fiscal years ending in December.
Observations with the end of the fiscal year in March and June cover 10 and 7 percent of the
sample, respectively, and concern a small number of countries, in particular South-Africa,
Pakistan, India and Malaysia.
3.2.3 Macroeconomic variables
Our choice of macroeconomic variables Mjt to be included in the regression models above
is guided by the idea that security analysts likely attempt to obtain a comprehensive
assessment of the overall macroeconomic situation in a given emerging market. Hence, we
include forecasts of three key macroeconomic variables: output growth, inflation, and a
measure of political stability.
Forecasts for these macroeconomic variables can be obtained in various different ways.
We decide to include survey forecasts instead of, for example, forecasts obtained from time
series regression models for two reasons. First, the exact publication date of survey forecasts
is generally easy to retrieve, which avoids the delicate issue of uncertain publication lags
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of actual macroeconomic variables. Second, survey forecasts are not subject to revisions.
Both these points are important for identifying exactly which macroeconomic information
is public and available to analysts at the time they make their earnings forecasts. In
addition, the use of survey forecasts over other forecasts methods is motivated by studies
such as Ang et al. (2007), who find that survey forecasts of inflation are superior over
alternative forecasting methods.
We use output and inflation forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. and the political
risk index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by Political Risk
Services. Both sources provide monthly updates without any publication delay and without
revisions after the initial publication. Further details are provided below. Finally, we obtain
corresponding actual values of output growth and inflation from the Economist Intelligence
Unit and IFS databases, respectively.5
Output growth
Output growth is the most natural measure of the state of the economy, and seems of
obvious importance for corporate earnings growth. In addition, Ackert and Hunter (1995)
uncover a positive and significant relationship between future earnings forecast errors and
past output growth for US stocks.
The output growth forecasts from Consensus Economics have an identical set-up as our
I/B/E/S earnings forecasts. On a monthly (or bi-monthly during the first few years of
our sample period) basis professional forecasters are polled for their forecast for principal
macroeconomic variables for the current and following (calendar) year. We include the
consensus forecast for real GDP growth for the current year as issued in June, that is
six months before the end of the year, corresponding with the earnings forecast horizon.
Recall that the large majority of earnings forecasts in our sample concern fiscal years which
coincide with calendar years. The consensus forecast is a simple arithmetic average of all
individual forecasts. Consensus Economics started collecting survey forecasts for a few
developed countries in 1989, expanding its sample to include emerging markets gradually
in subsequent years. For this reason our emerging markets coverage is not complete, but
still satisfactory at 89 percent.
5We use IFS line 64F for the CPI. The Economist Intelligence Unit real GDP data is identical to
GDP-at-constant-prices in IFS line 99.
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Inflation
Inflation is included following the findings of O’Brien (1994), Ackert and Hunter (1995) and
Basu et al. (2006) for the US market. Ackert and Hunter (1995) document no relationship
between earnings forecast errors and inflation, which leads them to conclude that analysts
rationally include inflation forecasts in their earnings forecasts. The conclusion of Basu
et al. (2006) is opposite, as their findings indicate that analysts do not fully account
for the information in inflation forecasts in their earnings forecasts. Basu et al. (2006)
explain these differences by cross-sectional heterogeneity in earnings exposures to inflation
as documented by Chordia and Shivakumar (2005). The inflation forecast is constructed in
the same way as the real GDP growth forecast, that is, we include the consensus forecast
for the current year as issued in June.
Political risk
The political environment is generally believed to be important in emerging markets. Fis-
man (2001), for example, shows that about 25 percent of the value of Indonesian firms
is related to political connections. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) also analyse the role
of political connections in Indonesia and conclude that firms with political connections
dislike transparency. Claessens et al. (in press) show that the economic costs of political
connections in Brazil lower GDP with 0.2% per annum. Motivated by these studies we
analyse the role of politics in the earnings forecasts. We hypothesize a positive effect of
political stability on earnings growth.
Quantifying the political situation in a country is a delicate issue, because it entails
many facets. The ICRG publishes monthly survey data on 12 political factors, which are
aggregated into a single political risk index. The index varies between 0 and 100, where
a low score indicates high political uncertainty and a high score an investor friendly and
stable political environment.6 Each factor is assigned a numerical rating within a specified
range, where the allowed range reflects the weight attributed to a factor. We refer to Erb
et al. (1996), Bilson et al. (2002) and Harvey (2004) for more detailed discussion of the
political risk index and its relevance for emerging stock markets. The index is available for
all observations in our sample. The average score is 68.3 and is quite stable over time. The
Philippines’s score in 1991 of 41 is the lowest, while the 1998 and 1999 scores for Portugal
are the highest (91). We use the actual change in the political risk index between the end
6Besides political risk the ICRG also publishes economic and financial risk measures.
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of the previous fiscal year t−1 and six months into the current fiscal year t as the political
risk forecast. Hence, essentially we assume that the political situation does not change in
the remaining six months of year t.
Accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts
Obviously the quality of the macroeconomic forecasts partly determines their usefulness for
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Accurate forecasts of GDP growth, inflation and the political
situation should provide more information than poor forecasts. Figure 3.1 provides a
graphical impression of the quality of the macroeconomic forecasts by showing scatterplots
of the forecasts against the corresponding realizations for each country-year observation in
our sample. The graphs also include the results of a standard least squares regression of
the actual value of the macroeconomic indicator M in year t on its forecast made six years
before the end of the year for country k:
Mkt = α+ βM̂kt + ηkt. (3.5)
Figure 3.1(a) shows that analysts are too pessimistic about real GDP growth, given
the slope of 1.06, but that otherwise forecasts for the GDP are of reasonably good quality
given the R2 of 0.71. For both CPI inflation (Figure 3.1b) and the change in the political
situation (Figure 3.1c), analysts are too optimistic with slopes of respectively 0.90 and
0.95. Especially the forecast for inflation is good given the R2 of 0.81, while the R2 of the
regression for the change in the political situation is 0.53. From this we conclude that the
quality of the macroeconomic forecast is good enough to use in our analysis.
3.2.4 Company-specific variables
As discussed in the introduction, previous research has shown that the positive bias in
analysts’ earnings forecasts is related to firm-specific information. For that reason we
include prior-year earnings growth, market capitalization, analyst coverage and price-to-
book ratio as control variables Sjt in our regression models. We obtain the number of
analysts providing earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S and collect market capitalization and
the price-to-book ratio from Standard and Poor’s (formerly IFC) Emerging Markets Data
Base (EMBD).
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Figure 3.1: Macroeconomic forecasts and realizations
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
-.15 -.10 -.05 .00 .05 .10 .15
Output growth forecast
Re
ali
ze
d o
utp
ut 
gro
w
th
y=1.063x+0.001
R2=0.71
(a) GDP growth
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Inflation forecast
Re
ali
ze
d in
fla
tio
n
y=0.903x+0.002
R2=0.81
(b) CPI inflation
(continued on next page)
63
59
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
Forecast of change in political risk
Re
ali
ze
d c
han
ge 
in 
po
liti
ca
l ri
sk
y=0.946x+0.002
R2=0.53
(c) Political risk
Note: The graphs in this figure show scatterplots of forecasts and realizations for GDP growth, CPI
inflation and the change in political risk, as well as the fit of a regression of the macroeconomic realization
on a constant and the corresponding forecast. For the CPI inflation regression the observations for Brazil
in 1993 and 1994 are omitted, when realized inflation was 2477% and 916%, respectively.
Prior-year earnings growth
Several previous studies explain the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts in terms of mis-
interpretation of the information in prior-year earnings. De Bondt and Thaler (1990)
document that predicted earnings changes are more extreme than the corresponding real-
ized earnings changes, suggesting that analysts tend to overreact. By contrast, Abarbanell
and Bernard (1992) present evidence that analysts underreact to prior-year earnings infor-
mation. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) reconcile these conflicting results by showing that
analysts underreact to negative earnings news, but overreact to positive news, such that
analysts are systematically optimistic.
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Market capitalization
The market capitalization of a stock, which we measure in US dollars, is an indication of
firm’s information environment. Information uncertainty is likely to be lower for larger
companies. Both Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Lim (2001) show that analysts provide
more accurate earnings forecast for larger firms. Therefore we expect a negative effect of
the log market value on the earnings forecast error.
Analyst coverage
The number of analysts following a company and providing earnings forecasts varies widely
across stocks. For example, highly volatile stocks are covered by more analysts than
average, while small caps are covered by relatively fewer analysts. Based on the findings
by Lim (2001) and Chan and Hameed (2006) we expect stocks with higher coverage to
have smaller forecast errors as the information environment for such companies tends to
be richer.
Price-to-book
Following Lim (2001) we also include the price-to-book ratio as control variable. Van der
Hart et al. (2005) show that a portfolio of high price-to-book stocks in emerging markets
has a smaller forecast error than a portfolio of low price-to-book stock during the first 11
months after portfolio formation. Hence we expect companies with a low price-to-book
ratio to have a larger forecast bias.
3.3 Empirical results
3.3.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the distribution of the firm-year observations across years
and countries. The number of observations per year, which equals 673 on average, varies
substantially over time. Starting relatively low at 97 in 1991, the number of firms grows
rapidly to around 950 in 1997/8. Due to the effects of the Asian crisis and Russia crisis (in
addition to countries such as Portugal and Greece leaving the IFC Investable index) this
declines to 586 in 2003, followed by a sharp increase again during the final two years of the
sample period. A similar pattern occurs for most individual countries. We also observe a
positive relationship between country size and the number of observations per country,
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as expected. In terms of data coverage, on average our sample includes 65 percent of the
constituents of the IFC Investable index, except for the first three years of the sample
period during which coverage is lower at around 43 percent.
Table 3.2 displays the mean and median earnings forecast errors across countries and
across years. Consistent with previous research for developed markets, we find that the
overall average forecast errors are negative, suggesting that on average analysts are too
optimistic about future earnings. The magnitudes of the mean and median errors of −5.2
and −0.5 percent, respectively, also are comparable to values typically found for developed
markets. For example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) report mean and median errors of
−1.93 and −0.32 percent for the US over the period 1982–1995. It is worthwhile to consider
the forecast errors during the emerging markets crises that occurred during our sample
period. For most crises we observe substantially larger negative median forecast errors:
−4.4 percent in Mexico during the 1994 (December) peso-crisis, −32 percent in Thailand
during the 1997 (July) Asia crisis, −48 percent in Russia during the 1998 (August) Russia
crisis and −8.6 percent (−21 percent) during the Argentina crisis in 2001 (November)
and 2002 (January). Recall that most earnings forecasts in our sample were produced in
June, prior to the crises’ occurrence. Hence, the excessive optimism during these years
suggests that analysts did not foresee these periods of turmoil. For the Turkey crisis in
February 2001 we do not observe a clear deviation from the historical pattern, suggesting
that analysts did incorporate negative earnings related news in their forecasts during this
period of larger economic uncertainty.
3.3.2 Firm-level earnings growth and actual macroeconomic de-
velopments
Before examining the role of information in macroeconomic forecasts in analysts’ earnings
forecasts, we first consider the relationship between actual earnings growth and realizations
of our three macroeconomic variables to determine whether and how firm-level performance
is related to macroeconomic performance in the first place. Specifically we estimate the
following regression:
Eit − Ei,t−1
Pit
= α+
∑
j
βjMjt +
∑
j
γjSjt + εit, (3.6)
where Mjt are the realizations of our macroeconomic factors in year t. Panel A of Table
3.3 presents robust estimation results for (3.6), as well as for regressions including only one
of the three macroeconomic variables.
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Table 3.3: The importance of macroeconomic forecasts
Panel A: Realized earnings growth and realized macroeconomic factors
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP −0.04 0.14 −0.11 0.01 −3.37 14.34 0.119
(−15.27) (9.22) (−14.67) (14.29) (−5.11) (15.03)
CPI −0.04 0.02 −0.13 0.01 −3.45 14.86 0.083
(−15.31) (6.89) (−15.74) (14.29) (−5.20) (10.40)
POL −0.03 0.06 −0.11 0.01 −2.87 15.08 0.113
(−13.63) (8.26) (−15.22) (14.25) (−4.91) (11.44)
Multivariate
−0.05 0.13 0.03 0.06 −0.14 0.01 −3.56 11.08 0.075
(−16.87) (8.27) (8.68) (6.78) (−16.61) (16.20) (−5.23) (7.63)
Panel B: Earnings forecast errors and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP −0.06 0.07 0.09 0.01 −2.40 19.91 0.017
(−24.22) (4.18) (16.51) (18.23) (−4.27) (15.03)
CPI −0.05 −0.01 0.09 0.01 −2.00 22.11 0.016
(−24.02) (−3.26) (16.01) (17.53) (−3.57) (16.35)
POL −0.05 0.02 0.09 0.01 −1.80 19.37 0.018
(−25.95) (2.79) (15.96) (18.37) (−3.64) (17.02)
Multivariate
−0.06 0.07 −0.00 0.02 0.09 0.01 −2.20 20.33 0.019
(−22.98) (4.07) (−1.39) (2.16) (15.76) (17.94) (−3.86) (15.45)
(continued on next page)
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Panel C: Earnings realizations and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP −0.03 −0.02 −0.11 0.01 −3.14 16.61 0.113
(−11.62) (−1.28) (−12.65) (13.90) (−4.73) (11.18)
CPI −0.04 0.03 −0.13 0.01 −3.29 15.01 0.079
(−15.62) (8.89) (−15.70) (15.74) (−4.93) (10.44)
POL −0.03 0.01 −0.11 0.01 −3.11 15.58 0.111
(−13.35) (1.60) (−14.16) (14.20) (−5.32) (11.81)
Multivariate
−0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 −0.13 0.01 −3.32 14.19 0.077
(−13.95) (0.58) (9.37) (2.16) (−16.16) (15.69) (−4.88) (9.80)
Panel D: Earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Univariate
GDP 0.03 −0.09 −0.20 −0.00 −0.78 −5.32 0.168
(20.01) (−9.08) (−32.63) (−4.86) (−2.24) (−7.49)
CPI 0.02 0.03 −0.22 −0.00 −1.32 −8.39 0.136
(12.06) (17.69) (−34.12) (−0.35) (−3.82) (−11.15)
POL 0.02 −0.01 −0.20 −0.00 −1.24 −5.74 0.169
(19.38) (−3.16) (−33.70) (−4.23) (−4.02) (−9.01)
Multivariate
0.02 −0.07 0.03 −0.00 −0.23 −0.00 −1.10 −7.30 0.143
(13.26) (−6.01) (15.60) (−0.79) (−35.25) (−1.21) (−3.09) (−9.77)
Note: This table presents estimation results for the regressions involving macroeconomic forecasts
and firm characteristics
Yit = α+ β1ĜDP t + β2ĈPIt + β3P̂OLt+
γ1
(
Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2
Pi,t−1
)
+ γ2MCAPit + γ3COVit + γ4PBit + εit,
where ĜDP t is the forecast of real GDP growth in year t, ĈPIt is the forecast of consumer
price inflation in year t, and P̂OLt is the forecast of the change the political risk in year t. All
macroeconomic forecasts are made six months prior to the end of year t. Eit is the realized
earnings per share in local currency for firm i in fiscal year t, and Pi,t−1 is the local stock price
six months into year t − 1 such that (Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2)/Pi,t−1 is the actual earnings change in
fiscal year t − 1. MCAPit, COVit and PBit are the log market capitalization in US dollar, the
number of analysts covering the stock and the price-to-book ratio, respectively, all measured six
months before the end of year t. The dependent variable Yit is either the earnings forecast error
FEit = (Eit − Êit)/Pit, where Êit is the consensus analysts’ earnings forecast made six months
prior to the end of the year (Panel B), the actual earnings change (Eit − Ei,t−1)/Pit (Panel C),
and the earnings forecast (Êit − Ei,t−1)/Pit (Panel D). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the
the actual earnings change (Eit − Ei,t−1)/Pit, while the macroeconomic forecasts are replaced by
the corresponding realizations. Regressions under the heading ‘Univariate’ include only one of the
three macroeconomic variables. The coefficient estimates for COVit and PBit are multiplied with
10,000. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels
are marked with one, two and three asterisks, respectively. All samples comprise 10,102 firm-year
observations from 29 different emerging market countries.
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We find significantly positive slope coefficients for all three macroeconomic variables,
confirming prior expectations. The positive slope estimate for realized output growth of
0.13 (t = 8.3) implies an earnings increase equal to 13 percent of economic growth on
average. The coefficient estimate of realized inflation, although positive, is small at 0.02
(t = 8.7), suggesting a rather weak relationship between inflation and nominal earnings in
emerging markets. Finally, an increase in political stability leads to a significantly positive
effect on earnings growth, given the coefficient estimate of 0.06 (t = 6.8).
For the firm-specific information we observe a negative coefficient of the prior-year
earnings growth, equal to −0.13 (t = −16.6). This indicates a mean reversion effect
that is also documented by Easterwood and Nutt (1999) for earnings growth in the US.
The positive slope of 0.01 (t = 16.2) for the log market capitalization suggests that the
relationship between size and nominal earnings is rather weak. The same applies to analyst
coverage and the price-to-book ratio with coefficient estimates of −0.00036 (t = −5.2) and
0.0011 (t = 7.6), respectively.
The fairly modest R2 at 7.53% indicates that the relationship between earnings growth
and macroeconomic developments in emerging markets is not particularly strong. Never-
theless, these results indicate that analysts may benefit from incorporating macroeconomic
information into their earnings forecasts. The question is whether they indeed do this and
if so, whether this is done in the best possible way.
3.3.3 Analysts’ efficiency
If analysts make optimal use of macroeconomic information for their earnings forecasts, the
forecast errors should be uncorrelated with any information that is available at the time the
forecasts are made. We examine this issue by estimating the forecast error model in (3.2).
We stress that we include the macroeconomic forecasts as they were made in June of each
year, coinciding with the six-month horizon used for defining the earning forecast error
such that this information is available at the time analysts issue their earnings forecasts.
The results reported in Panel B of Table 3.3 show a number of interesting features. First
and foremost, we obtain significant slope coefficients for two of our three macroeconomic
variables. The positive coefficient estimates for the forecasts of output growth and political
risk of 0.07 (t = 4.1) and 0.02 (t = 2.2), respectively, indicating that analysts underestimate
the effects of output growth and the change in political risk on earnings growth. Analysts do
incorporate inflation forecasts efficiently in their earnings forecasts, given that its coefficient
(−0.004, t = −1.4) is not significantly different from zero.
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Second, we find a significantly negative intercept equal to −5.7 percent (t = −23.0),
confirming that analysts are optimistic on average.
Third, we find that the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts also varies systematically
with the included firm characteristics. The positive coefficient estimate of 0.09 (t = 15.8)
for the prior-year earnings growth indicates that analysts do not efficiently take into account
the information from last year’s earnings growth. We note that this estimate resembles
Easterwood and Nutt (1999)’s slope estimate of 0.13 (t = 15.29) and also is in line with
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992)’s finding of β1 of 0.08 (t = 3.30) for both US companies.
Furthermore, we find a larger bias for smaller companies, in line with the result for US
stocks documented by Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Lim (2001), and for an international
sample of stocks by Ang and Ciccone (2002). The larger bias for companies with a low
price-to-book ratio is also present in our dataset. Contrary to our expectations, we find a
smaller bias for stocks with low analyst coverage. This effect is statistically significant but
economically very small.
The above observations summarize our main results. Most importantly, we find signif-
icant coefficient estimates for two of the three macroeconomic variables. Analysts do not
use information that is available in forecasts of output growth and the political situation
in emerging markets for their earnings forecasts in the best possible way. The information
in inflation forecasts seems to be accounted for correctly.
3.3.4 Interaction between macroeconomic forecasts and earnings
forecasts
At first sight, our finding that earnings forecast errors are related to the output growth
and political risk forecasts seems to imply that analysts ignore valuable macroeconomic
information when producing their earnings forecasts for individual companies. This is not
necessarily true, however. An alternative explanation is that these macroeconomic forecasts
are incorporated into the earnings forecasts, but this information actually is irrelevant for
earnings growth. As discussed in Section 3.2 we may shed light on the question which of
these competing mechanisms is the relevant explanation by regressing the realized earnings
growth and the earnings forecasts on the macroeconomic forecasts and firm characteristics,
as given in (3.3) and (3.4), respectively.
The estimation results shown in Panels C and D of Table 3.3 indeed provide useful
insights on this issue. First, for the inflation forecasts we find significantly positive coeffi-
cients in both regressions of the actual earnings growth and the forecasts (0.03, t = 15.6
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and 0.03, t = 9.4, respectively), which furthermore are of comparable magnitude. Hence,
the inflation forecasts do contain useful information for actual earnings growth for emerging
markets firms, and analysts incorporate this information correctly in their forecasts.
The insignificant coefficient β3 = −0.0047 (t = −0.8) of the political risk forecast in
panel D suggests that analysts ignore changes in the emerging market’s political situation
in their earnings forecasts. Panel C, however, shows that the political risk forecast is
related to actual earnings, with a significantly positive coefficient equal to 0.02 (t = 2.2).
This implies that analysts would be able to improve their earnings forecasts by taking this
information into account, as also indicated by the significant coefficient for the political
risk forecast in panel B for the forecast error regression.
Finally, the most striking results are obtained for the output growth forecasts. We find
a significantly negative coefficient of −0.07 (t = −6.0) in the regression for the earnings
forecast, indicating that higher forecasts of output growth are accompanied by lower earn-
ings forecasts. This contradicts the positive relationship found between realized earnings
and output growth in panel A, so that analysts seem to respond to this information in the
wrong way. At the same time, the results in panel D point out that there is no significant
relationship between the output growth forecast and realized earnings with a coefficient of
0.01 (t = 0.6). Hence, analysts better ignore this information altogether for their earnings
forecasts. This outcome confirms O’Brien (1994)’s finding that macroeconomic news that
arrives after the earnings forecast issuance is reflected in the forecast error.
In sum, our findings indicate that analysts do not efficiently use the available macro-
economic information represented by forecasts for output growth and the change in the
political situation in their earnings forecasts for emerging markets’ stocks. Analysts do
incorporate the information represented by inflation forecasts correctly. The political risk
forecasts contain useful information for realized earnings, but analysts ignore this com-
pletely. Output growth forecasts do not seem useful sources of information for realized
earnings. Analysts, however, ‘overreact’ and adjust their earnings forecast in the opposite
way.
3.3.5 Transparency
As discussed in the introduction, earnings forecasting is closely related to the information
environment. We return to this issue in this section and examine whether the role of
macroeconomic information in analysts’ earnings forecast differs systematically according
to the ease with which analysts may gain access to firm-specific information. This builds
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upon the point made by Bae et al. (2006) that a firm’s transparency may be an important
factor determining analyst behaviour. Intuitively, if its financial statements are limited
and a firm provides little or no information about its business operation’s outlook, analysts
need to rely more upon macroeconomic information for producing an earnings forecasts.
Macroeconomic information may have little added value for a company that is more willing
to disclose firm-specific information and management expectations.
We investigate the role of the information environment by distinguishing between com-
panies with high and low transparency, according to two measures. First, we split our
sample into stocks with and without ADR’s, following the suggestion of Lang et al. (2003)
and Baker et al. (2002). Our second measure of transparency is the time that it takes a
company to release its annual report: Stocks releasing their annual report within three
months after the end of the prior fiscal year are labelled as ‘fast reporting’, and all other
stocks as ‘slow reporting’. To the best of our knowledge, this second transparency measure
has not been examined before. Both measures are defined such that analysts know in
advance if the stock is transparent given either its ADR listing or its prompt release of the
prior-year annual report.
The ADR identifier comes from the Factset Pricing database. This database contains
firm-level information about the start and end dates of an ADR cross-listing. Our sample
includes 2161 firm-year observations that have an ADR listing when the earnings forecasts
are issued. We obtain the fiscal year-end date as well as the publication data of the
annual report from the I/B/E/S database. In total we have 3522 fast-reporting firm-year
observations.7 For both measures it holds that the distribution of transparent companies
in our sample is fairly uniform across countries, sectors as well as calendar years. This is
important as it implies that the following analysis truly measures transparency at the firm
level instead of, for example, transparency at the country level.
Table 3.4 shows the results for the regressions allowing for different coefficients for
transparent and non-transparent firms. The results for the forecast error regression in
panel B provide convincing evidence that analysts’ handle macroeconomic information
more efficiently for transparent companies, irrespective of which transparency measure is
used. For fast-reporting firms, only the political risk forecast is significantly related to the
forecast error, while all three macroeconomic forecasts are significant for slow-reporting
7While fast reporting generally is a good sign, the quality of financial statements may be doubted when
companies publish their annual report very fast. Our sample contains 27 firm-year observations that report
within one month, 662 within two months and 2829 within three months after the end of the book year.
Excluding the companies that report within one month or within two months does not affect our results.
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Table 3.4: Transparency and the importance of macroeconomic forecasts versus earnings
forecast errors
Panel A: Realized earnings growth and realized macroeconomic factors
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non-ADR −0.05 0.13 0.03 0.07 −0.14 0.01 −2.62 12.77
0.072
(−13.74) (6.48) (9.55) (6.64) (−15.46) (12.16) (−3.10) (8.41)
ADR −0.08 0.26 −0.01 0.16 −0.29 0.02 −5.95 18.78
(−3.59) (2.12) (−1.42) (2.23) (−3.25) (3.87) (−1.83) (1.64)
Fast reporting
SLOW −0.05 0.15 0.03 0.07 −0.14 0.02 −5.23 11.99
0.067
(−13.71) (6.27) (10.81) (5.71) (−13.86) (12.70) (−5.24) (6.01)
FAST −0.16 0.66 0.01 0.32 −0.52 0.05 −7.67 15.53
(−2.65) (1.68) (2.73) (2.52) (−3.92) (3.20) (−1.94) (1.88)
Panel B: Earnings forecast errors and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non-ADR −0.06 0.05 −0.00 0.02 0.08 0.01 −1.60 20.01
0.020
(−19.84) (2.33) (−0.11) (2.01) (13.94) (14.91) (−2.24) (14.16)
ADR −0.16 0.17 −0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 −0.67 24.78
(−5.55) (1.16) (−1.04) (1.50) (0.27) (5.66) (−0.28) (2.99)
Fast reporting
SLOW −0.07 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.02 −2.43 22.75
0.021
(−18.82) (2.71) (2.05) (3.56) (14.69) (14.28) (−2.78) (11.59)
FAST −0.29 0.41 −0.00 −0.19 −0.00 0.08 −9.65 9.63
(−6.07) (1.32) (−0.74) (−2.40) (−0.03) (6.20) (−2.60) (1.83)
(continued on next page)
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Panel C: Earnings realizations and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non ADR −0.04 −0.02 0.03 0.02 −0.14 0.01 −2.42 15.15
0.075
(−11.33) (−0.75) (9.46) (1.65) (−15.02) (12.23) (−2.89) (10.06)
ADR −0.07 −0.05 −0.00 0.18 −0.28 0.02 −5.50 21.27
(−2.93) (−0.34) (−0.28) (2.53) (−3.14) (3.85) (−1.63) (1.80)
Fast reporting
SLOW −0.04 −0.01 0.04 0.04 −0.14 0.02 −4.30 14.83
0.065
(−11.27) (−0.33) (10.06) (2.74) (−13.63) (12.34) (−4.39) (7.56)
FAST −0.17 0.40 0.02 −0.12 −0.52 0.05 −12.43 13.03
(−2.40) (0.85) (2.69) (−1.09) (−3.88) (2.99) (−2.50) (1.75)
Panel D: Earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
ADR
Non ADR 0.02 −0.07 0.03 −0.01 −0.24 −0.00 −0.93 −6.75
0.142
(12.33) (−5.30) (14.44) (−1.52) (−32.05) (−2.39) (−2.13) (−8.44)
ADR 0.09 −0.22 0.05 0.09 −0.29 −0.02 −4.85 −3.43
(4.42) (−2.29) (1.23) (1.68) (−7.83) (−3.12) (−1.83) (−0.45)
Fast reporting
SLOW 0.02 −0.09 0.04 −0.01 −0.27 −0.00 −1.99 −8.87
0.136
(10.67) (−5.57) (13.00) (−1.71) (−34.18) (−0.53) (−3.69) (−7.93)
FAST 0.12 −0.00 0.02 0.07 −0.52 −0.03 −2.79 3.40
(2.14) (−0.01) (3.28) (1.62) (−5.28) (−2.31) (−0.86) (1.09)
Note: This table presents estimation results for transparent and non-transparent stocks. Rows labelled
‘ADR’ (‘Non-ADR’) indicate the sub-sample of stocks with (without) an ADR cross-listing in the US.
Rows labelled ‘Fast’ (‘Slow’) indicate the subsample of stocks that publish their annual report before
(after) three months after the fiscal year end. See table 3.3 for further details.
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firms. The positive coefficients for the latter group of companies furthermore suggest that
analysts underreact to the information in the forecasts for inflation, output growth and
political risk. For ADR stocks, we even find that none of the macroeconomic forecasts
is statistically significant, while for non-ADR stocks the output growth and political risk
forecasts are, and again with positive coefficients. The results in panel C demonstrate that
the output growth forecast is not relevant for earnings growth, neither for transparent nor
for non-transparent firms. For the inflation and political risk forecasts, the results partly
depend on the transparency measure that is used to classify firms. For ADR stocks we
find that the political risk forecast bears useful information for earnings growth and the
inflation forecast does not, while the opposite is found for fast-reporting firms. For both
non-ADR stocks and slow-reporting firms we find significantly positive coefficients for both
these macroeconomic forecasts.
Overall we conclude that analysts handle macroeconomic information in a better way
for more transparent companies. This confirms the finding of Lim (2001) for US stocks
that analysts’ earnings forecast bias is related to the information uncertainty environment,
and in fact expands it by documenting this effect for macroeconomic forecasts.
3.4 Robustness
In this section we report results from a number of additional analyses, intended to check the
robustness of our main finding that analysts do not optimally account for macroeconomic
information in their corporate earnings forecasts.
3.4.1 Crises
Our robust estimation technique ascertains handling of outliers. Although this approach
has several desirable features and has been used by others like Chan and Lakonishok (1992)
or Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), a potential concern is that crises still might
influence our results. To address this issue explicitly we distinguish between firm-years in
normal and in crises periods and consider the role of macroeconomic information for these
sub-samples separately. In total we identify 391 firm-year observations in crisis periods:
the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997/1998, the Russian debt crisis in
August 1998, Argentina’s default at the end of 2001 and Turkey’s currency crisis in 2001.
Estimating the four regression models in (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6) allowing for dif-
ferent coefficients during crises and ‘normal’ periods renders estimates as reported in
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Table 3.5: Crises and the importance of macroeconomic forecasts versus earnings forecast
errors
Panel A: Realized earnings growth and realized macroeconomic factors
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal −0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 −0.14 0.01 −1.91 8.14
0.114
(−13.37) (4.18) (7.53) (2.72) (−17.06) (14.22) (−2.73) (5.81)
Crisis −0.88 0.64 0.01 0.58 −0.80 0.25 −17.59 321.77
(−4.86) (0.95) (2.32) (1.19) (−5.58) (4.13) (−0.53) (6.32)
Panel B: Earnings forecast errors and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal −0.05 0.06 −0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 −1.13 16.36
0.091
(−21.01) (3.37) (−3.03) (2.03) (13.81) (16.76) (−1.94) (12.99)
Crisis −1.05 −0.90 −0.00 0.98 −0.10 0.31 0.19 225.93
(−6.62) (−1.26) (−0.29) (1.59) (−0.96) (6.05) (0.01) (4.52)
Panel C: Earnings realizations and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal −0.03 −0.03 0.02 0.02 −0.14 0.01 −1.65 9.97
0.111
(−10.76) (−1.44) (6.87) (1.67) (−16.71) (13.72) (−2.36) (6.97)
Crisis −0.97 0.08 0.02 0.35 −0.79 0.28 −23.37 328.04
(−5.09) (0.08) (2.42) (0.45) (−5.46) (4.40) (−0.71) (6.22)
Panel D: Earnings forecasts and macroeconomic forecasts
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Normal 0.02 −0.09 0.03 −0.01 −0.22 −0.00 −0.54 −7.39
0.136
(14.55) (−7.73) (13.97) (−1.09) (−34.18) (−2.47) (−1.40) (−9.60)
Crisis 0.08 0.98 0.02 −0.63 −0.69 −0.04 −23.57 102.11
(0.74) (1.55) (2.29) (−1.24) (−4.89) (−1.00) (−1.12) (3.75)
Note: This table presents estimation results for normal market periods and crisis periods. Rows la-
belled ‘Normal’ and ‘Crisis’ indicate the sub-sample of stocks during normal market periods and crises
(1994 Peso crisis in Mexico; 1997-1998 Asia crisis in Thailand (start), Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Philippines; 1998 Russia’s default; 2001 Turkey crisis and 2001-2002 Argentina default and currency
crisis), respectively. See table 3.3 for further details.
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Table 3.5. Reassuringly, the results of the earnings forecast error in normal markets are
largely comparable with the results for the complete data set. In particular, analysts un-
derestimate the effects of output growth and changes in political stability during normal
periods, with significantly positive coefficients in panel B that are very close to those found
for the complete sample. The estimates of the corresponding coefficients in panels C and
D also confirm the earlier finding that output growth forecasts do not carry relevant infor-
mation for earnings growth while political risk forecasts do. Analysts treat these forecasts
wrongly, in the sense that they do incorporate output forecasts in their earnings forecasts
but ignore the political risk forecasts. Interestingly, the coefficient of the inflation forecast
in normal markets in the forecast error regression is more than double the coefficient for
the complete sample at −0.0085 compared to −0.0039, and is significantly different from
zero with a t-statistic of −3.0. This indicates that analysts overestimate the effect of in-
flation on earnings growth when constructing their earnings forecasts. This is also borne
out by the estimates in panels C and D, showing that the inflation forecast coefficient is
considerably larger in the regression of the earnings forecast than of the realized earnings
growth.
The results for the crisis periods also are noteworthy. From panel B we observe that the
earnings forecast errors are not significantly related to our three macroeconomic forecasts
during such periods. Panels C and D indicate that analysts correctly account for the
inflation forecast, which bears useful information for earnings growth, and rightfully ignore
the non-informative output growth and political risk forecasts.
We conclude that our primary results are confirmed after controlling for the crisis peri-
ods: analysts do not efficiently incorporate macroeconomic information into their earnings
forecasts during normal market circumstances.
3.4.2 Country, sector and year effects
Next, we verify the appropriateness of our country-specific approach, rather than a global
or sector-specific set-up. This is done by limiting the regressors in (3.2) to the stock-
specific characteristics and including different types of dummy variables instead of the
macroeconomic forecasts. First, we consider the relative importance of year, country and
sector effects by including a set of corresponding dummies. For constructing the sector
dummies we use the MSCI sector classification. The year dummies can tentatively be
interpreted as representing a global macroeconomic factor, such as US output growth or
inflation, impacting all emerging markets earnings equally. The other two types of
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dummies cover structural differences across countries and sectors. Second, we jointly in-
clude year and country dummies or year and sector dummies. Third and of most interest,
we include country-year or sector-year dummies. These dummies should shed most light on
the question whether macroeconomic effects are important for explaining analysts’ forecast
bias. The year-country dummies have a clear economic interpretation as they can be con-
sidered as proxies for time-varying country-specific macroeconomic information. In fact,
year-country dummies provide the most perfect macroeconomic factor, such that the R2 of
this regression provides an upper bound on the explanatory power than we can attain with
specific macroeconomic variables. The year-sector dummies can be interpreted as sector-
specific factors that change over time, such as the oil price for the energy sector or the price
of semiconductors for the IT sector. A comparison of the adjusted-R2 of the regressions
with these two types of dummies should demonstrate whether the country-based approach
taken in our paper is justified, or whether a sector-based approach would have been more
appropriate.8
Table 3.6 reports the R2’s for the different dummy regressions, obtained with the robust
estimation method. It can be seen that the individual time, country and sector effects are
approximately equally important with R2 values of 2.31, 2.04 and 1.89 percent, respectively.
The R2 of 6.05 percent for the year-country dummies more than doubles the R2 of 2.95
percent obtained for the specification with year-sector dummies, clearly suggesting that
the country-based macroeconomic approach taken here is indeed appropriate.
3.4.3 Macroeconomic exposures per year and per country
As a further robustness check, we explore how the information content of macroeconomic
forecasts varies over time and across countries. Ciccone (2005) reports a steady decrease in
analysts’ earnings forecast errors for US stocks over the period 1990-2001. This motivates
us to explore if and how the information content of macroeconomic forecasts varies over
time for our sample of emerging market firms. We examine this issue by estimating the
forecast error model (3.2) for individual calendar years. If analysts indeed have become
more efficient over time the relationship between macroeconomic forecasts and earnings
forecast errors should weaken for more recent years.
8A more technical point is that in order to avoid multicollinearity we impose that the dummy coefficients
sum to 0, such that they measure the deviation from the overall intercept, see also Heston and Rouwenhorst
(1995), for example.
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Table 3.7: The importance of macroeconomic forecasts per calendar year
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
1991 −0.05∗ 0.63∗ 0.04 0.21∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 −7.79∗ −0.73 0.12
1992 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.05 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗ 15.61∗∗∗ 0.02
1993 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.02∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.05 0.01∗ 1.17 15.65∗∗∗ 0.11
1994 −0.02∗∗ −0.15 −0.00∗ −0.14 −0.05 0.01∗∗∗ −6.43∗∗ 10.71∗∗ 0.00
1995 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.06 0.00 0.04∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 1.97∗ 15.55∗∗∗ 0.04
1996 −0.02∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.03 0.04∗ 0.00∗∗ 6.41∗∗∗ 17.60∗∗∗ 0.01
1997 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 0.04 0.01∗∗∗ −3.67 43.77∗∗∗ 0.04
1998 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.10 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.09 0.37∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.62 65.67∗∗∗ 0.01
1999 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.06 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −5.21∗ 32.83∗∗∗ 0.04
2000 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.04∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.42 21.96∗∗∗ 0.02
2001 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 8.37∗∗∗ 44.94∗∗∗ 0.07
2002 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ −4.64 41.97∗∗∗ 0.00
2003 −0.02 0.16 0.01 −0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.25 −10.11∗ 0.02
2004 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.02 0.13∗∗ 0.06 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −2.53 −16.30∗∗∗ 0.01
2005 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.02 −0.03 0.02 0.02∗∗∗ −1.85 14.52∗∗∗ 0.06
Note: This table presents estimation results for the regression of the earnings forecast error on
the macroeconomic forecasts and firm characteristics
FEit = α+ β1ĜDP t + β2ĈPIt + β3P̂OLt+
γ1
(
Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2
Pi,t−1
)
+ γ2MCAPit + γ3COVit + γ4PBit + εit,
for each individual calendar year. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%
and 1% significance levels are marked with one, two and three asterisks, respectively. See Table
3.3 for variable definitions.
Table 3.7 displays the regression results for the forecast error model for each individual
calendar year. These suggest that analysts’ earnings forecasts consistently are inefficient
and have not improved in recent years. Especially information in prior-year earnings growth
is not taken into account correctly, as its coefficient is significantly positive for 10 out of 15
years, with no indications that this effect weakens over time. It seems that analysts assess
the information concerning the political situation better over time, as the earnings forecast
errors are uncorrelated with the change in political risk during the last four years of our
sample period, in contrast to the significantly positive coefficient for earlier years. This is
not the case for inflation and output growth, for which we still find a significantly positive
relationship with the forecast error in the (prior) last year of our sample period. Also note
that analysts’ reaction to the inflation and output growth forecasts varies substantially over
time. For some years (1996, 1997) we find evidence for underreaction (as the coefficient
83
79
is negative), while for other years we find evidence for overreaction (given the positive
coefficient). In contrast to the US results reported in Ciccone (2005) we conclude that
analysts’ inefficiency of earnings forecasts for emerging markets does not weaken during
more recent years.
In addition, we examine if the value of macroeconomic information varies across coun-
tries. Table 3.8 explores the cross-country heterogeneity in the properties of earnings
forecast errors. For 23 countries the individual R2 of the regression in (3.2) is higher than
the R2 obtained with the complete sample, in particular for the Czech Republic, Russia
and Egypt. The estimation results reveal a considerable amount of heterogeneity for the
macroeconomic variables, as the coefficients of both output and political risk forecasts are
significantly positive and negative for about the same number of countries (five and six,
respectively). This also applies to the inflation forecast, as its coefficient is positive and
significantly different from zero for 7 countries and significantly negative for 10 countries.
Apparently these effects cancel out when the forecast errors are pooled across countries,
given that we do not find a significant effect of the inflation forecast when the model is
estimated for the complete sample.
Overall, we conclude that our results are robust over time but show considerable het-
erogeneity across countries. It would be interesting to examine whether the cross-country
differences in the effects of the macroeconomic forecasts can be related to, for example,
differences in the transparency and disclosure regulations and practices of the financial mar-
kets in the different emerging markets, see Bae et al. (in press). This would show whether
transparency at the country level also affects the role of macroeconomic information for
analysts’ earnings forecasts, in addition to transparency at the firm level documented in
Section 3.3.5. This, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper and is left for future
research.
3.4.4 Stale forecasts
Another potential explanation why earnings forecast errors are correlated with output
growth and political stability is related to the earnings forecasts used in this study. The
I/B/E/S database contains earnings forecasts that are stale, as older forecasts that are
not revised (or reaffirmed) by the analysts in a given month are retained. Given that the
consensus earnings forecast is defined as the median of all individual analysts’ forecasts,
even a single individual stale forecast may cause the consensus to be stale as well. Such
stale forecasts are likely to be biased and inefficient.
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Table 3.8: The importance of macroeconomic forecasts per country
α β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2
Argentina −0.05∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.05 −0.06 0.00 13.34∗∗∗ 37.17 0.01
Brazil −0.05∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.03∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −3.59 56.66∗∗∗ 0.02
Chile −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.01∗∗∗ −13.03∗∗∗ 25.09∗∗∗ 0.09
China −0.03∗∗ 0.03 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −7.23∗∗∗ 11.79 0.11
Colombia −0.16∗ 1.19 0.46 −0.07 0.05 −0.01 34.59 75.61 0.21
Czech Rep. −0.05 −0.45 −0.27∗ −0.13 0.29∗∗∗ 0.02 2.02 44.77 0.70
Egypt −0.15∗∗∗ −3.64∗∗∗ 4.75∗∗∗ 0.22 −0.01 0.03 85.41∗∗ −87.54∗∗∗ 0.50
Greece 0.11∗∗∗ −2.83∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ 0.05 0.21∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.69 28.84∗∗∗ 0.14
Hungary −0.08∗∗∗ −0.83∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ −0.05 0.20∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −5.48 −15.76 0.22
India −0.06∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.11∗∗ −0.05∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −9.05∗∗∗ 8.05∗∗∗ 0.14
Indonesia −0.04∗∗ −0.15 −0.05 0.21∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −5.63 15.49∗∗∗ 0.19
Israel −0.04∗ 0.34 0.11 −0.09 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 −15.96 19.59 0.05
Korea −0.12∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.20∗ 0.02 0.02∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗ 43.55∗∗∗ 0.07
Malaysia −0.02∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.14∗ −0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.85 5.63∗∗∗ 0.20
Mexico −0.09∗∗∗ 0.13 0.11∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.03 0.02∗∗∗ −11.74∗∗∗ 87.54∗∗∗ 0.05
Pakistan 0.01 −0.48 −0.47∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.03 0.00 59.57∗ 52.49∗∗ 0.10
Peru −0.02 0.93∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.01 −31.46∗∗∗ 38.43 0.12
Philippines −0.11∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗ −0.16 0.05 0.30∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −25.03∗∗∗ 43.17∗∗∗ 0.17
Poland −0.16∗∗∗ −0.32 0.40∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −21.33∗∗ 72.66∗∗∗ 0.19
Portugal 0.02 −0.17 −0.56∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.01 −13.34∗∗∗ 16.43∗ 0.04
Russia −0.72∗∗∗ 5.77∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ −0.03 0.07∗∗∗ −33.10 −132.49∗ 0.50
Slovakia −0.71 8.70∗∗∗ 5.04 −16.71∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ −0.05 −67.56 1009.56 0.36
S. Africa −0.02∗∗ 0.05 −0.11∗∗ −0.01 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −13.98∗∗∗ 9.17∗∗ 0.01
Taiwan −0.06∗∗∗ 0.05 0.16 −0.04 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ −6.51∗∗ 30.61∗∗∗ 0.08
Thailand −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.32∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −15.97∗∗∗ 13.30∗∗ 0.00
Turkey −0.03∗∗ 0.09 −0.02 0.02 0.16∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −17.62∗∗∗ 10.67∗∗∗ 0.07
Venezuela −0.09 0.38 0.30∗∗∗ 0.80∗ 0.18∗∗ −0.02 39.93 −298.10∗∗∗ 0.34
Note: This table presents estimation results for the regression of the earnings forecast error on the
macroeconomic forecasts and firm characteristics
FEit = α+ β1ĜDP t + β2ĈPIt + β3P̂OLt+
γ1
(
Ei,t−1 − Ei,t−2
Pi,t−1
)
+ γ2MCAPit + γ3COVit + γ4PBit + εit,
for each individual country. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels are marked with one, two and three asterisks, respectively. See Table 3.3 for variable
definitions.
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To investigate the relevance of this potential data problem we identify consensus earn-
ings forecasts that did not change in the past two months. In our sample about 16% of our
earnings forecasts is labeled ‘stale’ according to this definition.9 The average forecast error
is slightly larger (−6.3%) for the stale sample than for the non-stale sample (−5.0%). We
estimate the forecast error model model (3.2) allowing for different coefficients for non-stale
and stale forecasts.10 Stale forecasts do not seem to affect our conclusions, as all coefficient
estimates for the non-stale forecasts are very close to those for the full sample reported in
Table 3.3. The coefficients for the stale forecasts do differ and sometimes substantially, but
at least have the same sign as the non-stale forecasts. Partly this can be explained by the
negative correlation between our stale-dummy with analyst coverage (−22%) and market
value (−15%). These negative correlations indicate that these company-specific variables
partly control for the stale forecasts in our sample. In sum, our results are unlikely to be
caused by the presence of stale earnings forecasts in our sample.
3.5 Conclusion
We present empirical evidence that analysts do not make efficient use of publicly available
macroeconomic information when producing earnings forecasts for emerging market firms.
We show that analysts do incorporate macroeconomic forecasts in their earnings forecasts,
but in a sub-optimal way. Analysts show strong signs of underreaction to political stability
forecasts and overreaction to output growth forecasts. The forecasts on political stability
are completely ignored by analysts, while these provide valuable information for firm-level
earnings growth. Analysts do incorporate output growth forecasts, but these actually
bear no relevant information for firm-level earnings growth. Hence, analysts better ignore
this information altogether for their earnings forecasts. Inflation forecasts are taken into
account appropriately. These results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics,
including prior-year earnings growth, market value, analyst coverage and the price-to-book
ratio.
In addition, we show that firm transparency determines analyst behaviour as we docu-
ment analysts’ earnings forecasts to be more efficient for transparent stocks. We distinguish
between transparent and non-transparent stocks based on either the availability of an ADR
listing, or the publication of the annual report within three months after the fiscal year
9If we look back over 1 month (3 months) our sample contains 35% (10%) stale forecasts.
10Detailed results are available upon request.
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end. For both measures of transparency we find that analysts correctly take into account
(all) macro economic forecasts as well as the prior-year earnings growth. This result con-
firms Bae et al. (2006) and Lim (2001)’s conclusion that analysts’ earnings forecast bias is
related to the information uncertainty environment.
Overall our findings suggest the usefulness of macroeconomic forecast information in
earnings forecasts for emerging market companies. Note that our results offer analysts, as
well as investors, immediate possibilities for improving their earnings forecasts. Companies,
on the other hand, can facilitate analysts in their earnings forecasts by increasing their
transparency, for example by publishing their annual reports promptly after the fiscal
year end. Finally, our findings provide evidence on the importance of political stability in
emerging markets. Countries benefit from increased political stability in terms of higher
earnings growth.
Future research could consider the role of macroeconomic information in individual an-
alysts’ earnings forecasts. More specifically we suggest to look at the difference between
local analysts and foreign analysts. Bae et al. (in press), for example, find that local an-
alysts have an economically and statistically significant advantage over foreign analysts.
It would be interesting to examine whether the use of macroeconomic information also
differs between domestic and foreign analysts. Furthermore, we have implicitly assumed
a specific (quadratic) loss function for analysts and a constant relation between macro-
economic information and earnings forecasts over time and across countries and individual
stocks. Following Basu and Markov (2004) and Rodriguez (2005) a closer look at the ef-
fect of these assumptions may provide more empirical evidence for analysts’ inefficiency in
emerging markets earnings forecasts.
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Appendix: Huber’s Generalized M-estimator
Robust estimation techniques are a convenient method to guard against the influence of
aberrant observations. In this appendix we briefly describe the Generalized M-estimator
(GM) employed in this paper in the context of a linear regression model
yi = xiβ + εi, i = 1, . . . , n, (3.7)
where β is an unknown parameter and εi are independently distributed errors. A GM
estimator of the linear regression coefficient β can be defined as the solution to a weighted
least squares equation defined by the first order condition
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ)xiwr(ri) = 0, (3.8)
where ri denotes the standardized residual, ri ≡ (yi − xiβ)/(σεwx(xi)) with σε a measure
of scale of the residuals and wx a weight function that is bounded between 0 and 1. The
weight functions wr(·) and wx(·) are chosen in such a way that i-th observation receives a
relatively small weight if either the regressor xi or the standardized residual (yi − xiβ)/σε
becomes large, such that the outlier does not influence the estimates of β and σε.
The weight function wr(ri) is specified in terms of the Huber (1981) ψ function as
wr(ri) = ψ(wr)/ri for ri 6= 0 and wr(0) = 1. The Huber ψ function is given by
ψ(rt) =

−c if rt ≤ −c,
rt if −c < rt ≤ c,
c if rt > c,
(3.9)
The tuning constant c determines the robustness and efficiency of the estimator. We use
the commonly used value of 1.345 for c as the resulting estimator has an efficiency of 95%
compared to the OLS estimator in case the errors εi are normally distributed. We use the
same function to define the regressor weights wx(xi).
The use of the weighted least squares estimator implies that the coefficient of determina-
tion for the original data, R2WLS has different characteristics than usual. Most importantly,
the R2WLS can become negative. For this reason we follow the suggestion of Verbeek (2002)
and define the R2 as the squared correlation between the actual values yi and the fitted
values yˆi = xiβˆGM, where βˆGM denotes the GM estimate of β.
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Chapter 4
The Economic Value of Fundamental
and Technical Information in
Emerging Currency Markets∗
4.1 Introduction
The literature on exchange rate forecasting has extensively analyzed the predictive content
of two types of information: news on macroeconomic fundamentals as used in structural
exchange rate models, and information from historical prices as used in technical trading
rules. Meese and Rogoff’s (1983) finding that structural models cannot outperform a naive
random walk forecast at short horizons still stands after 25 years of intense research, see
Cheung et al. (2005) for a recent assessment. There is somewhat more supportive evidence
for the usefulness of macroeconomic information for forecasting exchange rates at longer
horizons, see Mark (1995), Kilian (2001) and Berkowitz and Giorgianni (2001), among
others. In general, the performance of technical trading rules at short horizons has been
found to be considerably better, see Sweeney (1986), Levich and Thomas (1993) and Neely
and Weller (1999), with Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) providing a recent comprehensive
survey. Nevertheless, Olson (2004), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) and Neely et al. (in
press) report that the profitability of technical trading rules has weakened substantially in
∗This chapter is based on the ERIM Working paper De Zwart et al. (2008). We are grateful to Kees
Bouwman, Ron Jongen, Michael Melvin and Marno Verbeek for helpful suggestions. We would also like to
thank participants of the 2007 Conference on Heterogeneous Agents in Financial Markets at the Radboud
University Nijmegen, the 2007 Nonlinear Economics and Finance Research Community at Keele University,
the 2nd EMG Conference 2008 on Emerging Markets Finance at Cass Business School, the 6th INFINITI
Conference on International Finance at Dublin University, and seminar participants at the University of
Groningen.
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recent years, at least for developed currencies.
The predictive ability of structural exchange rate models and technical trading rules has
generally been considered in isolation. This is quite remarkable, in the sense that surveys
among foreign exchange market participants invariably indicate that they regard both types
of information to be important factors for determining future exchange rate movements,
see Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkhoff (1997), Lui and Mole (1998), Cheung and Chinn
(2001), and Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004). Not surprisingly then, most foreign exchange
professionals use some combination of fundamental analysis and technical analysis for their
own decision making, with the relative weight given to technical analysis becoming smaller
as the forecasting (or investment) horizon becomes longer.
The weights assigned to fundamental and technical information for a given horizon
may also vary over time. For example, Frankel and Froot (1990) provide empirical evi-
dence for the switch of many professional forecasters from being “fundamentalists” (using
structural models and macro data) to acting as “chartists” (using technical trading rules)
during the second half of the 1980s. They motivate this changing behavior by the fact
that fundamentalists experienced large negative returns in the mid-1980s, when currency
prices deviated from their fundamental values. This idea of switching behavior has more
recently been formalized in so-called heterogeneous agents models. Brock and Hommes
(1997, 1998) develop equilibrium models in which agents update their beliefs about the fu-
ture profitability of investment strategies based on their past performance. These models
show that rational investors can switch between simple (costless) strategies and sophisti-
cated (costly) strategies. When all investors follow the simple strategy prices may diverge
from their fundamental value, making it worthwhile for investors to engage in sophisticated
strategies, because expected profits increase. Prices are then pushed back to their funda-
mental value and the expected net profits for sophisticated investors are turn negative.
This, which leads them to switch back to simple and costless strategies that might again
result in prices moving away from their fundamental value. These heterogeneous agents
models have recently been applied to currency markets, explicitly allowing for the presence
of both chartists and fundamentalists, see Chiarella et al. (2006), and De Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2005, 2006). The relative importance of these two types of traders (and, hence,
the two types of information) varies over time as investors are assumed to switch between
strategies according to their relative past performance. De Grauwe and Markiewicz (2006)
offer an alternative interpretation of these models, in which market participants combine
technical analysis and fundamental information in order to forecast future foreign exchange
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rates, with weights varying over time as a function of past profitability.
Most research on exchange rate forecasting has focused on developed markets. Scarcely
any attention has been paid to emerging market currencies, possibly due to the fact that
many emerging countries maintained a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime until fairly
recently.1 Since the mid-1990s, approximately, more and more countries have switched to
a floating exchange rate regime, such that by now the time series length as well as the
cross-sectional breadth are sufficient to warrant a meaningful investigation of exchange
rate predictability in emerging markets. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to
conduct such an analysis. Previous empirical research on heterogeneous agents models has
also been limited to developed currency markets, such as Vigfusson (1997) and De Jong
et al. (2006). These studies report only limited evidence supporting the switching behavior
between fundamentalist and chartist strategies based on past performance that is assumed
in the theoretical models.
In this paper we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the economic value of technical
and fundamental information in emerging currency markets. Specifically, we assess the
performance of currency trading strategies based on monthly fundamental information
derived from the real interest rate differential, GDP growth, and the ratio of money supply
to foreign exchange reserves, as well as a set of daily moving average technical trading rules.
We implement these strategies for all freely floating emerging market currencies relative to
the US dollar over the period 1995-2007. We also consider combined strategies in which
both chartist and fundamentalist information are used, in line with the actual behavior of
market participants, as discussed above. In particular, we examine a dynamic combination
scheme with time-varying weights according to the relative profitability of the fundamental
and technical strategies. As a benchmark we employ a naive strategy that assigns constant
and equal weights to the two types of information. Throughout the empirical analysis, we
also consider nine developed currencies as a control sample.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, both fundamentalist and chartist
strategies generate economically and statistically significant Sharpe ratios for emerging
currency markets. This finding is consistent with McNown and Wallace (1989), who doc-
ument that fundamentalist trading strategies perform well in four emerging markets over
the period 1972-1986. Our positive results for technical trading rules provide out-of-sample
1One aspect of exchange rate forecasting in emerging markets that did receive ample attention in
the past is prediction of currency crises, in particular by means of so-called early warning systems, see
Kaminsky (2006) for a detailed overview.
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evidence for the profits described by Martin (2001) and Lee et al. (2001a) for the early
1990s.
Second, we document that naively combining chartist and fundamentalist strategies
generates positive risk-adjusted returns that are both economically and statistically signif-
icant. Moreover, the performance of the combined strategy is much more consistent and
stable across currencies than the individual fundamentalist and chartist strategies. This
provides convincing evidence for the complementary value of technical and fundamental
information as suggested by questionnaires among currency traders. The dynamic com-
bined strategies, where the weights assigned to fundamentalist and chartist strategies vary
according to their past performance, do not increase the profitability of the trading strat-
egy relative to the naive combination. Thus, we find only limited empirical support for
the enhanced profitability of the investment strategies based on the heterogeneous agents
models of Chiarella et al. (2006) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006).
Third, for developed currency markets we find that fundamental trading strategies
render statistically and economically significant Sharpe ratios, but this is not the case for
the chartist strategies. This result is in line with Abhyankar et al. (2005), who conclude
that investors may benefit from fundamental exchange rate models trading the US dollar
against the Canadian dollar, Japanese Yen, and British Pound over the period 1977-2000.
It also corroborates the findings of Olson (2004), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) and Neely
et al. (in press), who document that returns to technical trading strategies in developed
markets have declined over time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the
data. We examine the performance of the fundamentalist and chartist strategies individ-
ually in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. In Section 4.5 we integrate the chartist and
fundamentalist information into combined strategies. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.6.
4.2 Data description
Our analysis is most relevant for exchange rates under a free float, as currency prices in this
system are determined in principle by demand and supply, although intervention activities
of central banks cannot be ruled out completely.2 Data before 1995 is thus not considered,
as most of the countries in our sample adopted a floating exchange rate regime around
2We refer to the conference notes of the IMF ‘High-Level seminar on exchange rate regimes: Hard peg
or free floating?’ for an overview of central bank intervention activity in the emerging currency markets,
see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2001/err/eng/.
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that time or later.3 In total we examine the currencies of 23 emerging markets which
currently have a (managed) floating exchange rate system: the Argentine peso, Brazilian
real, Chilean peso, Colombian peso, Mexican peso and Peruvian sol from Latin-America;
the Indian rupee, Indonesian rupiah, Kazakhstan tenge, Korean won, Malaysian ringitt,
Phillipine peso, Sri Lanka rupee, Taiwanese dollar and Thai bath from Asia; and the Czech
koruna, Hungarian forint, Israeli shekel, Polish zloty, Romanian leu, Slovak koruna, South
African rand, and Turkish lira from Europe, Middle-East, and Africa (EMEA). All of these
currencies became floating at some point between January 1995 and June 2007. Figure
4.1 shows the historical development of the number of emerging market countries with a
floating exchange rate regime in our sample. The exact dates of the the currencies’ floats
are given in Table 4.1.
We employ daily and monthly exchange rates for the technical trading rules and the
fundamental models, respectively. The exchange rates correspond to Reuters 07:00 GMT
middle rate fixings against the US dollar.4 All exchange rates are expressed in the standard
way, that is, as the price of one US dollar in the emerging market currency. The sample
period runs from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2007 (3260 daily and 150 monthly obser-
vations), where it is to be understood that each currency is included in the analysis only
six months after the start of its floating exchange rate regime. In practice, most investors
will hold off investing in a currency for some time to avoid the often dramatic exchange
rate movements immediately following the float of a currency. The market has sufficiently
‘cooled down’ after about half a year for most currencies.
A common instrument that can be used for sec investments in the currency market is
the currency forward contract. These instruments enable us to invest in a currency without
owning any underlying assets, for example bonds or stocks, in the country. With the help
of the forward contract we lock in a specific foreign exchange rate in the future.
3In the late 1980s many emerging market countries pegged their currency to the US dollar or a basket
of developed currencies to achieve price stability after a period of (hyper-)inflation. Some countries used
a crawling peg, where the currency was allowed to depreciate at a steady rate such that the local inflation
rate could be higher than the pegged rate. A side effect of the emerging markets currency crises during
the 1990s has been that most emerging markets changed their exchange rate system from a pegged to a
floating regime. Currently, only a small number of emerging market countries still maintain a (crawling)
peg regime: China (pegged to the US dollar), Russia (pegged to a basket of the US dollar and euro),
Vietnam (US dollar) and Pakistan (US dollar).
4Results for the Eastern European currencies (CZK, SKK, PLN, HUF and RON) relative to the EUR
are similar and available upon request.
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Figure 4.1: Number of emerging market countries with a floating currency.
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The figure shows the number of emerging market countries with a floating exchange rate regime over the
period December 1994 – June 2007.
The investment return on a currency is then defined as the difference between this forward
rate and the future spot rate:
rt = st − ft−1,t (4.1)
where st is the log spot rate at time t and ft−1,t is the log forward rate at time t − 1
maturing at time t. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the forward rate is given by:
Ft−1,t = St−1 exp(iEMt−1 − iUSt−1) (4.2)
where iEMt−1 and i
US
t−1 are the cash interest rates in the emerging country and the US, re-
spectively. The cash rate is generally the offshore deposit rate for money deposited in the
currency and maturity that matches the maturity of the forward contract, for example the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for US dollars.5 Substitution of (4.2) in (4.1)
leads to the return on a foreign exchange investment:
rt = st − st−1 + iUSt−1 − iEMt−1 (4.3)
5The cash rates are quoted on an annualized basis. For our return calculations the cash rates are scaled
to the a daily or monthly basis by dividing the rate by 360 days and multiplying by the number of days
that a position will be held.
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Many studies on trading strategies for developed exchange rate markets disregard the
interest rate differential as the influence on profitability is found to be negligible, see
Sweeney (1986) and LeBaron (1999), among others. For emerging markets the interest rate
differentials can be substantial, as shown below, and therefore should be taken into account
for a fair judgement of the investment returns. We obtain interest rates from two different
sources: Bloomberg and the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The
monthly IFS data has the advantage that it is available for a longer time period, while
the Bloomberg data is updated on a daily basis. As daily data entails more information,
Bloomberg interbank interest rates are used from the moment they are available; otherwise
IFS deposit rates are used.6
Summary statistics for the monthly returns of the emerging markets currencies are
reported in Table 4.1.7 The Turkish lira has the best performance with an annualized
mean return of 25.6 percent per year, relative to the US dollar. Note that the Turkish
lira hardly moved during its floating period (February 2001 - June 2007), but an investor
was more than compensated by the interest rate differential of 25.4 percent per year. The
Taiwanese dollar has the worst performance with an average return of –2.45 percent per
year. The annualized standard deviations of the monthly returns range between a low of
3.4 percent for the Malaysian ringitt (July 2005 - June 2007) and a high of 26.5 percent
for the Indonesian Rupiah (August 1997 - June 2007). For 12 of the 23 currencies the
kurtosis is (much) higher than three, indicating a high peak and fat tails in the empirical
distribution of the returns relative to a normal distribution. The tail behavior of emerging
market currencies is studied in detail by Candelon and Straetmans (2006). The unreported
Jarque-Bera test shows that almost none of the currency returns are Gaussian, due to the
high kurtosis and the nonzero skewness. The example of the Turkish lira mentioned above
already suggests that we should not disregard the interest rate differential when computing
the investment return on the emerging market currencies. This is confirmed by the last
two columns of Table 4.1, showing that the average interest rate differential is even larger
than the spot rate return for 11 out of 23 currencies.
6Interest rates are available for different maturities. We use the three-month rates because our final
trading strategy (see Section 4.5) holds its positions for three months on average. All interest rates are
reported on an annualized basis. For daily performance evaluation we use the ‘actual/365’ day count
convention for all countries.
7The (unreported) descriptive statistics for the daily returns show similar patterns, although the kurtosis
is higher. This corresponds quite well with the stylized fact of asset returns that non-normality (in
particular peakedness and fat tails) becomes more pronounced at higher frequencies
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics currency returns
Currency Float Mean Stdev Skew. Kurt. FX IRD
Emerging
Taiwanese dollar (TWD) Dec-94 2.45 5.52 0.06 5.43 1.9 0.6
Peruvian sol (PEN) Dec-94 −3.17 4.00 −0.12 4.12 2.7 −5.8
Indian rupee (INR) Dec-94 0.04 5.05 0.74 5.13 2.0 −1.9
Mexican peso (MXN) Dec-94 −8.23 9.06 0.53 1.68 4.4 −12.7
S. African rand (ZAR) Jan-95 −2.07 15.37 0.20 1.21 5.5 −7.6
Czech koruna (CZK) May-97 −5.45 11.57 −0.27 −0.20 −4.5 −1.0
Israeli shekel (ILS) Jun-97 −1.82 7.41 1.45 5.46 1.9 −3.8
Thai bath (THB) Jul-97 −3.55 11.97 −2.43 18.33 −3.3 −0.3
Phillipine peso (PHP) Jul-97 −4.70 8.43 −0.05 4.43 1.4 −6.1
Indonesian rupiah (IDR) Aug-97 −11.97 26.49 −0.64 8.83 0.4 −12.3
Korean won (KRW) Dec-97 −5.47 9.60 −0.14 4.58 −4.6 −0.8
Slovak koruna (SKK) Oct-98 −8.92 10.26 −0.24 −0.29 −6.2 −2.7
Brazilian real (BRL) Feb-99 −13.31 17.61 1.10 5.24 0.9 −14.2
Chilean peso (CLP) Sep-99 0.19 9.27 −0.14 −0.34 0.7 −0.5
Colombian peso (COP) Sep-99 −5.05 9.14 −0.12 3.30 0.1 −5.1
Polish zloty (PLN) Apr-00 −11.80 11.01 0.08 −0.30 −7.1 −4.7
Turkish lira (TRY) Feb-01 −25.64 16.68 0.34 1.93 −0.2 −25.4
Hungarian forint (HUF) May-01 −13.45 12.02 0.59 1.16 −7.7 −5.7
Sri Lanka rupee (LKR) Dec-01 −4.59 3.92 −1.39 9.41 2.9 −7.5
Argentine peso (ARS) Jan-02 −13.77 9.28 −1.38 2.40 −4.1 −9.6
Romanian leu (RON) Oct-04 −9.85 8.93 0.17 −0.90 −8.0 −1.9
Kazakhstan tenge (KZT) Dec-04 −5.09 6.40 1.21 3.65 −4.1 −1.0
Malaysian ringitt (MYR) Jul-05 −4.41 3.44 0.43 0.19 −6.0 1.6
Developed
Australian dollar (AUD) Dec-94 −2.59 9.88 0.21 −0.04 −1.3 −1.2
Canadian dollar (CAD) Dec-94 −1.84 6.33 −0.09 0.01 −2.1 0.3
UK sterling (GBP) Dec-94 −3.04 7.26 0.03 −0.14 −1.9 −1.1
Japanese yen (JPY) Dec-94 7.13 11.02 −0.88 4.72 3.1 4.0
Euro (EUR/DEM) Dec-94 1.31 9.37 −0.25 0.06 0.2 1.1
Swiss franc (CHF) Dec-94 3.14 9.87 −0.28 −0.39 0.5 2.7
Norwegian krone (NOK) Dec-94 −0.99 9.99 −0.12 0.58 −0.5 −0.5
Swedish krona (SEK) Dec-94 −0.14 10.13 −0.31 −0.01 −0.5 0.4
N. Zealand dollar (NZD) Dec-94 −3.70 10.58 0.28 0.43 −1.3 −2.4
Note: The table shows annualized statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) of
monthly returns on 23 emerging markets and 9 developed market foreign exchange rates (based on a
long US dollar position and a short position in the emerging market) for the period January 1995 -
June 2007. The returns include the spot rate change as well as the interest rate differential between
the US and the specific country. Columns 7-8 report the average, annualized return on the foreign
exchange rate (FX) and the average, annualized interest rate differential (IRD), respectively.
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Table 4.1 also includes summary statistics of our developed markets control sample.
This sample holds the G10 currencies: Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, UK pound,
Japanese yen, Euro, Swiss franc, Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, and the New Zealand
dollar, all relative to the US dollar. We use the German Deutschmark for the history of
the euro prior to 1999. The New Zealand dollar performs best with an annualized return
of 3.7 percent. The Japanese yen shows the worst performance with an average return
of −7.1 percent per year. The average volatility is 9.4 percent, with much less variation
across currencies than for the emerging markets.
Finally, we compute the cross-correlations of the monthly returns. The average correla-
tion between all possible pairs of emerging markets exchange rates is 0.18. Most correlations
are in fact close to zero, although some currencies within the same region have a correlation
of up to 0.50 for Asia and 0.75 for Europe. These small correlations are advantageous for
our empirical analysis, as it means that the trading strategies can benefit from diversifi-
cation if we combine the currencies in a portfolio. The cross-correlations among emerging
market currencies are considerably smaller than those for the developed exchange rates,
which generally exceed 0.75. For example, the correlation between the euro and Swiss
Franc is equal to 0.94. The main exception is the correlation of the Japanese yen with the
other developed currencies, which is substantially lower and equals 0.32 on average.
4.3 Fundamentalist trading strategies
Fundamentalists believe that the exchange rate is intimately linked to macroeconomic
variables such as output, inflation, and the trade balance, among others. Hence, news in
these economic “fundamentals” is responsible for exchange rate movements. A wide variety
of structural exchange rate models is available that might be used for forecasting the future
exchange rate. Cheung et al. (2005) conclude that “old-fashioned”, basic structural models,
such as the real interest rate differential (see Frankel (1979), for example) perform at least
as good as more recent, elaborate models. This motivates us to use relatively simple
structural models in our empirical analysis. In particular, we assume that fundamentalists
derive their exchange rate forecasts from information on the real interest rate differential,
the growth rate of GDP, and the growth rate of the ratio of the money supply (M2) to
foreign exchange reserves.8 Furthermore, we do not explicitly estimate regression models
8Data on inflation, GDP, M2 and Reserves are taken from the IFS database. The Taiwan data comes
from the website of the Taiwanese Central Bank.
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that include these variables like Garrat and Lee (2007). Instead we simply use them to
generate buy and sell signals for the different currencies based on a prediction of the sign
of the exchange rate return in the next month, as explained in detail below. On the
one hand, this is motivated by the fact that the time period during which the emerging
market currencies are floating generally is already rather short. Using part of the available
sample for model estimation would leave only a very limited number of observations for
out-of-sample forecasting. On the other hand, as pointed out by Leitch and Tanner (1991),
among others, correctly forecasting the sign of asset returns is perhaps more crucial than
forecasting their magnitude when it comes to economic forecast evaluation measures such
as the performance of trading strategies.
The three macroeconomic variables are used to generate buy and sell signals as follows.
First, we consider the real interest rate differential (RID) as an example. Given the high
inflation in emerging markets we do not consider the nominal differential but the real
interest differential, see Isaac and de Mel (2001) for discussion of the real interest rates
differential literature. The RID forecasting rule can be thought of in terms of the variable
RID t, defined as
RID t =
{
1 if iEMt−1 − piEMt−1 < iUSt−1 − piUSt−1,
−1 otherwise, (4.4)
where iXt−1 is the short-term interest in country X and pi
X
t−1 is the corresponding inflation
rate. The values 1 and −1 for RID t correspond to a long position in the US dollar and
in the emerging market currency, respectively. In other words, in month t we take a long
(short) position in the emerging market currency if its real interest rate in month t− 1 is
above (below) the US one.
The levels of GDP in the countries under consideration differ substantially, therefore we
consider the relative GDP growth rates as more appropriate for forecasting the direction
of the future exchange rate movement. As higher GDP growth leads to higher income,
we expect an increased demand for money and therefore a stronger currency. Hence, we
take a long position in the emerging market currency if its GDP growth over the past 12
months was higher than the US GDP growth, and a short position when GDP growth was
lower. The GDP buy-sell indicator may thus be defined as
GDP t =
{
1 if ∆GDPEMt−1 < ∆GDP
US
t−1,
−1 otherwise, (4.5)
where ∆GDPXt−1 is the GDP growth rate in country X.
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Our third and final fundamental variable, the growth rate of the ratio of M2 money
supply (M2) to foreign exchange reserves (RES), influences exchange rates through the
rules of demand and supply. A loss of international reserves or a large rise in the domestic
money supply can lead to less confidence in a currency and therefore less demand and more
supply. Let ∆
(
M2Xt−1
RESXt−1
)
denote the 12-month growth rate of the money-reserves ratio in
country X in period t− 1. The investment decision is based on the buy-sell indicator
M 2Rt =
{
1 if ∆
(
M2EMt−1
RESEMt−1
)
> ∆
(
M2USt−1
RESUSt−1
)
−1 otherwise,
(4.6)
that is, we take a long position in the currency with the lowest growth of the money-reserves
ratio.
Although in the following we also consider the strategies based on the RID, GDP
and M 2R signals individually, we mainly focus on an investor who combines the different
fundamental signals for making her ultimate decision. Of course, there are infinitely many
ways to combine the three pieces of information. Here we take the simple average of the
three signals, that is
Ft =
RID t +GDP t +M 2Rt
3
. (4.7)
Note that the combined fundamentalist signal will be +1 (+1/3) if all three (two) strategies
are negative on the non-US currency, and vice versa.
The fundamental buy-sell indicators RID t, GDP t, M 2Rt, and Ft are used to implement
trading strategies with monthly rebalancing. The return of the fundamental strategy based
on signal Yt for currency i, r
Y
i,t, is computed as r
Y
i,t = Yt · rt,i, where ri,t is the return on
a short position in the non-US currency (and thus a long position in the US dollar) for
month t. This is a long-short investment strategy, because we will be long in one currency
and short in the other currency. The risk free rate is therefore an appropriate benchmark.
For this reason we use the Sharpe Ratio as the main criterion to judge the performance of
the strategies, because our returns are self financed (excess) returns.
The strategies are implemented for all the emerging and developed currencies individ-
ually. In addition, we consider the performance of equally-weighted (EW) and volatility-
weighted (VW) portfolios. The weights in the latter portfolio are set proportional to the
inverse of the ex post volatility of the spot rates, as measured by the standard deviation
over the whole sample period. This is based on the idea that in that case each currency
contributes an approximately equal amount to the total portfolio risk. The return of the
100
96 Fundamentalist trading strategies
equal-weighted and volatility weighted portfolios are computed as
rY,EWt =
1
nt
∑
i²Ωt
rYi,t and r
Y,V W
t =
1∑
i²Ωt
1
σi
∑
i²Ωt
1
σi
rYi,t (4.8)
where Ωt is the set of available currencies at time t, nt the number of currencies in Ωt at t,
and σi is the volatility of the spot rate for country i. We acknowledge that the use of the
full-sample standard deviation to weight the currencies entails some form of data-snooping
and also avoids the fact that, especially for the emerging markets, the volatilities vary
over time. More advanced weighting schemes using an ex ante volatility measure would,
however, put serious limitations on the sample period available for forecast evaluation.
Hence, these are left for future research.
The results for the fundamental strategies based on the individual RID, GDP and
M 2R signals are summarized in Table 4.2. Several interesting conclusions emerge. First,
the performance of the strategies for individual currencies based on RID or GDP is on
average positive, while the performance of theM 2R strategy is mostly negative. Especially
for the GDP strategy the average return is also significantly different from zero (in terms
of t-values at a 5 percent significance level) for quite a large number of currencies, while
no significantly negative average returns occur. The M 2R strategy renders a significantly
negative average return for two individual countries, compared to only one significantly
positive return. Thus, the RID and GDP strategies seem to provide considerably more
accurate forecasts of future exchange rate movements than the M 2R strategy. Within the
strategies the results vary dramatically across countries. For example, the average returns
on the RID strategy range between 14.3 and –5.1 percent for Turkey and Kazakhstan,
respectively. For the other strategies the variation is even more pronounced. This also
shows up in the volatilities of the individual strategies, see India and Slovakia, for example.
For the developed currencies, we also find that the M 2R strategy performs relatively
worse for most countries. A difference with the emerging markets is, however, that the real
interest rate differential seems to be more informative for the exchange rate movements
than the relative GDP growth rates. Except for the Swedish krona, the RID strategy results
in positive average returns for all developed currencies, which furthermore are statistically
significant for four of the eight countries.
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Table 4.2: Performance of fundamental trading strategies
Average return Standard deviation
RID GDP M 2R RID GDP M 2R
Emerging
TWD −0.21 −0.87 −1.37 5.6 5.6 5.5
PEN 3.20∗ 2.38∗ −1.02 4.0 4.0 4.1
INR 2.66∗∗ −0.04 0.75 5.0 5.0 5.0
MXN 4.01 9.59∗ −1.33 9.3 8.9 9.4
ZAR 1.02 2.11 −7.70∗∗ 15.4 15.4 15.2
CZK 0.20 7.48∗ 1.45 11.7 11.5 11.7
ILS 1.82 0.97 −1.98 7.4 7.4 7.4
THB 1.57 −1.15 −3.35 12.0 12.0 12.2
PHP 2.66 4.70∗∗ −3.06 8.5 8.4 8.5
IDR −4.72 11.64 −4.68 26.7 26.5 26.7
KRW 3.15 −2.33 5.14 9.7 9.7 9.6
SKK 1.31 8.64∗ 6.02∗∗ 10.6 10.3 10.4
BRL 13.31∗ 11.48∗∗ 2.67 17.6 17.7 18.0
CLP 5.39 −0.19 −4.65 9.1 9.3 9.2
COP 1.20 6.33∗∗ 0.88 9.3 9.1 9.3
PLN 8.73∗ 4.90 5.04 11.2 11.4 11.4
TRY 14.30∗ 25.64∗ −19.64∗ 17.8 16.7 17.4
HUF 7.09 14.20∗ −8.96∗∗ 12.5 11.9 12.4
LKR 0.41 4.59∗ 2.14 4.1 3.9 4.1
ARS −0.69 13.77∗ −11.83∗ 10.1 9.3 9.5
RON −0.81 9.85 14.07∗∗ 9.4 8.9 8.4
KZT −5.09 5.09 −2.86 6.4 6.4 6.5
MYR −4.41 4.41 −1.58 3.4 3.4 3.6
Developed
AUD 5.61∗ 5.95∗ −0.10 9.8 9.8 9.9
CAD 0.93 −2.63 −2.91 6.3 6.3 6.3
GBP 1.58 3.23 −0.25 7.3 7.3 7.3
JPY 5.85∗∗ 7.13∗ −7.84∗ 11.1 11.0 11.0
EUR 5.42∗ 1.39 0.16 9.3 9.4 9.4
CHF 7.26∗ 3.03 0.20 9.7 9.9 9.9
NOK 3.79 −4.45 −2.10 9.9 9.9 10.0
SEK −0.76 −2.26 5.86∗ 10.1 10.1 10.0
NZD 1.00 11.57∗ 0.02 10.6 10.1 10.6
Portfolios
EM-EW 2.21∗∗ 4.32∗ −1.63 4.1 4.2 4.2
EM-VW 1.49∗ 2.49∗ −0.64 1.9 1.9 1.6
DEV-EW 3.41∗ 2.55∗ −0.77 5.3 3.9 4.3
DEV-VW 3.23∗ 2.18∗ −0.79 5.1 3.8 4.0
Note: The table shows average return, in annualized percentage points, and
standard deviations for the fundamental strategies based on the real interest
differential (RID), relative GDP growth (GDP) and relative growth in the
M2 to reserves ratio (M 2R) applied to all exchange rates over their floating
currency regime periods (see Table 4.1). * and ** indicate that the average
return is significantly different from zero at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The results in Table 4.2 do not take into account transaction costs. To investigate
the influence of such costs, we record the number of transactions in each strategy and
compute break-even transaction costs. The average number of transactions per year is
equal to approximately 1, 0.5 and 1.5 for the RID, GDP and M 2R strategies, respectively.
Compared to trend strategies these numbers are rather low (as shown in the next section),
which results in relatively high levels of break-even transaction costs. For most countries
and strategies having a positive performance, break-even transaction costs exceed 2 percent,
which for most currencies is clearly above the level of transactions costs encountered in
practice by a large institutional investor. More detailed results on the RID, GDP and
M 2R strategies are not shown here to save space, but are available upon request.
Combining the individual currencies in a portfolio results in significantly positive re-
turns for the RID- and GDP -based strategies, except for the equally-weighted emerging
market portfolio based on the real interest rate differential. The benefits of diversification
across currencies become clear by noting the low volatilities of the portfolio returns. For
the emerging markets, we also observe a substantial difference in returns for the equally-
weighted and volatility-weighted portfolios, especially for the GDP strategy. This is due to
the fact that the countries generating the highest average returns for this strategy, includ-
ing Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia and Brazil, also have the highest exchange rate volatility
(see Table 4.1) and thus receive a relatively small weight in the volatility-weighted port-
folio. The reduction in average return from 4.32 to 2.49 percent when going from equal
weighting to volatility weighting is, however, more than compensated by the reduction
in volatility, from 4.2 to 1.9, such that the Sharpe ratio in fact increases. For the M 2R
strategy the portfolio performances are negative, albeit insignificant, as expected from the
poor performance of this strategy for the individual currencies.
Our next step is to combine the individual fundamental signals, as in (4.7). Table 4.3
reports results of this combined strategy. The most pronounced effect of combining the
three fundamental signals is a substantial reduction in volatility. For almost all currencies,
the volatility of the combined strategy is about 50% lower compared to the individual
strategies. The same applies to the volatility at the portfolio level. At the same time,
the average portfolio returns for the combined strategy are also lower than those for the
individual RID and GDP strategies, due to the inclusion of the poorly performing M 2R
strategy. The reduction in returns is relatively small though compared to the emerging
market RID strategy, such that the resulting Sharpe ratio is considerably higher. For the
volatility-weighted portfolio, for example, the Sharpe ratio reaches 0.96, compared to 0.80
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Table 4.3: Performance of combined fundamentalist trading strategy
Mean Stdev Sharpe t-value #TR BETC
Emerging
TWD −0.81 3.6 −0.23 −0.79 1.02 −0.4
PEN 1.52 2.2 0.70 2.42 1.13 0.7
INR 1.12 2.7 0.42 1.45 0.52 1.1
MXN 4.09 5.6 0.73 2.53 0.88 2.3
ZAR −1.52 10.1 −0.15 −0.52 0.58 −1.3
CZK 3.04 7.0 0.43 1.35 1.31 1.2
ILS 0.27 3.9 0.07 0.21 0.87 0.2
THB −0.97 5.0 −0.19 −0.58 1.39 −0.4
PHP 1.43 5.2 0.28 0.85 0.88 0.8
IDR 0.75 11.4 0.07 0.20 0.86 0.4
KRW 1.99 5.4 0.37 1.11 1.03 1.0
SKK 5.32 5.7 0.94 2.69 0.89 3.0
BRL 9.16 10.0 0.92 2.59 0.80 5.7
CLP 0.18 5.4 0.03 0.09 1.45 0.1
COP 2.80 4.5 0.62 1.68 0.50 2.8
PLN 6.22 7.2 0.86 2.23 1.09 2.9
TRY 6.77 10.5 0.64 1.56 0.62 5.5
HUF 4.11 7.1 0.58 1.39 0.88 2.3
LKR 2.38 2.4 1.00 2.23 0.67 1.8
ARS 0.42 3.4 0.12 0.27 0.67 0.3
RON 9.30 4.0 2.32 2.76 1.71 2.7
KZT −0.95 2.2 −0.44 −0.63 0.32 −1.5
MYR −0.53 1.2 −0.43 −0.53 0.44 −0.6
Developed
AUD 3.82 7.0 0.55 1.90 1.19 1.6
CAD −1.54 2.8 −0.56 −1.94 1.24 −0.6
GBP 1.52 3.6 0.43 1.48 0.99 0.8
JPY 1.71 6.8 0.25 0.88 0.39 2.2
EUR 2.32 4.9 0.48 1.66 0.47 2.5
CHF 3.50 5.2 0.67 2.32 0.74 2.3
NOK −0.92 5.8 −0.16 −0.55 1.32 −0.3
SEK 0.95 4.7 0.20 0.70 1.93 0.2
NZD 4.20 6.2 0.67 2.35 0.86 2.5
Portfolios
EM-EW 1.65 2.41 0.68 2.37 1.28 0.6
EM-VW 1.11 1.15 0.96 3.35 0.90 0.6
DEV-EW 1.73 2.52 0.69 2.39 1.46 0.6
DEV-VW 1.51 2.32 0.65 2.27 1.03 0.7
Note: The table shows mean return (in annualized percentage points), stan-
dard deviation, the Sharpe ratio and its t-value, the average number of trans-
actions per year (#TR) and the breakeven transaction costs (BETC) for
the fundamental strategy combining signals from the real interest differen-
tial (RID), relative GDP growth (GDP) and relative growth in the M2 to
reserves ratio (M 2R), applied to all exchange rates over their floating cur-
rency regime periods (see Table 4.1). Transactions are reported as the single
counted average number of transactions per year; therefore turnover is twice
the number of transactions. The four bottom lines report the same statis-
tics for equally-weighted (EW) and volatility-weighted (VW) portfolios for
emerging (EM) and developed (DEV) markets.
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for the corresponding portfolio in the RID strategy. Due to the larger return difference, the
combined strategy performs worse than the GDP -based strategy, which achieves a Sharpe
of 1.30. The decline in average returns is also much larger for the developed portfolios,
such that both the individual RID and GDP strategies outperform the combined strategy.
Returning to the results for individual emerging market currencies, we observe that the
performance differences across countries of the combined strategy are much less extreme
than for the individual strategies in Table 4.2. We find positive average returns for 18 of
the 23 currencies, while none of the five negative average returns are significant. In sum,
combining the fundamental signals results in an attractive and fairly robust fundamentalist
trading strategy.
4.4 Chartist trading strategies
Among the different types of technical trading rules employed by chartists moving average
rules are by far the most popular. The general idea of these rules is to give a buy signal
when a fast moving average of the spot rate over the previous K days is above a slow
moving average taken over the previous L days, that is
MAt(K,L) =
{
1 if 1
K
∑K
k=1 St−k ≥ 1L
∑L
l=1 St−l,
−1 otherwise, (4.9)
where K < L. Moving average rules are sometimes referred to as trend-following rules, as
they generate long (short) signals when the exchange rate has recently been rising (falling).
We compute the returns of the moving average strategy as before, with the difference that
the signal in (4.9) is updated daily.
The results of moving average rules are known to be sensitive to the choice of K and
L. To prevent that our conclusions are based on one specific parameter setting, we decide
to combine a range of moving average rules instead of testing one particular rule. To
determine a reasonable range for the lengths of the fast and slow moving averages, we vary
K between 1 – 20 days in steps of one day and L between 25 – 200 days in steps of 5 days.
Figure 4.2 shows the empirical results for the individual moving average strategies based
on (4.9) for each of the resulting 720 different combinations of K and L. Panels (a) and
(b) of Figure 4.2 show the average t-values for the 23 emerging markets currencies and for
the nine developed currencies, respectively. For the emerging markets we observe that the
average t-value of these strategies is positive for all settings. The average t-values are high
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Figure 4.2: Moving average strategy heat-maps.
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The figure shows the heat-map of the average t-values for moving average strategies with the short term
moving average ranging between 1 – 20 days and the long term moving average between 25 – 200 days. The
average t-value of the emerging markets in panel a) is based the average of 23 emerging market currencies.
The developed market average in panel b) is based on nine developed market currencies. See Section 4.2
for details
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for the models with a relatively short slow moving average (L < 100), independent of the
length of the fast moving average.
The results for the developed markets are disappointing. For all settings the t-value
is between –0.5 and 1. Closer inspection of these results reveals that they actually are
poor for each of the individual developed currencies. This finding is in line with Olson
(2004), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) and Neely et al. (in press), who report that profit
opportunities for the moving average rules in the developed currency markets disappeared
by the mid-1990s.
Based on these results we decide to select all rules with a fast moving average between 5
and 20 days and a slow moving average between 25 and 65 days, resulting in 144 combina-
tions of K and L. The simple average of the resulting buy-sell signals MAt(K,L) obtained
from (4.9) is defined as the buy-sell indicator Ct, which is employed in the chartist trading
strategy.
Table 4.4 reports the performance statistics of the chartist strategy. The trend strategy
renders a positive return for 21 of the 23 currencies, where 10 are significant at a 5% level.
One of the best risk-adjusted results is obtained for Taiwan, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.23
and t-statistic of 4.26. This is in line with Lee et al. (2001b), who find that moving
average technical trading rules work well for Taiwan over the period 1988-1995. The
high Sharpe ratios for Colombia, Romania and Kazakhstan are also worth mentioning
(1.23, 1.22 and 2.02 respectively), although their floating regime history is shorter than for
Taiwan. Negative returns, albeit not significant, are found for the Mexican peso and the
Sri Lanka rupee. Our findings for Mexico are in contrast with the positive results reported
by Lee et al. (2001a) for the period 1992-99. Apart from the different sample period, this
discrepancy can be explained by the fact that Lee et al. (2001a) do not take into account
the interest rate differential in the calculation of the exchange rate returns. As seen in
Table 4.1, with an average of 12.7 percent per year the interest rate differential is far from
negligible for the Mexican peso.
Combining the individual currencies again achieves a large reduction in risk. The equal-
weighted portfolio based on the moving average trading rules has a highly economically
and statistically significant Sharpe ratio of 1.24. The Sharpe ratio further increases to
1.52 for the volatility-weighted portfolio, as the moving average strategy performs well for
the relatively less volatile currencies (Taiwan, Peru, India, Israel and Philippines), while it
performs worse for some of the more volatile currencies (Mexico and Czech Republic).
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Table 4.4: Performance of combined chartist trading strategy
Mean Stdev Sharpe t-value #TR BETC
Emerging
TWD 5.00 4.1 1.23 4.26 5.86 0.43
PEN 2.14 3.5 0.62 2.15 6.21 0.17
INR 4.84 4.4 1.09 3.79 5.55 0.44
MXN −2.94 9.8 −0.30 −1.04 8.25 −0.18
ZAR 5.96 13.1 0.46 1.58 6.84 0.44
CZK 1.13 11.0 0.10 0.32 7.80 0.07
ILS 4.88 5.9 0.83 2.56 6.48 0.38
THB 6.22 7.8 0.80 2.46 6.45 0.48
PHP 4.63 6.3 0.73 2.26 5.91 0.39
IDR 14.53 21.4 0.68 2.08 6.87 1.06
KRW 4.53 7.8 0.58 1.75 7.29 0.31
SKK 3.52 8.7 0.41 1.16 7.22 0.24
BRL 10.92 16.4 0.67 1.88 6.39 0.85
CLP 6.14 8.3 0.74 2.01 6.41 0.48
COP 9.98 8.1 1.23 3.33 5.72 0.87
PLN 3.47 9.4 0.37 0.96 7.25 0.24
TRY 8.56 13.0 0.66 1.60 7.14 0.60
HUF 1.19 9.3 0.13 0.30 8.43 0.07
LKR −0.97 3.2 −0.30 −0.67 5.01 −0.10
ARS 3.72 7.8 0.48 1.07 7.07 0.26
RON 10.05 7.8 1.30 1.94 6.07 0.83
KZT 7.81 3.9 2.02 2.91 4.43 0.88
MYR 1.84 3.4 0.54 0.66 6.39 0.14
Developed
AUD 0.13 9.1 0.01 0.05 8.08 0.01
CAD 0.44 5.7 0.08 0.27 7.96 0.03
GBP −1.26 6.1 −0.21 −0.72 8.43 −0.07
JPY 2.94 9.1 0.32 1.12 7.71 0.19
EUR 3.43 7.8 0.44 1.53 7.50 0.23
CHF 1.10 7.8 0.14 0.49 7.92 0.07
NOK 0.04 7.8 0.00 0.02 8.24 0.00
SEK 2.25 8.5 0.26 0.91 7.67 0.15
NZD 2.10 10.1 0.21 0.72 7.98 0.13
Portfolios
EM-EW 4.52 3.63 1.24 4.32 6.65 0.34
EM-VW 2.58 1.70 1.52 5.25 6.42 0.20
DEV-EW 1.24 4.77 0.26 0.90 7.94 0.08
DEV-VW 1.07 4.60 0.23 0.80 7.96 0.07
Note: The table shows performance statistics for the technical trading strat-
egy combining signals from moving average rules with different lengths of the
fast and slow moving averages applied to all exchange rates over their floating
currency regime periods (see Table 4.1). See Table 4.3 for further details.
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Trend models with daily rebalancing as considered here may lead to high turnover. For
that reason we again consider the effects of transactions costs. Columns 6 and 7 in Table
4.4 show the number of transactions and the break-even transaction costs, respectively.
Averaged across individual currencies, the number of transactions equals approximately
6.7 per year, which means that the chartist investor trades about once every two months
in each currency. Compared to the fundamental strategies these numbers are rather high.
For most countries and strategies having a positive performance, break-even transaction
costs exceed 0.4 percent, which for most currencies is still above the level of transactions
costs encountered in practice by a large institutional investor.
Thus, based on our empirical analysis, we conclude that chartists may benefit from
applying a moving average trading rule in emerging markets currencies. Note that this is
not the case for the developed markets in our control sample. Although the average return
is positive for eight of the nine currencies, none of these are significantly different from
zero. Even combining the currencies into a portfolio does not render significantly positive
risk-adjusted returns, possibly as a result of the limited diversification potential due to the
high cross-correlations among these currencies.
4.5 Combining fundamentalist and chartist trading
strategies
In the previous two sections we analyzed the profitability of fundamentalist and chartist
investment strategies for emerging currency markets. Our empirical results indicate that
both types of strategies generate significantly positive risk-adjusted returns over the pe-
riod 1995-2007. In this section, we investigate whether the performance can be further
improved by combining fundamental and chartist information. We start by examining a
naive equally-weighted combination of both types of information. Subsequently, this is ex-
tended to a combined strategy where the relative weight given to fundamental and chartist
signals is based on their past performance.
Table 4.5 shows the performance statistics of the strategy that is based on an equally-
weighted combination of the fundamental signal Ft and the chartist signal Ct. This strategy
mimics the behavior of a currency trader who puts equal value on fundamentalist and
chartist information. The benefits of combining both sources of information is clearly borne
out by the results for the individual emerging markets. The ‘naive’ combination yields
positive risk-adjusted returns for all 23 currencies, with no less than 12 being significant
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Table 4.5: Performance of equally-weighted fundamentalist-chartist
trading strategy
Mean Stdev Sharpe t-value #TR BETC
Emerging
TWD 2.09 2.63 0.80 2.77 3.44 0.30
PEN 1.83 2.12 0.87 3.01 3.67 0.25
INR 2.98 2.83 1.06 3.67 3.04 0.49
MXN 0.57 5.35 0.11 0.37 4.57 0.06
ZAR 2.22 7.75 0.29 0.99 3.71 0.30
CZK 2.09 7.07 0.30 0.92 4.55 0.23
ILS 2.57 3.13 0.82 2.54 3.67 0.35
THB 2.72 4.38 0.62 1.87 3.92 0.35
PHP 3.03 3.34 0.91 2.79 3.39 0.45
IDR 7.70 11.11 0.69 2.12 3.86 1.00
KRW 3.26 5.29 0.62 1.86 4.16 0.39
SKK 4.42 5.46 0.81 2.33 4.06 0.54
BRL 10.04 9.10 1.10 3.10 3.59 1.40
CLP 3.16 5.05 0.63 1.69 3.93 0.40
COP 6.39 4.67 1.37 3.70 3.11 1.03
PLN 4.85 6.83 0.71 1.84 4.17 0.58
TRY 7.67 8.47 0.91 2.20 3.88 0.99
HUF 2.65 6.65 0.40 0.95 4.66 0.28
LKR 0.70 1.99 0.35 0.79 2.84 0.12
ARS 2.07 3.08 0.67 1.51 3.87 0.27
RON 10.48 5.83 1.80 2.14 3.89 1.35
KZT 3.43 2.36 1.45 2.10 2.38 0.72
MYR 0.66 1.65 0.40 0.48 3.41 0.10
Developed
AUD 1.98 6.20 0.32 1.11 4.63 0.21
CAD −0.55 2.80 −0.20 −0.68 4.60 −0.06
GBP 0.13 4.06 0.03 0.11 4.71 0.01
JPY 2.33 5.32 0.44 1.52 4.05 0.29
EUR 2.88 5.14 0.56 1.95 3.98 0.36
CHF 2.30 5.10 0.45 1.57 4.33 0.27
NOK −0.44 5.00 −0.09 −0.31 4.78 −0.05
SEK 1.60 5.04 0.32 1.10 4.80 0.17
NZD 3.15 6.48 0.49 1.69 4.42 0.36
Portfolios
EM-EW 3.08 2.22 1.39 4.81 3.97 0.39
EM-VW 1.83 1.12 1.63 5.65 3.66 0.25
DEV-EW 1.48 2.98 0.50 1.72 4.70 0.16
DEV-VW 1.30 2.83 0.46 1.60 4.50 0.15
Note: The table shows performance statistics for the equally-weighted
fundamentalist-chartist strategy applied to all exchange rates over their float-
ing currency regime periods (see Table 4.1). See Table 4.3 for further details.
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at the 5 percent level. We also note that turnover is reduced compared to the chartist
strategy in Table 4.4, such that for most currencies the break-even transaction costs are
considerably higher than transaction cost levels encountered in practice.
At the portfolio level, the highly significant Sharpe ratios equal 1.39 and 1.63 for the
equally-weighted and volatility-weighted portfolios, respectively, which also are higher than
the Sharpe ratios for the fundamental and chartist strategies individually. The Sharpe ratio
of the combined strategy is significantly higher than the fundamental strategy according
to the Jobson and Korkie (1981) test (and Memmel’s (2003) adjustment). Although the
Sharpe ratio of the chartist strategy is not significantly different from the combined strategy
at the 5% level, the Jobson-Korkie t-values of 1.80 and 1.44 for the equal and volatility
weighted portfolios, respectively, are pointing in this direction.9 This indicates that over
the past 12 years an emerging markets currency trader would have earned higher risk-
adjusted returns from combining fundamentalist and chartist trading rules, even with a
naive equally-weighted combination.
This result for emerging markets is in line with the questionnaire results obtained by
Taylor and Allen (1992), Lui and Mole (1998), Cheung and Chinn (2001), and Gehrig and
Menkhoff (2004), which indicate that foreign exchange dealers, based in the major for-
eign exchange trading centers, view technical and fundamental analysis as complementary
sources of information. In contrast, a naive combination does not seem to add sufficient
value for an investor in the developed markets. We observe that none of the individual
developed currencies has a risk-adjusted return that is statistically significant at the 5%
level. Sharpe ratios are even negative (albeit insignificant) for Canada and Norway. The
equally-weighted and volatility-weighted portfolios of developed currencies yield t-values
of 1.72 and 1.60, respectively, indicating that the risk-adjusted returns (0.50 and 0.46) are
not significantly different from zero.
In the heterogeneous agents models developed in Chiarella et al. (2006), De Grauwe
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) and De Grauwe and Markiewicz (2006), agents determine the
weights assigned to the different available investment strategies based on their relative past
performance. In order to test whether this type of strategy delivers superior returns we
consider a combined investment strategy with monthly rebalancing and dynamic weights
9Details are not reported here to save space, but are available upon request.
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Figure 4.3: The relationship between γ and dynamic weights illustrated.
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The figure shows the sensitivity of the dynamic weights in the combined fundamental-technical trading
strategy to the choice of γ in (4.10) for the Indonesian rupee.
placed on fundamental and chartist signals as follows:
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) = 1−W Ft , (4.11)
whereW Ft andW
C
t are the weights on the fundamentalist and chartist signals, respectively,
rFt and r
C
t are the returns on the fundamentalist and chartist trading strategies in month t,
and J is the length of the look-back period of the investor. The parameter γ ≥ 0 determines
the strength of the deviation from the equally weighted average and thus measures the
‘aggressiveness’ of the dynamic weighting scheme. Note that the limiting case γ = 0
implies equal weighting, as this reduces W Ft and W
C
t to 0.5. Figure 4.3 shows an example
of the sensitivity of the dynamic weights, with J = 12 months, for the choice of γ for
Indonesia over the period 2004-2007.
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Table 4.6: Performance of dynamic combined fundamentalist-chartist trading strat-
egy
Dynamic weights Equally-weighted
Mean Stdev Sharpe t-value Mean Stdev Sharpe t-value
Emerging
TWD 4.49 3.78 1.19 3.78 2.37 2.69 0.88 2.80
PEN 2.51 2.68 0.94 2.98 2.38 2.22 1.07 3.41
INR 3.78 3.17 1.19 3.79 3.12 2.60 1.20 3.81
MXN 0.05 8.19 0.01 0.02 −0.41 5.35 −0.08 −0.24
ZAR 5.29 13.81 0.38 1.21 2.18 8.40 0.26 0.82
CZK 1.83 7.00 0.26 0.72 3.12 6.72 0.46 1.29
ILS 1.99 3.91 0.51 1.40 2.62 3.16 0.83 2.29
THB 4.97 4.79 1.04 2.76 3.38 3.18 1.06 2.83
PHP 4.37 5.17 0.85 2.32 2.80 2.48 1.13 3.09
IDR 6.72 9.32 0.72 1.96 4.39 6.74 0.65 1.77
KRW 1.91 4.80 0.40 1.06 3.12 4.37 0.71 1.90
SKK 6.28 6.60 0.95 2.38 4.98 5.65 0.88 2.20
BRL 13.58 16.72 0.81 1.98 11.35 9.87 1.15 2.80
CLP 3.91 7.05 0.55 1.28 2.79 5.24 0.53 1.23
COP 7.62 6.51 1.17 2.70 6.98 5.18 1.35 3.11
PLN 1.58 6.77 0.23 0.51 4.42 6.82 0.65 1.41
TRY 4.88 10.93 0.45 0.88 7.37 7.13 1.03 2.05
HUF 1.13 5.28 0.21 0.41 1.00 5.75 0.17 0.33
LKR −0.80 1.32 −0.60 −1.05 −0.60 1.59 −0.38 −0.65
ARS 0.27 1.43 0.19 0.33 0.53 1.48 0.35 0.61
RON 22.60 5.74 3.94 1.97 23.24 5.78 4.02 2.01
KZT NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
MYR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Developed
AUD 3.21 7.98 0.40 1.28 2.44 6.67 0.37 1.16
CAD −0.72 4.47 −0.16 −0.51 −0.48 2.92 −0.17 −0.52
GBP 0.02 3.85 0.00 0.01 0.11 3.87 0.03 0.09
JPY 0.56 5.86 0.10 0.30 0.96 4.79 0.20 0.64
EUR 2.20 5.56 0.39 1.25 2.98 5.22 0.57 1.81
Portfolios
EM-EW 3.83 2.91 1.31 4.17 2.78 2.21 1.26 3.99
EM-VW 1.93 1.21 1.59 5.06 1.61 1.05 1.53 4.86
DEV-EW 1.06 3.54 0.30 0.95 1.28 3.12 0.41 1.30
DEV-VW 0.92 3.39 0.27 0.86 1.14 2.97 0.38 1.21
Note: The table shows performance statistics for the combined fundamentalist-chartist strategy
with weights determined by the relative performance during the past 12 months, applied to all
exchange rates over their floating currency regime periods in the period 1997-2007 (see Table
4.1). See Table 4.3 for further details.
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic strategy performance for varying lookback periods and γ levels.
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The figure shows dynamic weighting between fundamentalist and chartist rules. The figure shows the
Sharpe ratio of the equally weighted portfolio for different lookback periods J ranging from 1 to 24 months
and for different ‘aggressiveness’ of the dynamic strategy as measured by γ. Here γ = 0 corresponds to the
naive equally-weighted strategy, while γ = 50 corresponds to the most aggressive strategy, with weights
changes the fastest.
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In Table 4.6 we display the results from the dynamic weighting scheme in (4.10) and
(4.11) with J = 12 months and γ = 30, as well as the results of our equally-weighted
strategy for the period 1997-2007.10 The results from this dynamic approach are mixed for
the individual countries, as about 2/3 of the Sharpe ratios (and their t-values) decrease
relative to the equally-weighted strategy. Nevertheless, we observe a small increase in the
level of risk-adjusted returns for both emerging market portfolios from 1.26 and 1.53 to
1.31 and 1.59 for the equally-weighted and volatility-weighted portfolios, respectively. This
result does not depend on the particular configuration of the parameters J and γ, as can
be seen in Figure 4.4. This figure shows the Sharpe ratios of the portfolio based on the
combined strategy with dynamic weights for different look-back periods J ranging from 1
to 24 months and for different levels of ‘aggressiveness’ as measured by γ. Panel (a) of
Figure 4.4 contains the results for the emerging markets portfolio. The Sharpe ratios are
comparable for all parameter settings, although we do observe a modest increase in the
Sharpe ratio when the look-back period gets longer and the strategy becomes more aggres-
sive. The difference in Sharpe ratios between the best performing dynamic strategy (with
J = 24 and γ = 50) and the equally-weighted strategy is not significant, however.11 In
panel (b) of Figure 4.4, where we rotate the graph by 90 degrees, it can be seen that for de-
veloped currency markets the naive equally-weighted combination seems to be best within
the range of parameters considered. The Sharpe ratio declines along both dimensions with
J or γ. This leads us to the conclusion that a dynamic weighting scheme between chartists
and fundamentalists does not yield additional returns relative to a naive combination.
4.6 Conclusions
Empirical research on exchange rate forecasting has tended to focus on the usefulness
of either technical analysis or of structural exchange rate models. Both questionnaires
among foreign exchange market participants as well as recently developed heterogeneous
agents models indicate that both types of information are relevant for assessing future
exchange rate movements. In addition, the heterogeneous agents models suggest that the
relative importance of chartism and fundamentalism varies over time according to the past
performance of the corresponding trading strategies.
In this paper we analyze the economic value of combining chartist and fundamentalist
10We reduce the sample period to 1997-2007 such that the performance evaluation covers the same
period for all values of the look-back period J , which we vary between 1 and 24 months.
11More detailed results are available upon request.
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information for 23 emerging currency markets with a floating exchange rate regime over the
period 1995-2007. We document that an equally-weighted combined chartist/fundamentalist
investment strategy renders economically and statistically significant positive risk-adjusted
returns. Although both fundamentalist and chartist trading rules individually also gener-
ate positive risk-adjusted returns on average, the performance of the combined strategy
is far superior and, in particular, much more stable across countries. Notably, the dy-
namic strategy, in which the weights assigned to chartist and fundamental information
are adjusted dynamically based on relative past performance, does not outperform a naive
equally-weighted combination.
Further research can be done on the inclusion of other types of information in the
emerging currency market. In particular, it may be of interest to expand our information
set with information on (proprietary) customer order flows of investment banks, which have
been studied, as far as our knowledge, only for developed markets, see Evans and Lyons
(1999), among others. Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004), for example, document that many
foreign exchange market participants consider flow analysis as an independent third type
of information, next to technical analysis and fundamental information. The inclusion of
this additional source of information may further increase the economic value of emerging
markets currency investments. Another potential avenue for further research would be to
investigate other statistical techniques to combine fundamental and chartist information
dynamically, although it is likely that these methods require a larger number of observations
than currently available for emerging markets. Bayesian Model Averaging, for example
applied by Wright (2003) and Garrat and Lee (2007) for the developed currency markets,
can be one of these methods.
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Chapter 5
The Short-Term Corporate Bond
Return Anomaly∗
5.1 Introduction
Despite the massive size of the corporate bond market, surprisingly little is known about
to which extent dynamics of corporate bond returns are properly explained by common
risk factors. Our concern is that exceptional combinations of return and risk are achieved
through investments in specific segments of the maturity spectrum, which have received
limited attention in earlier studies about the pricing of corporate bonds. Sharpe ratios
of US Treasury bills and short term bonds are reported by Pilotte and Sterbenz (2006)
to be atypically high, while Sharpe ratios for bonds with a medium and longer maturity
are reported to be similar to the Sharpe ratios of common stocks. For corporate bonds,
Alexander (1980) applies the market model to examine return on long-term bonds, and
Gebhardt et al. (2005) find that term and default risks are able to describe the returns on
investment-grade corporate bonds with a remaining maturity of at least three years.
The few studies that concentrate on the cross-sectional determinants of corporate bond
returns have identified several proxies for non-diversifiable risk as important. Consistent
with the asset pricing theories of Merton (1973) and Ross (1976), several of these studies
suggest that bond returns are explained by loadings on factors that represent term and
default risks in the economy (Fama and French (1993), Gebhardt et al. (2005)), and by
∗This chapter is based on the working paper by Derwall et al. (2008). We are grateful to Dick van Dijk,
Ronald Kahn, Jianming Kou, Michiel de Pooter, Richard Sloan and Marno Verbeek for helpful suggestions.
We would also like to thank participants of the Interest Rate Term Structure Modelling Workshop at the
Erasmus University Rotterdam and seminar participants at Barclays Global Investors and Maastricht
University.
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premiums associated with inflation and economic development (Elton et al. (1995)). Others
have put forward factor models based on the dynamics of the term structure of Treasury
securities (e.g., Litterman and Scheinkman (1991)), one-index market models (Alexander
(1980)), and liquidity (De Jong and Driessen (2006)).
In this paper, we report that common risk factors do a good job of explaining the
cross-section of returns on corporate bond portfolios with medium to long maturity, but
significantly underestimate the returns on corporate bonds with a short maturity (but
still larger than one year). Portfolios composed of corporate bonds with lowest exposure
to a term risk factor earn anomalously positive returns. A substantial portion of short-
term corporate bond returns is independent of risk premiums associated with term risk,
default risk, yield curve dynamics, liquidity, and premiums associated with macro-economic
variables. In addition, time variation in the bonds’ factor loadings does not account for
the abnormal returns on short-term corporate bond portfolios.
We obtain bond return data from both the Lehman Investment Grade Bond Data-
base and the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. This study is the first to incorporate both
individual corporate bonds and U.S. corporate bond mutual funds to address anomalous
patterns in corporate bond returns. Studying the cross-section of returns on bond mutual
funds enriches our results, because it is usually an open question whether anomalies that
emerge from analyses based on hypothetical portfolios of individual bonds withstand im-
portant practical issues, such as short-selling restrictions, transaction costs, and illiquidity.
Earlier studies have tended to avoid such problems by excluding bonds that are prone to
pricing errors and illiquidity, such as those with particularly maturities, but this sacrifices
information about the return and risk dynamics of these particular types of bonds. The
powerful advantage of bond mutual funds is that they represent real portfolios that have
been traded at real prices, so that the usual caveats with corporate bond data are not a
concern. Our evidence of the short-term corporate bond anomaly not only shows up in
hypothetical portfolios of individual corporate bonds, but also in portfolios of corporate
bond funds.
The contribution to the literature can be summarized as follows. Our evidence con-
tributes to earlier research on the determinants of corporate bond returns by among others
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Elton et al. (1995), Gebhardt et al. (2005). Prior stud-
ies of individual corporate bonds (Alexander (1980) and Gebhardt et al. (2005)) have been
confined to bonds with medium to long-term maturity whereas this study, inspired by the
results of Pilotte and Sterbenz (2006), examines a wider range of maturity spectrums.
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In doing so, our study finds that the dynamics of short-term corporate bond returns are
inconsistent with existing risk-based explanations of the return generating process. In
addition, our study also adds to more general discussions in the asset pricing literature,
which primarily emerged from a large body of research on equity returns.1 An extension of
these discussions to a non-equity context could provide valuable insights into, for example,
the necessity of using multiple risk factors to describe the cross-section of asset returns.
Moreover, our documentation of abnormal returns on short-term corporate bonds might
facilitate a better understanding of the mechanisms that drive asset returns as such, in-
cluding behavioral explanations of investor behavior that have originally been suggested
in equity research. For example, our finding that short-term corporate bonds earn returns
that are too high given their beta displays strong parallels with the low-beta stock anomaly
reported by Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Karceski (2002).
Furthermore, the results have implications for various practical applications. Many
important fixed-income applications, such as performance evaluation, require estimates of
securities’ expected return based on an asset pricing model. Most applications critically
assume that the chosen model is correctly specified and consistent with the theoretical
conditions embedded in the risk-return paradigm. Conventional approaches to performance
attribution test whether the returns of an actively managed portfolio can be fully mimicked
by investment exposures to a set of passive indexes or risk factors. Unexplained returns of
the portfolio are attributed to managerial skill under the assumption that the factor model
is correctly specified. The presence of return anomalies, however, implies that common
factors insufficiently describe the cross-sectional variation in the returns of passive bond
portfolios. These shortcomings are consequential to the interpretation of abnormal returns
produced by actively managed fixed-income vehicles, which might reflect omitted-variables
bias instead of skilled portfolio management.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes our data.
Section 5.3 discusses the methodology. Our empirical results are described in Section 5.4.
Finally, section 5.5 concludes.
1Classical examples of studies that examine cross-sectional variation in equity returns are Fama and
French (1992, 1993, 1996), Carhart (1997), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
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5.2 Data
This study is the first to provide evidence on the adequacy of expected return models for
corporate bonds by using two comprehensive databases. We posit that these databases
jointly provide the best setting to test how well existing specifications fare in explaining
bond returns. The sample central to our analyses covers the period January 1990 to
December 2003.2
5.2.1 Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database
Following Hong et al. (2000) and Gebhardt et al. (2005), our first tests draw on a unique
database that covers individual U.S. investment grade corporate bonds. This database is
unique in the sense that it continues the extensively researched Lehman Brothers Fixed
Income database, which became proprietary in the nineties. For this reason, our study is
able to expand the analysis of expected corporate bond returns to more recent periods.
The main advantage of using individual bond data for explaining the cross-section of ex-
pected returns is that deficiencies of expected return models can be traced quite accurately
to specific bond features, since cross-sectional differences in returns across bond portfolios
are obtained mechanically with pre-specified discriminating criteria. Our sample of indi-
vidual bonds includes all US investment-grade corporate bonds that are included in the
Lehman US Credit Index.3 To be included in the database, corporate bonds need to meet
liquidity, maturity and quality requirements. Each bond must be rated investment grade by
at least two rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P or Fitch), publicly issued, dollar-denominated,
coupon-bearing, non-convertible, and must have a minimum remaining maturity of one
year. We note that our sample expands the sample used in Gebhardt et al. (2005) in the
sense that we include bonds with a remaining maturity between one and three years.
Monthly return data on corporate bonds are not as easily available as those on gov-
ernment debt or stocks. To the best of our knowledge, the data from the 2003 Lehman
Brothers Fixed Income Database (henceforth, LBFI) are superior to those from other data-
bases in terms of both coverage and reliability. Moreover, the Lehman Bond indexes, which
comprise bonds from LBFI, are used by the majority of bond market participants for port-
2Our sample follows from choices with respect to the minimum number of bonds/bond funds available
in the cross-section and length of the portfolio formation period. These issues are described in more detail
in Section 5.3.1. The minimum number of bonds/bond funds available in the cross-section is 50, and we
set the length of the portfolio formation period to 36 months.
3The Lehman US Credit Index was formerly known as the US Corporate Investment Grade Index.
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folio benchmarking. Hong et al. (2000) and Gebhardt et al. (2005) provide a more detailed
discussion of these data.
LBFI includes 12,777 different bonds from 2,022 different issuers over the period Octo-
ber 1988 to December 2003. Our sample omits bonds that lack return history (i.e., 36 or
more consecutive return observations), which is needed to estimate bonds’ risk factor sen-
sitivities. We focus on the period January 1993 to December 2003 to cover the same period
as the mutual fund data set. This reduces our sample to 6,341 bonds from 1,301 different
firms for the sample central to our analyses. Panel A in Table 5.1 presents a year-by-year
overview of the summary statistics of our sample. It describes the return characteristics
and reveals that the average and median monthly returns are very similar, respectively
0.68 percent and 0.65 percent. The extreme negative -98.6 percent return traces back to
Enron Corporation bonds that lost almost all their value in November 2001, not long be-
fore Enron’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Because only bonds with a three-year return
history are eligible for inclusion, our sample covers about half of all available securities.
Be that as it may, differences between the return characteristics of the total LBFI sample
and those of our final sample are negligible. The sample contains, on average, 1,359 bonds
per month. This number is quite constant across the sample, although lower during the
credit bear market in 1993 and 1994. On average, our sample has a Moody’s credit rating
of A3 and an S&P rating of A-. The median dollar amount outstanding is 200 million with
a maturity of 6.62 years and duration of 4.77 years. All characteristics are fairly constant
through time, with the exception of amount outstanding and maturity.
5.2.2 CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database
The hunt for risk factors in current empirical asset pricing studies has mainly revolved
around tests of cross-sectional variation in the returns on portfolios that are rather hypo-
thetical.4 Mutual funds provide an excellent laboratory for testing cross-sectional variation
in returns of investable portfolios, which incorporate transaction costs and trading restric-
tions. At the same time, the competitive nature of the mutual fund industry ensures that
fund data are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of the risk exposures offered by these
investment vehicles, which is needed to uncover which factors determine bond returns.
The 2003 CRSP universe we study includes data on all mutual funds in the United
4Numerous studies document that well-known anomalies in the equity literature are concentrated in
small caps and illiquid stocks, see e.g., Stoll and Whaley (1983), Keim and Madhaven (1997), Loughran
(1997), Hong et al. (2000), Ali et al. (2003), Lesmond et al. (2004).
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics bond (fund) returns.
Panel A. Summary statistics Lehman Brothers corporate bonds database
Average Median Max Min observations
1993 0.85 0.66 9.01 -10.95 975
1994 -0.12 0.02 15.54 -10.01 714
1995 1.51 1.29 27.46 -20.89 1,025
1996 0.41 0.26 8.77 -16.08 1,381
1997 0.87 0.88 10.28 -18.07 1,632
1998 0.67 0.52 40.02 -21.99 1,659
1999 -0.11 0.17 21.05 -19.85 1,518
2000 0.73 0.84 23.20 -32.66 1,383
2001 0.86 0.83 32.27 -98.56 1,549
2002 0.97 1.14 47.07 -75.76 1,670
2003 0.72 0.55 20.04 -28.69 1,592
Total 0.68 0.65 47.07 -98.56 1372
Panel B. Summary statistics CRSP corporate bond funds
Average Median Max Min observations
1993 0.86 0.65 4.62 -2.85 127
1994 -0.21 -0.13 5.02 -7.21 139
1995 1.16 0.99 8.89 -16.22 216
1996 0.32 0.24 11.35 -6.95 319
1997 0.73 0.83 7.54 -64.24 413
1998 0.51 0.44 6.18 -16.67 489
1999 -0.12 -0.01 4.37 -4.86 526
2000 0.87 0.88 8.26 -8.73 586
2001 0.51 0.56 5.29 -5.76 566
2002 0.55 0.61 7.69 -6.96 586
2003 0.42 0.43 6.49 -9.86 608
Total 0.50 0.51 11.35 -64.24 416
Note: Panel A reports the return statistics, expressed as percentage per month, and the average number
of observations per month of the investment grade corporate bond of the 2003 Lehman Brothers Fixed
Income Database. To be included in our sample, corporate bonds need to meet the liquidity, maturity
and quality requirements set by Lehman. Furthermore, each bond must be rated investment grade by at
least two rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P or Fitch), publicly issued, dollar-denominated, coupon-bearing,
non-convertible, and have a minimum remaining maturity of one year. Lastly, our sample omits bonds
that lack a return history (i.e., 36 or more consecutive return observations), which is needed to estimate
bonds’ risk factor sensitivities.
Panel B reports the return statistics, expressed as percentage per month, and the average number of
observation per month of the investment grade bond mutual funds of the 2003 survivorship-free CRSP
U.S. mutual fund database. We select all bond funds that are classified as corporate, at the final quarter
of each year and omit government, high-yield, mortgage-backed, money market, and municipality bond
funds. In order to avoid that expenses affect our asset pricing test statistics, we have added back funds’
expenses to the reported returns.
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States for any given date since 1962, including dead funds. The database covers monthly
total returns of more than 21,400 open-ended mutual funds. Of these funds, approximately
7,000 are dead. The database also includes important supplementary data, such as fund
classifications by Wiesenberger, Micropal/ Investment Company Data Inc., and Strategic
Insight, and the expenses history of each bond fund. We select all bond funds that are
classified as corporate, at the final quarter of each calender year.5 We omit government,
high-yield, mortgage-backed, money market, and municipality bond funds. Furthermore,
we require a minimum of 50 funds in the cross-section at each point in time. Our resulting
sample covers 1,765 funds the period January 1990 to December 2003. Next, we drop funds
with fewer than 36 consecutive return observation over the entire sample period, and add
back the management fee. Adding back the management fee and other ‘non-transaction
cost’ fund expenses, which can run up to more than one percent per year, is crucial for our
analysis, as we would otherwise observe a negative premium on all funds. Our remaining
sample covers 1,090 funds.
Panel B in 5.1 presents the return statistics of our fund sample. Average and median
return are very similar. Moreover, the returns are in line with those of our individual
bond sample in panel A. The large negative return of 64.24 percent in 1997 traces back to
the last reported return of the Sterling Partners Short Term Fixed Income fund before it
stopped reporting in 1997. Differences in return characteristics between our sample (where
we require funds to have a return history of at least 36 months) and the total CRSP bond
fund sample are negligible.
5.3 Methodology
Our exploration into the cross-section of corporate returns follows the common approach
in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) and Daniel et al.
(1997)). The essence of the methodology involves two stages, where the first stage involves
ex ante formation of portfolios based on cross-sectional predictors of bond returns, and the
second stage concerns ex post factor regressions of the portfolio returns on common risk
factors. The key question is whether all of the cross-sectional variation in the portfolios’
returns is captured by risk factors.
5Our sample consists of bond funds with the following classifications: Wiesenberger (OBJ): CBD;
Micropal/Investment Company Data, Inc. (ICDI OBJ): BQ; Strategic Insight (SI OBJ): CGN Or CHQ
Or CIM Or CMQ Or CSM
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5.3.1 Construction of Portfolio Quintiles
To study cross-sectional variation in corporate bond returns we adopt a portfolio con-
struction approach in the tradition of Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Gebhardt et al.
(2005). These studies allocate securities to mutually exclusive portfolios based on two a
priori specified selection criteria that have been found to predict expected returns. We then
test whether the cross-section of portfolio returns are captured by common factors, which
is detailed in the next section of this paper. The decision to examine the cross-section
of returns on portfolios rather than securities deserves some explanation. One alternative
would be to perform a cross-sectional analysis of individual security returns. We rejected
this alternative because individual security returns tend to be very noisy, unlike returns of
well-diversified portfolios.
In line with Gebhardt et al. (2005), the corporate bond portfolios we construct for our
asset pricing tests are formed after a two-dimensional sort of all individual bonds in the
Lehman database on their sensitivity to the two factors in the following model:
r∗it = α
2F
i + β
2F
1i TERMt + β
2F
2i DEFAULTt + ε
2F
it , (5.1)
where r∗it denotes the excess return of bond i in period t, β
2F
1i denotes the sensitivity of
bond i to the term factor, β2F2i denotes the sensitivity of bond i to the default factor and
ε2Fit denotes the residual return. The term risk factor (TERM) is defined as the monthly
difference between the return on the Lehman U.S. Treasury Index and the Ibbotson one-
month Treasury-Bill rate. The default risk factor (DEFAULT) is defined as the monthly
difference between the return on the Lehman U.S. Credit Index and the return on the
Lehman U.S. Treasury Index. The U.S. Treasury Index includes all public obligations of
the U.S. Treasury with a remaining maturity of one year. These risk factors can be seen as
proxies for underlying term and default risks in the economy that are of hedging concern to
investors: unexpected changes in the term structure of bond yields and changes in default
risk due to changes in economic conditions.
Using Equation (5.1), we can construct double-sorted quintile portfolios with different
TERM and DEFAULT risk attributes. We first allocate all available bonds to quintiles
using their TERM premium sensitivity as the discriminating criterion, and then indepen-
dently allocate the bonds within each quintile to five quintiles based on their sensitivity
to DEFAULT. Using rolling 36-month regressions, we update the factor sensitivities and
rebalance all portfolios on a monthly basis. When applied on the sample of individual
bonds, this sorting approach ultimately produces monthly post-formation returns on the
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5 by 5 quintile portfolios over the period October 1991 to December 2003 (the first 36
months are used to initialize the procedure).
We obtain portfolios composed of corporate bond mutual funds in a similar manner.
We estimate TERM and DEFAULT sensitivities for all corporate bond funds in the CRSP
mutual fund database on a rolling-window basis and form double-sorted quintile portfolios
using the aforementioned portfolio allocation rule. The post-formation returns on the 5 by
5 equal-weighted quintile portfolios cover the period January 1993 to December 2003.
Hence, the portfolios altogether are constructed in a way such that they experience
significant cross-sectional variation in the sensitivity to term risk and default risk. The
idea to use betas with respect to these risk factors as criteria for portfolio allocation
follows from Gebhardt et al. (2005), who report that TERM and DEFAULT betas are
more important for explaining expected returns of corporate bond portfolios than corporate
bond characteristics (duration and credit rating). Figure 5.1, which displays simple average
portfolio excess returns, confirm the well-established view that realized returns compensate
fixed-income investors for bearing term and default risks inherent in corporate bonds. First,
if we look along the TERM dimension, we observe that average portfolio return decreases
with TERM exposure. This is in line with the notion that returns on long-term bonds tend
to be higher than those on short-term bonds. Second, if we look vertically along the default
dimension, we observe that average return increases with DEFAULT sensitivity, also when
holding TERM exposure constant. The two distinct return patterns can be identified
from the portfolios composed of individual bonds (Panel A) as well as those of mutual
funds (Panel B), but the return differences across mutual fund portfolios are economically
smaller than those observed across individual-bond portfolios. For example, the return
difference between the high default/high term-risk portfolio and the low default/low term-
risk counterpart is more than 4.3 percent per year for the individual bond sample whereas
this difference amounts to 2.5 percent for the bond fund sample.
An interesting observation emerges from the Sharpe ratios reported in Figure 5.2, Panels
A and B. Consistent with Pilotte and Sterbenz (2006)’ conclusion from a study of US Trea-
sury securities, we observe that Sharpe ratios vary inversely with maturity: Sharpe ratios
for the low TERM-beta portfolios are almost twice the Sharpe ratios of high TERM-beta
portfolios. These high Sharpe ratios for short-term corporate bonds imply that investors
who primarily focus on volatility as relevant risk measure would prefer leveraging short-
term corporate bonds instead of buying long-term corporate bonds to obtain exceptional
return/risk combinations. Whether these atypically high Sharpe ratios imply a challenge
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Figure 5.1: Average excess returns TERM and DEFAULT portfolios.
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(b) Average returns mutual corporate bond fund portfolios
Average excess returns (annualized) for individual bond portfolios (a) and mutual fund portfolios (b).
The portfolios are formed on two-dimensional sorts of individual bonds and bond mutual funds into
5x5 portfolios on their sensitivities to the two factors in the following model: rit = αi + β1iTERMt +
β2iDEFAULTt + εit, where TERM and DEFAULT are proxies for term and default risk. The model is
estimated using 36-month rolling regressions, and the portfolios are updated on a monthly frequency.
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Figure 5.2: Sharpe ratios TERM and DEFAULT portfolios.
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(b) Sharpe ratios corporate bond fund portfolios
Sharpe ratios for individual bond portfolios (a) and mutual fund portfolios (b). The portfolios are formed on
two-dimensional sorts of individual bonds and bond mutual funds into 5x5 portfolios on their sensitivities
to the two factors in the following model: rit = αi + β1iTERMt + β2iDEFAULTt + εit, where TERM
and DEFAULT are proxies for term and default risk. The model is estimated using 36-month rolling
regressions, and the portfolios are updated on a monthly frequency.
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to common risk factors when it comes to pricing short-term corporate bonds is explored
throughout the remainder of this paper.
5.3.2 Factor Model Specifications
The key issue in empirical studies on asset pricing concerns the ability of common factors
to capture the cross-section of asset returns. In our attempt to explain the post-formation
returns on the 25 portfolios formed on TERM and DEFAULT betas, we rely on a set of
factors that originate from earlier related studies on expected bond returns. Our universe
of factor models includes: (i)a single-factor model for bonds inspired by Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965), which was tested on corporate bond returns by Friend et al. (1977)
and Alexander (1980), (ii) a two-factor specification advanced by Fama and French (1993)
and Gebhardt et al. (2005), (iii) a three-factor model composed of factors extracted from
factor-analytical approaches (see, e.g., Litterman and Scheinkman (1991)), and (iv) the
Elton et al. (1995) model which augments multiple benchmark indexes with risk premiums
associated with fundamental economic variables.
Single-factor model
The single-factor model for bonds is in spirit similar to a model for stocks with one ag-
gregate market index as explanatory variable. The market model we test incorporates the
returns on a broad market index from Lehman Brothers:
rit = α
1F
i + β
1F
i MARKETt + ε
1F
i , (5.2)
where rit denotes the post-formation excess returns of term-default-beta portfolio i in
period t, β1F1i denotes the sensitivity of portfolio i to the market factor and ε
1F
it denotes the
residual return.
To compute the first factor affecting bond returns (MARKET), we take the return on
the Lehman U.S. Government/Credit Index in excess of the Ibbotson Treasury-Bill rate
from Kenneth French’s website. Here, the Lehman U.S. Government/Credit index serves as
a proxy for the aggregate return on the government and investment-grade corporate bond
market. This widely recognized index was created in 1979 and is market value weighted.
It includes Treasuries, Agencies, debt guaranteed by the US Government, and all bonds in
US Credit Index.
Next, we consider three multifactor model specifications that appear repeatedly in
studies involved with the pricing of bonds or bond portfolios. These multifactor models
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could be theoretically motivated by Merton (1973)’s intertemporal asset pricing theory, or
by the Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976).
Two-factor model
The second factor model we examine is a two-factor model specification similar to Geb-
hardt et al. (2005). The model contains two returns spreads that are intended to capture
securities’ exposure to term and default risks and which account for most of the variation
in bond returns according to Fama and French (1993). The two-factor model takes the
form:
rit = α
2F
i + β
2F
1i TERMt + β
2F
2i DEFAULTt + ε
2F
it , (5.3)
where β2F1i denotes the sensitivity of portfolio i to the term factor, β
2F
2i denotes the sen-
sitivity of portfolio i to the default factor and ε2Fit denotes the residual return. The term
risk factor (TERM) is defined as the monthly difference between the return on the Lehman
U.S. Treasury Index and the Ibbotson one-month Treasury-Bill rate. The default risk fac-
tor (DEFAULT) is defined as the monthly difference between the return on the Lehman
U.S. Credit Index and the return on the Lehman U.S. Treasury Index. We point out that
this model is employed for both ex ante quintile portfolio formation and ex post evaluation.
Three-factor principal components model
The third model is a three-factor model that augments the single-factor model with two
principal components, where the two principal components (PC1 and PC2) are orthogonal
to the Lehman US Government/Credit index and extracted from the residual returns on
passive Lehman Treasury bond indexes with different maturities:
rit = α
3F
i + β
3F
i1 MARKETt + β
3F
i2 PC1t + β
3F
i3 PC2t + ε
3F
i , (5.4)
To capture the effect of changes in the term structure in treasury yields that are not fully
picked up by duration, we rely on the principal components analysis (PCA) by Huij and
Derwall (2007). In their PCA setup, excess returns on Treasury indexes with varying ma-
turities are individually regressed on a constant and a proxy for the overall bond market
conform Equation (5.2).6 PCA is then performed on the time series of the residuals from
6We include indexes with maturities of 1 to 3 years, 3 to 5 years, 5 to 7 years, 7 to 10 years, 10 to 20
years and more than 20 years.
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each regression (plus the intercept). We find that 94.9 percent of the variation of the resid-
uals is explained by two largest eigenvalues. We then construct the principal components’
risk factors by taking the first two normalized components as portfolios weights for the
Treasury indexes’ return series. Models that incorporate principal components follow the
intuition and empirical findings of Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Knez et al. (1994),
Duffee (1996) and others, who advocate three unique factors to describe bond returns:
level, slope and convexity.
Four-factor model
The fourth factor model we focus on is a four-factor model that comprises a mixture of
factor-mimicking portfolios and two fundamental variables related to unexpected changes
in inflation (INF) and economic growth (GDP). The choice of fundamental variables follows
from Elton et al. (1995), who find evidence that adding fundamental economic variables to
bond pricing models leads to an improvement in the explanation of expected bond returns.
Consistent with an APT setup, we arrive at a model of the form:
rit = α
4F
i + β
4F
i1 TERMt + β
4F
i2 DEFAULTt+
β4Fi3 (INFt−1 + λINF) + β
4F
i4 (GDPt−1 + λGDP) + ε
4F
i , (5.5)
where INFt−1 is the one-month lagged unexpected change in inflation, GDPt−1 is the one-
month lagged unexpected change in economic growth, and λINF and λGDP are the risk
premiums for sensitivities to changes in inflation and economic growth, respectively.
As in Elton et al. (1995), we obtain the risk premiums by simultaneously estimating the
following regression for a set of passive benchmark indexes using nonlinear least squares:
rit = δi + β
4F
i1 TERMt + β
4F
i2 DEFAULTt + β
4F
i3 INFt−1 + β
4F
i4 GDPt−1 + ε
4F
i , (5.6)
subject to the restriction:
δi = β
4F
4,i λINF + β
4F
5,i λGDP. (5.7)
We use this restriction to derive proxies for the unobservable “true” risk premiums associ-
ated with two economic variables: inflation and economic development. Similar to Elton
et al. (1995), we derive unexpected changes in inflation and economic growth using the
US real GDP and inflation forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. This company polls
professional forecasters on a monthly basis for their forecast for principal macroeconomic
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variables for the current (calendar) year and for the following year.7 In our study, we
calculate the 12-month forward forecast as the weighted average of the current year and
the following year, where the weight of the current year is defined as the fraction of the
remaining number of months in the current year and the total number of months in a
calendar year.
To calibrate the parameters in the APT model for determining the risk premiums, we
use the same indexes as Elton et al. (1995).8 When we jointly estimate the regressions
for the nine passive indexes over the period January 1993 to December 2003, we obtain
λˆINF = −0.51 and λˆGDP = −0.08. These estimates closely correspond to those reported
by Elton et al. (1995).
5.3.3 Tests for the Adequacy of Expected Return Models
The models for expected bond portfolio returns that are described in the previous section
follow a linear factor structure:
rit = αi + β1ix1t + β2ix2t + . . .+ βkixkt + εit, (5.8)
where rit denotes the excess return of bond portfolio i in period t, βji denotes the sensitivity
of portfolio i (i = 1, ..., N) to factor j (j = 1, ..., k), and εit denotes the residual return.
The intercept term αi measures the empirical deviations from the prediction of the factor
model or the pricing error.
To test the empirical fit of models describing bond returns, we use the aforementioned
quintile portfolios and consider the portion of the portfolios’ cross-sectional variation that
is not explained by the employed factor models, i.e., the portfolios’ alphas. More specifi-
cally, we conduct Gibbons et al. (1989) tests (henceforth, GRS) and examine whether the
returns of bond portfolios can be fully described by a linear function of their sensitivity
to factors in the model. GRS is underpinned by the simple condition that an accurately
specified model leaves no cross-sectional variation in expected returns unexplained. Using
GRS, we formally test the hypothesis that the alphas for the bond portfolios are jointly
indistinguishable from zero:
7Consensus Economics started collecting survey forecasts in 1989.
8The following Lehman bond indexes are used as the dependent variables: 1 to 3 years U.S. Government
bonds, U.S. Treasury Intermediate, U.S. Treasury Long, Investment Grade Industrial, Investment Grade
Financial Institutions, U.S. Intermediate Credit Aaa, U.S. Long Credit Aaa, U.S. Intermediate Credit Baa
and U.S. Long Credit Baa.
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GRS ≡
(
T −N − k
N
)(
1 + µˆ′Ωˆ−1µˆ
)−1
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ ∼ F (N, T −N − k), (5.9)
where µˆ is a k by 1 vector of sample means of the factors’ excess returns, Ωˆ is an k by k
matrix that holds the unbiased estimate of the factor returns’ covariance matrix, αˆ is a N
by 1 vector of estimated alphas and Σˆ is an N by N matrix that holds the unbiased estimate
of the residual variance-covariance matrix. Assuming that the errors are independently and
normally distributed, independent of the returns on the factor portfolios, the GRS statistic
follows an F -distribution with N degrees of freedom in the numerator and T−N−k degrees
in the denominator under the null of zero alphas.
5.4 Empirical Results
We apply conventional asset pricing tests to evaluate the portfolios’ post-formation returns
and estimate the spread between the portfolios’ risk-adjusted returns after controlling for
exposures to the risk factors discussed in Section 5.3.2.
5.4.1 Portfolio evaluations with common factor models
We run regressions of each portfolio’s excess return on the excess return of the (multi-)
factors and an intercept term. We pay attention to the estimates of the abnormal returns
across the beta-sorted portfolios, their post-formation betas with respect to the common
risk factors, and we examine the time-series regressions’ R2 values. The variation in post-
formation alpha and beta across the portfolios helps to understand whether common factors
capture the cross-sectional dynamics of corporate bond returns, and to what extent cor-
porate bond returns are anomalous. If a set of factors accurately captures priced bond
risk then portfolios, that differ in average return, should have different sensitivities to the
common factors and be unable to earn a return beyond that suggested by factor betas.
When we look at our single-factor market model, we confirm our earlier suspicion that
abnormal returns on corporate bonds trace back to the lower-maturity range. Although
Panels A and B of Table 5.2 confirm that variation in the portfolio returns are in part
explained by cross-sectional variation in beta, column 3 of these panels shows that abnormal
portfolio returns tend to increase and reach values that are statistically significant as
maturity decreases. The majority of corporate bond portfolios that earn an economically
and statistically significant abnormal return, after controlling for beta, are concentrated
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Table 5.2 continued
Each month, we perform two-dimensional sorts of individual bonds and bond mutual funds into 5x5 portfo-
lios on their sensitivities to the two factors in the following model: rit = αi+β1iTERMt+β2iDEFAULTt+
εit, where TERM and DEFAULT are proxies for term and default risk. The model is estimated using
36-month rolling regressions, and the portfolios are updated on a monthly frequency. We then run single-
factor regressions on the post-ranking returns of the resulting portfolios. The table lists the portfolios’
post-ranking returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates, and R2 values. Panel A reports the results for
the LBFI database, and Panel B for the CRSP Mutual Fund database. The samples cover 6,341 individ-
ual bonds and 1,090 bond mutual funds over the period January 1993 to December 2003. All values are
annualized.
in the lower end of the maturity spectrum. Panel B demonstrates that the anomalously
positive returns on corporate bonds with relatively low-TERM exposure are material from
a practical perspective: although abnormal returns on low-TERM corporate bond funds are
economically smaller than those of individual bond portfolios, most of them in range P3.1–
P5.5 continue to be statistically and economically significant. The GRS test articulates the
pricing errors associated with a substantial number of short-term corporate bond portfolios
and mutual funds. GRS statistics in Panels A and B reject the null of jointly zero intercepts
at the convectional significance levels.
Table 5.3, columns 1 and 2, shows that the short-term corporate bond anomaly con-
tinues to be left unexplained when we employ two-factor regressions with TERM and
DEFAULT factors as explanatory variables. Compared to the single-factor model, the
abnormal returns on low-TERM corporate bond portfolios are economically smaller, but
nonetheless statistically and economically significant. The GRS tests rejects the null hy-
pothesis that abnormal returns on the quintile portfolios’ are jointly indistinguishable from
zero. Note that the two-factor model has been tested on the Lehman Fixed Income Data-
base over the period 1973–1996 by Gebhardt et al. (2005). Apart from our focus on a
more recent period, our study also differs from theirs by including all bonds with a remain-
ing maturity between 1 and 3 years. These two differences could explain the discrepancy
between the Gebhardt et al. (2005) study and the results reported here.9
Table 5.4 reports the results of factor regressions involving the market factor and two
term-structure components, PC1 and PC2. These components appear to help marginally in
the explanation of returns on low-TERM-beta portfolios. But while the abnormal returns
on low-TERM corporate bond portfolios and mutual funds that we observe under the three-
9In fact, unreported tests suggest that the two-factor model explains the cross-section of returns on
corporate bonds that have a remaining maturity of three years and higher. These results are available
upon request.
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factor model are smaller than those obtained from earlier factor regressions, a substantial
portion of the returns is not explained by market, steepness and curvature factors. As with
earlier factor models, GRS rejects the null hypothesis that the intercept terms from the
factor regressions are jointly zero.10
The four-factor regressions that we report on in Table 5.5 produce mixed results
concerning the explanation of short-term corporate bond returns. Regressions involving
TERM and DEFAULT factors in conjunction with premiums associated with inflation
(INF) and economic development (GDP) yield fewer portfolios with statistically signifi-
cant abnormal returns, but produce abnormal returns that are in magnitude larger than
those observed previously. Especially the unexplained returns on portfolios P5.1–5.5, those
with the lowest maturity, earn abnormal returns that can amount up to 7.24 percent per
year. Not surprisingly, the GRS test rejects this four-factor specification as an appropriate
model for expected returns of individual corporate bond portfolios. However, this rejec-
tion is less pronounced when it comes to explaining returns on corporate bond mutual
funds. Two of the ten mutual funds (P4.1–P5.5) that hold low-TERM corporate bonds
earn statistically significant abnormal returns, namely P4.3 and P5.2, and one portfolio
(P4.4) earns a marginally significant abnormal return. GRS does not reject the model for
describing the cross-section of returns on corporate bond mutual funds.
At first glance, the results hint that macro-economic variables could be useful in cap-
turing much of the abnormal returns on investable low-TERM corporate bond portfolios.
But two caveats warrant a careful interpretation of these results. First, we hasten to
argue that the risk premiums associated with GDP and inflation, are prone to ”ex post
over-fitting”critiques. The risk premiums are fitted on nine different passive indexes with
different maturities and credit quality, based on returns realized over a period that matches
the period we use to evaluate the quintile portfolios. The average correlation between these
indexes and our 25 portfolios is 0.81 for individual bond portfolios, and 0.87 for bond fund
portfolios. These high correlations explain why it is likely that we mechanically elimi-
nate abnormal returns through estimation of macroeconomic risk premiums. Second, the
intuition behind the loadings on the INF and GDP factors, reported in Table 5.5, is not
10It appears that portfolios with higher default risk are more sensitive to the curvature factor than are
the lower default portfolios. As we observe the sensitivity to the PC1, steepness risk factor, to be stable
over maturities, but almost monotonically decreasing over default. Portfolios with higher default risk seem
to be more exposed to the steepness of the yield curve as the sensitivities are almost equal per default
portfolio. Secondly, the sensitivity to the PC2, curvature risk factor, increases almost monotonically within
each maturity block and is not stable over default as well.
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entirely clear. Factor loadings are to some degree random across the quintile portfolios,
and there are a number of fundamental differences in sensitivity to INF and GDP between
corporate bond portfolios in Panel A and corporate bond mutual funds in Panel B. These
counterintuitive results cast doubts on a plausible economic explanation of abnormal short-
term corporate bond returns using macro-economic risk premiums.
Our last indication that common risk factors face problems explaining short-term cor-
porate bond returns is provided by the regression R-squares of the aforementioned factor
models. Independent of the employed factor specification, the time-series variation in re-
turn on the ten portfolios with lowest TERM sensitivity is less well explained by common
factors than is variation in the returns of all other portfolios.
The bottom line of the empirical evidence up to this point is that the returns of corpo-
rate bonds with medium- or long-term remaining maturity are well explained by a number
of factors that earlier studies have brought forward for explaining bond returns. But short-
term corporate bonds have delivered anomalously positive returns, given their sensitivities
to these common factors.
5.4.2 Robustness: alternative specifications
The evidence of abnormal returns on low-TERM portfolios that we observed in previous
sections of this study creates an appetite for alternative risk-based interpretations of the
anomaly. There are several avenues to pursue in order to arrive at such explanations.
Recent research has concentrated on liquidity risk in the corporate bond market, which
might be priced via factors other than those we used in conventional models of the bond
return generating process (see for example Chacko (2006) and De Jong and Driessen (2006)
for studies on bond liquidity). Other studies argue that asset returns are best described
using conditional factor models that allow for time variation in portfolios’ factor loadings
(see for example Ferson et al. (2006)). In this section, we first examine whether the low-
TERM bond anomaly can be explained by the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk
factor. Subsequently, we examine whether corporate bond returns are better captured by
conditioning factor exposures on economic information.11
11We also examined the cross-section of corporate bond returns using the size, SMB, and value, HML,
factors of the Fama and French (1993) model. Our results show that this model is clearly rejected according
to the GRS test statistics. Detailed results are available upon request.
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Bond single-factor model extended with a liquidity factor
This section examines whether liquidity can explain the short-term bond anomaly. Liquid-
ity might be an issue for low-TERM portfolios as it is a well-known fact that short term
bonds are less liquid. Most short term bonds have been in the markets for some time.
Generally, the older a bond gets, the larger part of the issue that will be held by buy-and-
hold investors, which reduces trading and increases illiquidity (Sarig and Warga (1989)).
Partly for this reason, Lehman excludes bonds with a remaining maturity of one year and
less from their indices (and dataset). Nevertheless, existing academic studies have yet to
reach consensus on the threshold remaining matirity for exclusion, because it ranges from
3 months (Ericsson and Renault (2001)), one year (Elton et al. (2002), Houweling et al.
(2005)), two years (Alexander et al. (2000)) to three years (Gebhardt et al. (2005)).
Our model follows Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), who estimate a liquidity factor for
capturing equity returns. We extend the bond single-factor model (5.2) with their liquidity
risk factor, LIQUIDITY, which results in the following model:
ri,t = α
1FC
i +
N∑
j
βNFj,i Fj, t+ βj+1,iLIQUIDITYt + εi,t, (5.10)
here LIQUIDITY is the updated value-weighted liquidity risk factor of excess returns for
the equity market from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Fj is factor j of the N -factor
model. The LIQUIDITY portfolio is constructed after a sort of all stocks on the “strength
of volume-related return reversals”. For further details on the construction of the liquidity
portfolios, see Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
Table 5.6 shows that this model yields marginally higher R2 values compared to all
factor models. The liquidity factor model offers little improvement upon the single-factor
model in terms of both time-series and cross-sectional explanatory power, and the model
is clearly rejected according to the GRS test statistics in Panels A and B. An additional
indication that the short-term bond anomaly cannot be explained by liquidity is docu-
mented by De Jong and Driessen (2006), who report that both equity and bond liquidity
explains a significant part of credit returns. Nevertheless they conclude that their model
underestimates expected returns for short maturity bonds.
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Conditional time-varying risk exposures
So far, we assumed expected returns and risks to be constant over time. Here, we investigate
time-varying exposures to common risk factors. We use a variant of the Ferson and Schadt
(1996) model to arrive at a conditional version of the single-factor model for bonds. Time
variation in factor sensitivity is captured by variables describing the interaction between
benchmark factor returns and a set of lagged instrumental variables:
ri,t = α
1FC
i + β
1F
1,iMARKETt +B
′
i[zt−1MARKETt] + εi,t, (5.11)
where zt−1 is a vector that consists of lagged values of three pre-determined information
variables. We use the variables that Ferson et al. (2006) identify as relevant in predicting
variation in exposures to common risk factors for fixed-income securities: the lagged level
of the one-month Treasury bill rate, the lagged default spread in the investment-grade bond
market, and a measure of industrial production and capacity utilization.12 The resulting
model includes four scaled factors and an intercept.
The results in Table 5.7 point out that the conditional market model is only marginally
better in explaining time-series variation in bond returns compared to its unconditional
counterpart. Moreover, conditioning risk on economic information does not help to sub-
sume the abnormal return on bonds with relatively short maturities. GRS strongly rejects
the notion that cross-sectional variation in the returns of individual bond portfolios (Panel
A) and those of bond funds (Panel B) are captured by the conditional bond single-factor
model.
5.5 Conclusion
This study on the cross-section of U.S. corporate bond returns shows that common risk
factors underestimate the returns of bond with short-term maturities. The returns of short-
term bonds, realized over the period 1993 to 2003, are underestimated by well-known risk
factors including market risk (Alexander (1980)), term and default risk (Gebhardt et al.
(2005)), steepness and curvature (Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Knez et al. (1994)),
premiums associated with inflation and economic development (Elton et al. (1995)) and
liquidity risk (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), De Jong and Driessen (2006)). We confirm
12We define the default spread as Moody’s BAA-rated corporate bond yield minus the AAA-rated
corporate bond yield. We obtain our data on industrial production and capacity utilization from the
Federal Reserve Board website.
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Table 5.7: Ferson & Schadt regressions using portfolios sorted on term and default.
A. Individual bonds B. Bond mutual funds
Alpha Alpha-t MARKET R2 Alpha Alpha-t MARKET R2
P1.1 1.24% 0.76 1.83 0.67 1.02% 1.21 1.73 0.82
P1.2 -0.02% -0.01 1.41 0.85 0.52% 1.70 1.06 0.96
P1.3 0.12% 0.14 1.49 0.89 0.08% 0.35 1.06 0.98
P1.4 0.33% 0.41 1.51 0.90 -0.00% -0.02 1.30 0.98
P1.5 -0.09% -0.14 0.99 0.93 -0.07% -0.25 0.98 0.97
P2.1 1.60% 1.01 1.10 0.65 0.29% 0.52 1.06 0.85
P2.2 0.42% 0.48 0.90 0.85 0.28% 1.05 0.92 0.96
P2.3 0.78% 1.20 1.05 0.89 0.28% 1.65 0.80 0.98
P2.4 0.35% 0.76 0.83 0.94 0.13% 0.77 0.96 0.98
P2.5 0.33% 0.86 0.71 0.95 0.35% 2.03 0.76 0.98
P3.1 0.97% 0.80 1.33 0.65 0.43% 0.65 0.88 0.78
P3.2 0.71% 1.69 0.62 0.93 0.48% 1.42 0.78 0.93
P3.3 1.14% 2.83 0.70 0.93 0.36% 1.72 0.66 0.97
P3.4 0.83% 2.45 0.66 0.94 0.38% 2.03 0.79 0.97
P3.5 0.77% 1.79 0.41 0.90 0.38% 1.63 0.78 0.96
P4.1 1.97% 1.98 0.15 0.62 0.96% 1.37 0.56 0.70
P4.2 1.25% 3.69 0.39 0.90 0.69% 2.73 0.67 0.94
P4.3 1.31% 4.30 0.34 0.91 0.63% 2.91 0.54 0.95
P4.4 1.13% 3.43 0.40 0.88 0.71% 3.30 0.60 0.94
P4.5 0.97% 2.95 0.26 0.86 0.64% 2.80 0.50 0.92
P5.1 2.50% 2.22 0.03 0.40 0.74% 1.15 0.46 0.40
P5.2 1.42% 4.23 0.18 0.70 1.02% 4.73 0.33 0.79
P5.3 1.22% 4.27 0.24 0.66 0.90% 4.63 0.15 0.78
P5.4 1.05% 2.88 0.47 0.57 0.80% 4.70 0.21 0.82
P5.5 0.45% 0.73 1.37 0.34 0.41% 2.69 0.24 0.84
GRS (p-value): 2.25 (0.00) GRS (p-value): 3.21 (0.00)
Note: This table presents estimation results of the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model on the
post-ranking returns of the term and default risk sorted portfolios. See Table 5.2 for further
details.
that the anomaly is not specific to hypothetical portfolios derived from our unique sample
of individual corporate bonds. Our finding that short-term corporate bond portfolios in the
form of U.S. mutual funds earn an abnormal return, suggests that the anomaly withstands
pricing errors, illiquidity problems, typical investment restrictions and transaction costs.
The results add new insights to the importance of the maturity dimension for pric-
ing corporate bonds. Prior studies of individual corporate bonds (Alexander (1980) and
Gebhardt et al. (2005)) have concentrated on bonds with medium to long-term maturity.
This study, inspired by Pilotte and Sterbenz (2006), uncovers anomalous returns using a
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wider range of maturities. In doing so, we find support for the conclusion that short-term
corporate bond returns are inconsistent with existing risk-based factor models.
Consequently, this study lays the foundations for further research on the determinants
of short-term corporate bond returns. Because the anomaly displays parallels with the
low-beta stock anomaly documented earlier (e.g., in Fama and MacBeth (1973)), our re-
sults might be relevant to behavioral explanations of the return-generating process that
have been brought forward in the equity pricing literature. Karceski (2002), for example,
hypothesizes that large aggregate demand for high-beta stocks relative to low-beta stocks
in specific market states forces up (down) the price of high-beta (low-beta) stocks so that
common equity factors are not priced to the degree predicted. One potential avenue for
further research would be to investigate whether time-variation in aggregate demand for
long-term bonds relative to demand for short-term bonds accounts for the short-term bond
anomaly.
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Chapter 6
A Recommitment Strategy for Long
Term Private Equity Fund Investors∗
6.1 Introduction
Nowadays many institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and
endowments, have included private equity in their strategic asset allocation. The vast
majority of these investments takes place indirectly through ‘funds’, because entering,
managing, and exiting direct private equity investments requires a high level of exper-
tise and experience. In private equity funds, investors bring in capital, while the fund’s
management brings in her expertise (Cumming et al., 2005), experience (Sørensen, 2006),
specialization (Gompers et al., in press), and network (Hochberg et al., 2007). Most insti-
tutional investors aim for a specific private equity exposure as part of their strategic asset
allocation. To the best of our knowledge, prior studies on optimal strategic asset allocation,
like Chen et al. (2002), ignore the illiquid nature of private equity. The illiquidity is due to
the lack of a well-developed secondary market and to restrictions on the sale of private eq-
uity fund investments, see Sahlman (1990) and Lerner and Schoar (2004) for a discussion.1
∗This chapter is based on the ERIM Working paper De Zwart et al. (2007). We are grateful to Tjeert
Keijzer, Erik Kole, Ludovic Phalippou, Per Stro¨mberg and Marno Verbeek for helpful suggestions. We
would also like to thank participants of the Inquire Europe meeting held in Stockholm, October 2007 and
seminar participants at Robeco.
1Lerner and Schoar (2004) show that restrictions on the transfer of fund-ownership are used by young
funds and funds with an investment focus in industries with longer investment cycles to attract deep-
pockets’ investors, that is investors who have a low probability of facing a liquidity shock. This will make
fundraising for a follow-on fund easier as these investors have an increased probability to re-participate,
which will be a good signal to new potential investors. Although this set-up of the private equity market
structure looks more complex than public equity, Axelson et al. (2007) show that the financial structure
of private equity funds is optimal for three characteristics of the industry: (1) pooling of investments, (2)
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This makes it difficult to achieve and maintain the desired strategic exposure to private
equity. First, the target allocation to private equity cannot be bought instantaneously, like
for bonds or public equity. Second, cash pay-outs of the private equity investments can
not be reinvested immediately either, while these pay-outs are significant, because private
equity funds have a finite lifetime (normally between 10 and 14 years).
Private equity fund investments start with an initial commitment, where the investor
commits herself for a certain amount of capital to the fund. These commitments are only
gradually invested (‘called’) by the fund, often taking a couple of years. In addition, often,
not even all committed capital is eventually invested. Finally, pay-outs (‘distributions’)
from liquidated investments typically start to occur when a fund is only just a few years
old, often already before all committed capital has been invested. This again lowers the
effective private equity allocation. In sum, attaining a certain target investment exposure
to private equity and maintaining it at that level is not straightforward.
The central question that arises from the above is: How much and when should new
private equity fund commitments be made to achieve and to maintain the desired strate-
gic allocation for a prolonged period, given that the cash in- and outflows are (highly)
uncertain? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by designing an appropriate
(re)commitment strategy. At the outset we stress that our focus is on getting passive
exposure to private equity and not on designing a strategy that outperforms the market.2
Furthermore, we do not examine the motivation to include private equity in the strategic
asset allocation decision, but we will assume that the decision to pursue a certain private
equity exposure has already been made.3
nonlinear profit sharing with the fund manager to limit governance problems and (3) a financial structure
that combines ex-post fundraising and specific deal financing.
2Lerner et al. (2007) report that some institutional investors have been more successful than others at
investing in private equity. It would be interesting to examine which factors determine the performance of
a private equity investment strategy, but this is not the aim of our paper.
3A possible motivation to include private equity in an investment portfolio is provided by its risk and
return characteristics. These have been studied extensively (i) at the firm level (Gompers and Lerner,
1998; Cochrane, 2005), (ii) at the fund level (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003a; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005;
Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2007) and (iii) at the index level (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Chen
et al., 2002; Woodward and Hall, 2003). An important issue here concerns the private equity risk premium,
in particular its comparison with the public equity premium. The consensus view seems to be that private
equity investments should offer a higher return than public equity, for example due to their illiquidity.
However, conclusions from empirical research are mixed. Rather poor returns are reported by Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2007). Kaplan and Schoar (2005) report
comparable average returns for private equity and the S&P 500 index, while Ljungqvist and Richardson
(2003a) claim that private equity investments outperform the aggregate public equity market by 6-8% per
annum, see also Cochrane (2005). More recent studies focus on (explanations for) cross-sectional return
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Our recommitment strategy makes new commitments to private equity funds every
quarter. In addition, the strategy is dynamic in nature by taking into account the charac-
teristics of the current portfolio. The level of the new commitments is determined by the
past quarter’s distributions in cash, the uninvested capital from earlier commitments as
well as the exposure of the current portfolio relative to its target, indicated as ‘investment
degree’ in the remainder of this paper. Committing the paid out cash distributions is in-
tuitive, as these liquidated investments should as soon as possible be reinvested in private
equity to keep the allocation at the desired level. Commitments which are not invested
within a certain period of time are recommitted in order to prevent leakage of private
equity exposure. Finally, the current investment degree of the existing portfolio is used to
either reduce or increase the new commitment to bring the exposure to the desired level.
Our results, based on historical simulations using the Thomson Venture Economics
database, can be summarized as follows. Our main finding is that our recommitment
strategy is capable of maintaining a stable investment degree that is close to the target
allocation, while keeping the probability of being over-exposed within reasonable bounds.
This conclusion holds for portfolios diversified across venture capital and buy-out capital
and across the US and Europe. In addition, sensitivity analysis shows that our strategy
remains equally successful when the portfolio is restricted to a certain type of private equity
capital (buy-out or venture capital), to a specific region (US or Europe), or to varying fund
manager experience (first-time or follow-on funds). More generally, the principle of our
private equity recommitment strategy can easily be expanded to other illiquid asset classes
that involve illiquidity and commitments, like direct real estate or infrastructure funds.
In addition, we find that achieving the target exposure is possible only when commit-
ments for the initial portfolio, that is during the first year, are higher than the desired
strategic allocation. This so-called ‘overcommitment’, though, creates the possibility of
liquidity problems in the event that the amount of capital that is called for investment
exceeds the available capital. It may also result in a breach of investment policy guidelines
if these do not allow a larger private equity allocation than the target exposure. Nev-
ertheless our analysis indicates that a 30% overcommitment during the build-up period
(in our case one year) is required to achieve the desired exposure to private equity when
starting a new portfolio. Furthermore, we show, with perfect foresight, that the quality
of the strategy further improves if an investor uses the 3-year future investment degree of
differences between private equity funds (Cumming and Walz, 2004; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) and the
drivers of returns (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2007).
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the current portfolio to scale up or down new commitments (instead of the current invest-
ment degree). Alternatively, an investor that can permit herself a higher allocation could
consider overcommitment also when reallocating uncalled capital and distributions. We
find that this brings the average portfolio exposure closer to the target, but at the cost
of a higher risk of being overexposed. Finally, we compare our novel commitment strat-
egy with the few alternatives that have been put forward previously. Cardie et al. (2000)
present a commitment rule stating that investors should commit their complete private
equity allocation target every other year, or half of the allocation each year. A possible
drawback of this strategy is that it neglects past portfolio developments when making new
commitments. Nevins et al. (2004) derive a link between the target for committed capital
and the target for invested capital. The resulting commitment strategy rests on the crucial
assumption that the rate of investments and the rate of distributions are the same for all
private equity funds and constant over time, which is unlikely to hold in practice. In our
analysis, we find that indeed both these commitment strategies are not capable of keeping
the investment degree stable for a prolonged period of time. In particular, the investment
degree remains permanently above its target.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 describes the Thomson Venture Economics
data. Section 6.3 discusses the cash flow dynamics for an investor in private equity funds.
Section 6.4 develops the novel recommitment strategies. Section 6.5 presents the empirical
results, while Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Data
We use private equity fund data obtained from Thomson Venture Economics (TVE).4 Our
data set is comparable with Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2007), to which we refer for more information about the
way TVE collects the data and potential biases in the database.
The TVE database contains information on 2,786 individual private equity funds over
the period 1980Q1-2005Q4, and includes quarterly contributions, distributions and the
fund’s net asset value (NAV). Reported cash flows are in US dollars and are net of man-
agement fees, performance fees (‘carried interest’) as well as other costs. We make several
4Obtained in the period until Q2 2006. We are aware that the Thomson Venture Economics database
is backfilled. This backfilling will not distort our results, because we use the only cash flow data and not
the returns.
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Table 6.1: Distribution of private equity funds across investment
types and regions
Region
Investment type US Europe Global Total
Venture capital 1090 591 – 1681
Buy-out capital 535 401 1 937
Total 1625 992 1 2618
Note: The table reports the number of funds for each region (US, Europe,
and world) and type (Buy-out or Venture capital) combination.
corrections and adjustments to the data, detailed in the data appendix, after which there
are 2,618 funds left for analysis. Several fund characteristics also are available, including
the regional focus (US or Europe (EU)), the type of investment (venture capital (VC) or
buy-out capital (BO)), the fund managers experience (‘first-time’ or ‘follow-on’), and the
year of the fund’s formation (‘vintage year’). The distribution of funds over the different
investment types and regions is shown in Table 6.1. Close to two-thirds of all funds are
venture capital funds, while about 60 percent are US-oriented funds.
6.3 Descriptive statistics
6.3.1 Private equity cash flows
Private equity investments start with the investor committing a certain amount of capital
to the fund. No capital is exchanged when this decision is made, but from that moment
onwards the investor is obligated to provide capital whenever the fund manager asks for it.
During a fund’s lifetime commitments are irrevocable and the fund manager independently
decides on the fund’s investments and disinvestments. Investors only control the initial
size of their commitments, they do not know in advance when and into which companies
their money will be invested. As investment opportunities arise, part of the committed
capital will be called by the fund manager. These contributions include the capital that
actually is invested but also fees. Private equity funds typically unwind their investments
by distributing the proceeds of sold participations to the investors (‘limited partners’).
Figure 6.1 shows the average cumulative cash flows (contributions and distributions) over
the lifetime of the funds in our data set. We scale these cash flows by the total commitment
to the fund to make the individual fund statistics comparable and independent of the fund
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Figure 6.1: Average contributions, distributions and Net Asset Values.
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The figure present the average cumulative contributions, average cumulative distributions and average
NAVs of individual private equity funds over the period 1980Q1–2005Q4.
size.5
From this figure we observe that it takes several years before the committed capital is
invested. Investments are largest in the first year of the fund’s lifetime when, on average,
32% of the commitments are invested. After that the pace at which capital is invested
gradually decelerates. In the second year after the start of a fund on average 19% of the
commitments is called, followed by 15, 10, 7 and 5% capital calls in the next four years.
After approximately six years cumulative contributions level off. Note that on average
only about 90% of total commitments is eventually called by the private equity fund.
The average cumulative distributions show a typical S-shape. Starting after two years,
distributions are made at an accelerating pace up to seven or eight years, followed by a
steady decline until eventually cumulative distributions level off at around 1.5 times the
total commitments after 12 years.
Figure 6.1 also shows the average value of investments over the fund’s lifetime, again
expressed as a fraction of total commitments. The ‘net asset value’ (NAV) of a private
equity fund is defined as the sum of the NAVs of the individual investee companies. These
NAVs are based on the fund manager’s subjective valuation, as private equity investments
5The size of a private equity fund is defined as the sum of all the investors’ commitments to the fund.
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are not evaluated by the market and the fund manager is not subject to standardized
reporting guidelines.6 Generally, a manager keeps the NAV at investment cost during
the first years of an investment. After a while valuations are updated with additional
information from, for example, comparable listed companies or from a new financing round.
Due to the pattern of contributions and distributions, NAV builds up quickly during the
first few years of the fund’s lifetime, reaches its maximum between four and six years, and
then gradually drops off again over the remaining years. It appears that the average NAV
does not decrease completely to zero even after 15 years. This occurs because some funds
keep a residual value, although not showing any signs of activity (as mentioned before,
the lifetime of a typical private equity fund ranges between 10-14 years). Phalippou and
Gottschalg (2007) show that writing off these ‘living-dead’ investments lowers the average
private equity returns. Following Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003b), who suggest that
these residual values are unreliable, we set the NAV equal to zero after 12 years if there
are no signs of activity at that point or after the last activity if any cash flows take place
in year 13 or later. The effect of this write-off rule is observable in the NAV at the end of
year 12 in Figure 6.1.7
The average fund’s cash flow characteristics suggest that attaining a desired level of
investment exposure to private equity and maintaining it for a prolonged period is not
straightforward. Commitments are only gradually called to be invested and distributions
already occur before all committed capital has been invested, while in practice of course
the timing of these cash flows is typically unknown ex ante. The impact of these dynamics
on private equity investment exposure are shown in Figure 6.2. This graph shows the
portfolio weights of the cash from the initial commitment, the cash from the distributions,
and NAV of the actual private equity investments over a fund’s lifetime as percentage of
the total capital involved. From Figure 6.2 it is very clear that committed capital does not
equal the actual invested capital. The percentage of capital actually invested in private
equity reaches its maximum in the fourth year of the fund’s lifetime, where it equals not
more than 60%. Hence, at that point still only 60% of total capital is actually invested,
while 40% is left in cash. At all other times private equity exposure is less than 60%.
Obviously this is undesirable for institutional investors.
6Valuing companies in accordance with certain guidelines is increasing though, for example using the
International Private Equity and Venture Capital Guidelines developed by the European (EVCA), French
(AFIC) and British (BVCA) venture capital associations.
7As we focus on cash-flows and not on returns this adjustment has little impact on our analysis. Results
including the residual NAV values, which are available upon request, are qualitatively similar.
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Figure 6.2: Cash versus actual private equity fund investment.
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The figure shows the average relative portfolio weight of the available cash at start (100), cash from the
distributions and the value of the actual private equity investment (NAV), 1980Q1-2005Q4.
6.3.2 Cash flows over time
As the vast majority of private equity funds has a finite lifetime most managers introduce
a new fund every three to four years. All funds that start in a specific year belong to
the same ‘vintage year’. The summary statistics discussed before mask a great deal of
variation in the cash flows and NAV across vintage years. This is borne out by Table 6.2,
which presents the maximum investment degree and its timing (in quarters), as well as the
number of funds, for each vintage year in our sample period (1980–2005). The results for
vintage years 2001–2005 have to be treated with caution, because the average investment
degree of these funds is still increasing. As a result both the magnitude and timing of its
maximum cannot be determined with certainty yet.
First of all, the number of funds per vintage year illustrates the growth in private
equity: from 22 funds that started in 1980 to 301 in 2000. The peaks in the number of
funds occurring at the end of the 1980s and 1990s in Table 6.2 give an indication of the
cyclical pattern in supply and demand for private equity capital. Note in particular the
steep decline in the number of new funds after the collapse of the dot-com bubble in 2001,
to just 21 in 2005. Second, we observe that the magnitude of the maximum investment
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Table 6.2: Timing and magnitude of maximum investment degree
across vintage years
# funds in Maximum
Vintage vintage investment degree
year year Mean Timing CCt=4y CDt=4y
1980 22 0.72 Q10 0.83 0.32
1981 24 0.85 Q14 0.90 0.09
1982 29 0.85 Q13 0.88 0.07
1983 63 0.83 Q13 0.92 0.23
1984 82 0.77 Q16 0.87 0.13
1985 76 0.75 Q9 0.92 0.26
1986 70 0.71 Q15 0.83 0.16
1987 116 0.68 Q18 0.78 0.14
1988 95 0.67 Q18 0.74 0.11
1989 114 0.66 Q17 0.74 0.11
1990 67 0.67 Q18 0.78 0.18
1991 61 0.55 Q17 0.63 0.15
1992 58 0.69 Q13 0.82 0.35
1993 94 0.57 Q12 0.75 0.43
1994 105 0.62 Q14 0.77 0.29
1995 111 0.61 Q17 0.77 0.38
1996 104 0.62 Q14 0.81 1.07
1997 180 0.64 Q12 0.81 0.73
1998 213 0.65 Q9 0.81 0.40
1999 248 0.57 Q12 0.75 0.12
2000 301 0.55 Q23 0.65 0.11
2001* 172 0.54 Q20 0.59 0.13
2002* 86 0.39 Q16 0.49 0.11
2003* 60 0.61 Q12 -
2004* 46 0.36 Q8 -
2005* 21 0.15 Q4 -
Av. 80s 69 0.75 Q14 0.84 0.16
Av. 90s 124 0.62 Q14 0.77 0.41
Note: For each vintage year from 1980 to 2005, the table reports the num-
ber of funds, the magnitude and timing (in quarters) of the maximum
investment degree and the cumulative contributions and distributions after
4 years. The average maximum investment degrees and timing for vintage
years 2001-2005 are unreliable as the maximum and its timing cannot be
determined with certainty yet. Vintage year statistics are based on the av-
erage distributions, contributions and NAV for all funds that were started
during that year.
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degree varies over time and exhibits a downward trend. At the beginning of the 1980s it
amounted to about 80%, while funds at the end of the 1990s only achieved a maximum
investment degree of around 60%. Furthermore, the time it takes to reach the maximum
investment degree varies substantially, between 11 and 23 quarters. It seems that it takes
more time to reach to maximum invested degree for funds that started during economic
downturns as in 1990–1991 and 2000–2001.
The considerable variation in the timing and height of the maximum investment degree
across different vintage years reflects the fluctuations in private equity investment opportu-
nities, documented by Gompers and Lerner (1998), which are due to fluctuations in supply
and demand for private equity. The supply of private equity capital has been reported to
vary over time due to changes in regulatory factors, in particular capital gains tax rates
(Poterba, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 1998),8 state policies such as ERISA (Gompers and
Lerner, 1998), and harmonization like the International Financial Reporting Standards
(Cumming and Johan, 2007) or to labor market rigidities (Jeng and Wells, 2000).
The cyclical nature of the cash flows is further illustrated in the last two columns of
Table 6.2. These columns show the cumulative contributions and distributions after 16
quarters. The sharp contrast between the maximum investment ratios in the 1980s and
1990s is less pronounced in the contributions. During the 1980s on average 84% of the
commitments is called after four years while this is 77% for the 1990s. The differences in
distributions across vintage years are much larger, ranging from a low of 7% for funds that
started in 1982 to a high of 107% for funds dating from 1996. Averaging per decade, we
find that the total distributions in the 1980s are almost three times lower (16%) than in
the 1990s (41%). Hence, we conclude that the lower maximum investment degrees during
the 1990s do not arise because less commitments are actually invested, but are due to the
fact that distributions take place earlier.
The considerable variation in the size and timing of the cash flows motivates us to design
a dynamic recommitment strategy that takes into account the composition of the current
portfolio when making new commitments to achieve and maintain the desired exposure to
private equity.
8Although Gompers and Lerner (1998) also document that the effect of changes in capital gains tax
rates mostly appears to occur through the demand for capital.
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6.4 Commitment strategies
Our hypothetical investor aims to achieve and maintain a certain target allocation to
private equity. Although in practice this may be part of a larger investment portfolio, here
we simplify the problem by focusing on the private equity part only. Thus the investor
constructs a 100% private equity portfolio. The main objective is to keep the investment
degree as close as possible to one, where the investment degree (IDt) is defined as
IDt =
NAVt
NAVt + casht
, (6.1)
where NAVt is the sum of the NAVs of the private equity investments held at the end of
quarter t, and casht is the amount of cash or uninvested capital, computed as casht−1 minus
the sum of all contributions made in quarter t plus the sum of all distributions received
during quarter t. Hence, the objective of keeping the investment degree as close as possible
to one can be rephrased as keeping the amount of cash as close as possible to zero. An
important consideration is that at the same time liquidity shortfall should be avoided as
much as possible. Liquidity shortfall occurs at the moment required investments exceed
the amount of available capital such that cash becomes negative and the investment degree
larger than one. Recall that all capital calls have to be paid as the commitments made at
the start of the fund are irrevocable. This could lead to liquidity problems if the investor
does not have enough cash or credit lines available to fulfill the capital call or lead to a
breach of the investment guidelines if a higher private equity allocation is not allowed in a
more diversified portfolio setting.
The investment problem as described above is difficult, if not impossible to solve an-
alytically. Hence, our investor considers three heuristic recommitment strategies. First,
however, we consider the issue of constructing an initial private equity portfolio to which
the recommitment strategies can be applied.
6.4.1 Setting up the initial portfolio
Implementing a recommitment strategy to maintain a constant exposure to private equity
requires an already existing portfolio. In practice, the composition of this portfolio and
accompanying characteristics may be given, but this need not necessarily be the case. As
discussed in the introduction, a mature private equity portfolio can, in general, not be
bought instantaneously, due to the lack of a well-developed secondary market. Hence, the
start-up of a private equity portfolio is an interesting problem in its own right. Here we
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construct the initial portfolio over a one year period by making equal commitments to 16
randomly selected private equity funds with the same vintage year (4 new commitments per
quarter).9 This is in line with Weidig and Mathonet (2004), who report that a diversified
private equity portfolio contains approximately 20 funds. As discussed in Section 6.2,
the average maximum investment degree of private equity funds (60%, in year four) is
well below one. This suggests that achieving a certain level of private equity investments
requires an overcommitment strategy, where commitments exceed the target exposure.
For example, for the average fund in our sample a commitment of 167% (that is, 67%
overcommitment) would be required to obtain a private equity exposure of 100% in year
four.
From Section 6.3.2 we know that cash-flow characteristics of private equity funds evolve
over time. In particular, the maximum investment degree has declined due to more rapid
distributions, while the timing of this maximum also varies. Based on the findings in
Section 6.3.2, a 30% overcommitment is applied to set-up the initial portfolio and achieve
an investment degree close to one. We choose this overcommitment percentage to limit
liquidity risk and to make sure that we are not overinvested in the 1980s, although a larger
overcommitment of about 60% would be preferred for the portfolios that start in the 1990s.
6.4.2 Recommitment strategies
Our investor considers three heuristic recommitment strategies to maintain her exposure
to private equity at the desired level. Strategy I simply states that distributions received
during quarter t are (re)committed to new private equity funds at the same time. The
advantage of this strategy is that the possibility of liquidity shortfall is avoided altogether.
However, given that committed capital will be called only gradually over a number of
years after the initial commitment, the effective investment degree may be expected to fall
below one. In addition, this strategy implicitly assumes that all committed capital will
eventually be called. However, as seen in Section 6.2, this is not the case as on average
9Normally an investor would spread her initial commitments over 2 – 3 years to benefit from vintage
year diversification, while a limited number of investors tries to buy an existing portfolio in the secondary
market. The secondary market is no open market and not very deep because many funds put restrictions
on the transfer of fund-ownership (Lerner and Schoar, 2004). In order to examine the relevance of this
issue, we also conduct the empirical analysis discussed in the next section with initial portfolios built up
in two or three years. Doing so, the investment degrees differ during the first few years as the portfolio
gets invested more slowly. After about five years, all portfolios converge, showing that the construction of
the initial portfolio does not seem to affect the quality of the recommitment strategies after the portfolio
matures. Detailed results are available upon request.
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private equity funds call only 90% of committed capital. This results in ‘leakage’, that is
uncalled commitments remaining within the portfolio as cash and accumulating over time.
For this reason, strategy II extends strategy I by setting commitments at the end of quarter
t equal to the sum of the current distributions and uncalled capital from the commitments
made P quarters ago, at t− P .
Although recommitting uncalled previous commitments as in strategy II should help
to improve the average investment degree, it cannot possibly achieve the target exposure
completely. The data analysis in Section 6.2 reveals that the investment degree for indi-
vidual funds on average only reaches up to 60% of committed capital as shown in Figure
6.2. Obviously this applies not only to the commitments made for the initial portfolio in
the first year, but also to the capital involved in the recommitment of distributions and
uncalled previous commitments. Hence, in order to counter the effects of this underin-
vesting and maintain the target exposure, overcommitment also seems necessary at the
recommitment stage.
An important but difficult choice to be made is the overcommitment percentage to be
applied. As shown in Table 6.2, the average (maximum) investment degree varies substan-
tially across vintage years, suggesting that a constant overcommitment percentage is not
appropriate. On the other hand, implementing a strategy with a dynamic overcommitment
percentage is not straightforward. Ideally, the overcommitment percentage for new com-
mitments in a given quarter would be based on the actual investment degree that will be
attained by funds from the current vintage year, but in practice this is of course unknown.
We argue that the current investment degree of the existing private equity portfolio also
provides valuable information regarding the appropriate overcommitment percentage for
new commitments. Intuitively, the further this investment degree falls below one, the more
aggressive we should recommit capital to new private equity funds in order to bring the
exposure back to the target level. Hence, strategy III sets the new commitments at the
end of quarter t equal to the distributions received during that quarter and uncalled com-
mitments made P quarters before as in strategy II, but now multiplied with the reciprocal
of the investment degree of the current private equity portfolio. Hence, in strategy III the
new commitments at the end of quarter t are determined by:
Ct =
1
IDt
(Dt + UCt−P ) , (6.2)
where Ct is the amount of new commitments made at the end of quarter t, IDt is the
investment degree of the current private equity portfolio, Dt are the distributions received
160
156 Results
during quarter t, and UCt−P is the amount of uncalled capital of commitments made P
quarters ago.
An important choice to be made in strategies II and III obviously is the ‘lag-time’ P .
In the empirical analysis below we set P = 24 quarters, based on the observation that for
the average private equity fund, the cumulative contributions level off after approximately
six years as shown in Figure 6.1, also see Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003b).
6.4.3 Implementation
We evaluate the performance of the three recommitment strategies by means of historical
simulation using the TVE database. Hence, we form initial portfolios for vintage years from
1980 up to and including 2000, and apply the recommitment strategies for the remainder of
the sample period. Several implementation issues are worth mentioning. First, we impose
no restrictions on the portfolio of private equity funds concerning the type of funds (venture
capital or buy-out capital), the investment region (US or Europe), the maximum number
of funds invested in or the maximum portfolio weights. The only restriction is that the
commitments must be sufficiently diversified. Reinvestment strategies when limited to a
certain type of funds or to a specific region are analysed in Section 6.5.2 below.
Second, after the portfolio construction period in the first year, the different recommit-
ment strategies are applied for the remainder of the sample period as described before. For
assigning the new commitments to be made in a particular quarter, four funds with the
relevant vintage year are drawn randomly from the TVE data set, again independent of the
region (EU or US) or investment type (venture capital or buy-out). The new commitment
will be equally assigned to each of the four random funds from the concerning vintage year.
Finally, throughout we assume no return on cash because our portfolio would be part
of a larger portfolio. In order to avoid dependence of the results on the particular initial
portfolio that is constructed and on the funds selected for the recommitments, we simulate
1,000 portfolios and average the results for evaluation.
6.5 Results
We evaluate the quality of the recommitment strategies by considering various properties
of the investment degree, in particular its mean, standard deviation and probability of
liquidity shortfall (that is, the probability that the investment degree exceeds one and
money needs to be borrowed to fulfill capital calls). When computing these statistics, we
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discard the first three years of the portfolio’s life, in order to avoid any influence of the
initial portfolio formation period.
6.5.1 Main results
Panel (a) in Figure 6.3 shows how the average investment degree evolves over time when
applying strategies I–III for the 1,000 private equity portfolios with vintage year 1980.
Summary statistics for all vintage years are given in Table 6.3. When applying strategy
I, which sets current commitments equal to current distributions, the investment degree
remains well below the target level of one. This does not come as a surprise as committed
capital is not called instantaneously, such that the portfolio always contains a certain
amount of cash. In fact, the average investment degree comes very close to the target
level of one between two and three years after formation due to the overcommitment in
the initial portfolio. This, however, is followed by a decline to a considerably lower level,
such that the average investment degree varies between 0.65 and 0.81 for the years 1996
and 1999, respectively, with an average across all vintage years of 0.73. Also note that,
although it would seem that an investment degree in excess of one cannot occur for this
strategy by construction, we do observe a positive probability of liquidity shortfall for
most vintage years. This is due to the overcommitment applied during the formation of
the initial portfolio.
The first recommitment strategy suffers from two problems that result in an average
investment degree below the target level of one. First, not all committed capital is called
instantaneously but with a delay that can extend to several years. Second, part of the
committed capital is never called at all. The results from the second recommitment strategy
suggest that the first problem is the most important one. Strategy II aims to remedy
the second problem by increasing the commitments at time t with uncalled capital from
the commitments made at t − P , where we set P = 24 for reasons discussed before. The
results show that this increases the average investment degree, but only by a small amount,
from 0.73 to 0.75. From panel (a) in Figure 6.3 it is clear that the improvement starts
approximately six years after the initial portfolio formation, as expected.
As discussed in the previous section, it seems necessary to apply overcommitment at
the recommitment stage as well to achieve an investment degree that is closer to the
target value of one. Using the investment degree of the existing portfolio for setting the
overcommitment percentage for the current recommitments as in strategy III appears to
be quite effective, because it increases the investment degree and lowers the variation of
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Figure 6.3: Evolution of cash flows and investment degree over time for vintage year 1980
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(a) Initial portfolio and strategy I–III for 1980
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(b) Average (re)commitments and cash flows using strategy III for 1980
The figure shows the average investment degree of private equity fund portfolios maintained with recom-
mitment strategies I–III for vintage year 1980 (panel (a)) and (re) commitments and cash flows of strategy
III for vintage year 1980 (panel (b)).
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the average investment degrees of the different vintage years. Table 6.3 shows that the
average investment degree rises to 0.85, well above the level attained with strategies I and II.
Not surprisingly, this comes at the cost of a higher risk of being overinvested, although the
increase in the probability of liquidity shortfall is quite modest from 5% to 9%. We also note
that the range of the average investment degree across the different vintage years is much
smaller, between 0.82 and 0.88. This is confirmed by Figure 6.4, showing the investment
degree for selected vintage years (1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001). We observe that the
average investment degree behaves similarly once the portfolios mature. For example,
for all vintage years the investment degree declines in the year 2000, driven by the large
distributions made during the dot-com bubble in that year. Due to the overcommitment
effect, however, the investment degree quickly increases again in subsequent years.
From Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2000), Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Gompers et al.
(in press) we learn that both capital flows and returns in the private equity market are
cyclical. For example, the venture capital market experienced a boom in 1981–1983 and in
1998–2000 when investments grew dramatically in personal computer hardware manufac-
turers, and in internet and telecommunication companies, respectively. The question rises
to what extent our recommitment strategy is cyclical in nature. This may be the case for
several reasons. First, we might invest aggressively when the market becomes overvalued,
because we will receive more distributions than normal that will be invested again. Second,
it might be that we make larger commitments at times when investments are difficult to
find due to our dynamic overcommitment, while simultaneously the uncalled commitments
might be relatively large, resulting in additional recommitments after 6 years. This can
lead to an undesirable accumulation of new commitments.
The detailed picture of the cash flows involved in strategy III, provided by panel (b)
of Figure 6.3 for the 1980 portfolios, leads us to the answer to this question. First, on
average the distributions amount to 5% of the total portfolio value per quarter, while the
actual investments (contributions) are slightly lower but much more constant than the
distributions. These orders of magnitude are fairly stable across vintage years.10 The new
commitments do show some cyclicality in, for example, the year 2000. Nevertheless, the
stability of the actual contributions illustrates that the cyclicality of our strategy is limited.
Second we observe a rise in the commitments in year 7 due to the recommitments of the
uncalled capital of the initial portfolio. We do not see this effect occurring again at a later
stage, showing that by then the portfolios mature and do not become cyclical in nature.
10Detailed results for other vintage years are available upon request.
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Figure 6.4: Evolution of the investment degree for different vintage years.
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The figure shows the average investment degree of private equity fund portfolios maintained with recom-
mitment strategy III for vintage years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001.
The bottom line of our results so far is that strategy III is very well able to bring the
investment degree close to the target level with an acceptable risk of being overinvested.
The potential cyclical behavior of our portfolio is small and not a major issue because our
aim is to get a passive exposure to the private equity market that includes investments in
over- and undervalued periods.
6.5.2 Portfolio restrictions
Investment focus
So far we considered unrestricted portfolios, not imposing any limitations on the investment
focus or accessibility. Here we examine the performance of our strategy when restrictions
are imposed on the type of funds (VC or BO) or the investment region (US or Europe).
Panel (a) in Figure 6.5 shows the average investment degree for the unrestricted portfolios
as well as the portfolios consisting of VC, BO, US or European funds only for vintage
year 1986. Before 1986 the number of European funds as well as the number of buyout
capital funds were very limited. Table 6.4 shows the corresponding summary statistics for
all vintage years.
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Figure 6.5: Evolution of the investment degree for restricted portfolios.
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(a) Investment focus restriction
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(b) Fund access restriction
The figure shows the average investment degree of private equity fund portfolios maintained with recom-
mitment strategy III for vintage year 1986 using all or only European (EU), US, buy-out (BO), or venture
capital (VC) funds (panel (a)), or only new (first time) and follow-on funds (panel (b)).
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Table 6.4: Summary statistics of the investment degree in recom-
mitment strategies for restricted portfolios
Vintage Investment focus Fund access
year EU US BO VC FO FT
1980 NA 0.84 NA 0.86 NA NA
1981 NA 0.86 NA 0.86 NA NA
1982 NA 0.88 NA 0.89 NA NA
1983 NA 0.86 NA 0.88 0.84 0.95
1984 NA 0.85 NA 0.87 0.85 0.94
1985 1.04 0.84 NA 0.89 0.88 0.91
1986 0.89 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.89
1987 0.90 0.83 0.89 0.85 0.83 0.89
1988 0.92 0.82 0.89 0.84 0.82 0.91
1989 0.88 0.81 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.87
1990 0.93 0.80 0.91 0.82 0.80 0.92
1991 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.90
1992 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.86
1993 0.93 0.79 0.89 0.82 0.81 0.90
1994 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.91
1995 0.97 0.79 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.95
1996 0.99 0.81 0.92 0.88 0.83 1.04
1997 0.92 0.80 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.95
1998 0.94 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.85 0.94
1999 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.84
2000 0.92 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.76 0.92
Average 0.92 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.92
Note: The table shows properties of the investment degree for private
equity portfolios where the current commitments are set equal to cur-
rent distributions plus uncalled commitments divided by the investment
degree, for specific portfolios only consisting of European, US, venture
capital, buy-out capital, follow-on or first time funds. Reported is the
mean investment degree based on 1,000 simulated portfolios (excluding
the first three years of the portfolios’ life). In each simulation, the initial
portfolio is composed of 16 randomly selected funds from the relevant
vintage year. Quarterly recommitments in subsequent years are equally
distributed among four randomly selected new funds from that year.
The results for vintage years 2001-2005 are not reported as these port-
folios are too immature to illustrate the effectiveness of the strategies,
while the first 4 years for Europe and 5 years for buy-out are missing
because not enough funds are available.
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The average investment degree for BO (0.87) and VC (0.86) portfolios are similar to the
unrestricted portfolios (0.85), while the probability of liquidity shortfall is marginally higher
than the unrestricted strategy. The strategies only differ in the volatility of the investment
degree, which is equal to 7.9 and 21.2 percent for BO and VC portfolios, respectively. From
Figure 6.5, panel (a) it can be seen that the average investment degrees for unrestricted and
VC portfolios are most similar. This close resemblance can be explained by the distribution
of funds over the two investment types: VC-funds constitute two-thirds of the TVE data
set. The difference in investment degree between VC and BO portfolios is particularly
clear during the dot-com bubble in 2000 and 2001. In those years venture capital funds
made historically large distributions while the buy-out distributions were less extreme.
The results for US portfolios closely resemble those for the unrestricted portfolios, al-
though the average investment degree for all vintage years is slightly lower (0.82). The
average for European portfolios (0.92) is closer to 1, but at the cost of an increased prob-
ability of liquidity shortfall.
Given that the results for VC and BO portfolios as well as the US and Europe portfolios
resemble the results for unrestricted portfolios, we conclude that our strategy III can also
be applied successfully to such specialised private equity portfolios.
Fund access
Typically, first-time funds are not in the position to turn away new investors, while estab-
lished private equity fund managers may restrict access to their follow-on funds. Access
to follow-on funds is in fact often limited to the shareholders that already participate in
a current fund. As a result fund investors are required to invest some part of their assets
in first-time funds from new managers. It has been documented that expected returns on
first-time funds are lower on average than expected returns on follow-on funds, see Kaplan
and Schoar (2005). Therefore, we examine the applicability of our strategy restricting the
sample either to first-time funds or to follow-on funds. Our sample holds 1,529 (58%)
follow-on funds and 1,089 (42%) first-time funds. Panel (b) in Figure 6.5 shows the aver-
age investment degree for the unrestricted portfolios as well as the portfolios consisting of
first-time and follow-on funds only for vintage year 1986. The last two columns in Table
6.4 show the corresponding summary statistics for all vintage years.
The average investment degree for follow-on funds (0.83) portfolios is similar to the
unrestricted portfolios (0.85), while the average investment degree for first-time fund port-
folios (0.92) is higher. From Figure 6.5, panel (b) it can be seen that the average investment
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degrees for unrestricted and first-time portfolios deviate most, with the difference being
most clear during the dot-com bubble in 2000–2001. During this period many first-time
venture capital funds were raised. Second the volatility of the investment degree of the
follow-on fund portfolios (8 percent) is similar to the total sample (9 percent), while the
investment degree of the first-time fund portfolios is more volatile (12 percent).
Given that the results for first-time and follow-on portfolios resemble the results for
unrestricted portfolios, we conclude that our strategy III can also be applied successfully
to such private equity funds with different degrees of accessibility.
6.5.3 More aggressive overcommitment
The analysis so far has demonstrated that making use of overcommitment with a dynamic
percentage based on the investment degree of the current private equity portfolio leads to
a successful recommitment strategy with stable performance. Nevertheless, the resulting
private equity exposure is still below the target level by 15% on average as the average
investment degree is equal to 0.85. This finding can be understood intuitively from (6.2),
which shows that new commitments become equal to current distributions and uncalled
capital that was committed six years before. The slow and incomplete calls for capital
then put downward pressure on the investment degree in subsequent quarters, as discussed
before. Obviously, the average investment degree can be brought further up by more ag-
gressive overcommitment, but this necessarily comes at a greater risk of liquidity shortfall.
In this section we examine the balance between these two aspects, by reconsidering our
strategy III, but now increasing the overcommitment with a constant percentage OC equal
to 10, 20, . . . , 50 percent in each quarter:
Ct =
1 +OC
IDt
(Dt + UCt−P ) (6.3)
Panel (a) in Figure 6.6 shows the average investment degrees resulting from these
strategies for the 1980 portfolios, with summary statistics provided for all vintage years
in Table 6.5. Inflating the overcommitment percentage appears to be successful, in the
sense that the average investment degree moves closer to the target level of one as OC
increases. The increase in the investment degree that we observe for 1980 in Figure 6.6 is
also prevalent for the other vintage years, see Table 6.5. The average investment degree
goes up from 0.85 for strategy III with dynamic overcommitment only, to 0.89, 0.92, 0.95,
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Figure 6.6: Evolution of the investment degree and overcommitment.
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(a) Strategy III with varying additional overcommitment (0, 10, . . . , 50%) for vintage year 1980
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Fr
ac
ti
on
 o
f 
to
ta
l c
om
m
it
m
en
t
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
(b) Strategy III with 20% additional overcommitment for vintage years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996
and 2001
The figure shows the average investment degree of private equity fund portfolios maintained with recom-
mitment strategy III with varying degrees of additional fixed overcommitment for vintage year 1980 (a)
and 20% overcommitment for vintage years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 (b).
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0.98 and 1.01 with additional fixed overcommitment equal to 10, . . . , 50%. Unfortunately,
the accompanying increase in the probability of being overinvested is substantial. In fact,
this probability rises faster than the average investment degree, and becomes equal to 16,
24, 33, 41 and 49%, while it is only 9% for strategy III without additional overcommitment.
Hence, it seems that a more aggressive overcommitment strategy is suitable only when
liquidity shortfall is not a serious problem for our institutional investor. This may be the
case when private equity is part of a larger investment portfolio that also includes public
equity, which can be sold (temporarily) to provide the capital necessary for the private
equity investments. For these investors it seems that a 20% additional overcommitment is
optimal as this brings the average investment ratio to 0.92 while the probability of being
overinvested is 24%. Panel (b) in Figure 6.6 shows the average investment degrees resulting
from strategy III including a 20% fixed overcommitment for different vintage years. From
this graph it is clear that the average investment degrees are close to one. Again we observe
that the investment degree develops similarly for different vintage years after the portfolios
have matured. All portfolios show a decline in the investment degree in 2000 and a sharp
increase in the years afterwards.
6.5.4 Using the future investment degree
Using the current investment degree of the existing private equaty portfolio to determine
the overcommitment percentage in quarter t, as in strategy III according to (6.2), might
be sub-optimal because part of the previously committed but yet uncalled capital will be
invested in the near future. Using the current investment degree might lead to an overesti-
mate of the required commitments in quarter t. On the other hand, distributions from the
current investments will likely continue in the future such that we may be underestimating
the required overcommitment percentage. The results in Section 6.5.1 suggest that this
second effect dominates.
The performance of the recommitment strategy may be improved by using the future
investment degree of the current portfolio to set the current commitments. Implementing
this in practice requires a cash flow prediction model, see Takahashi and Alexander (2002)
and De Malherbe (2004) for examples. The performance of the recommitment strategies
is then, to a considerable extent, determined by the quality of these forecasting models. In
order to focus on the merits of our recommitment strategy as such, we use perfect foresight
instead. Obviously this implies that our results have to be treated with caution, as they
may be overly optimistic about the ability of the strategies to achieve the goal of a full and
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constant exposure to private equity. On the other hand, we do not aim to select private
equity funds having a pattern of commitments that matches the pattern of distributions
from the portfolio as closely as possible. Instead, funds are selected randomly. Hence, we
consider strategy III but now applying the actual investment degree of the current portfolio
in quarter t+Q for determining the overcommitment percentage to be applied in quarter
t. That is, we replace the current investment degree IDt in (6.2) by IDt+Q, where we
consider values of Q equal to 4, 8, . . . , 20:11
Ct =
1
IDt+Q
(Dt + UCt−P ) (6.4)
The average investment degrees resulting from these strategies for the 1980 portfolios
are shown in panel (a) in Figure 6.7. Clearly, applying the future investment degree in the
recommitment strategy becomes effective only five years after inception of the portfolio as
the investment degrees do not differ much during the first years. It also appears that looking
ahead too far into the future, that is, four and five years, results in being overinvested.
This is probably caused by the fact that the investment degree of the current portfolio will
be quite low after four and five years, such that the level of new commitments becomes
too high. On the other hand, the investment degree does not rise that much if we use
the investment degree for one or two years ahead. This leads us to conclude that our
strategy can benefit most from a cash flow forecasting model with a three year horizon.
This conclusion is confirmed by the summary statistics for the other vintage years shown
in Table 6.6. Using a three year horizon in our recommitment strategy leads to an increase
of the average investment degree to 0.92 and a probability of being overinvested of 23%.
Panel (b) in Figure 6.7 shows the average investment degrees resulting from strategy III
including three-year perfect foresight for different vintage years. From this graph it is clear
that the investment degrees are close to 1. Again we observe that the investment degree
develops similarly for different vintage years after the portfolios have matured.
In sum, an investor who has a cash flow prediction model at her disposal can improve
our recommitment strategy by using the expected future investment degree of the current
portfolio to determine the appropriate overcommitment percentage. It is advisable to
employ investment degree forecasts for an horizon of three years.
11We stress that IDt+Q is the investment degree in quarter t+Q of the private equity portfolio held in
quarter t, that is, we do not use information about new commitments made between t and t+Q.
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Figure 6.7: Evolution of the investment degree and the future investment degree.
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The figure shows the average investment degree of private equity fund portfolios maintained with recom-
mitment strategy III with perfect foresight concerning the future investment degree at varying horizons
for vintage year 1980 (panel (a)) and three-year perfect foresight for vintage years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996,
and 2001 (panel (b)).
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6.5.5 Existing commitment strategies
CCK-rule
The literature on (re)commitment strategies in private equity is very scarce; in fact only
two relevant papers were found. Cardie et al. (2000) suggest a commitment rule (denoted as
CCK-rule), which states that an investor should commit her entire private equity allocation
target to new investments every other year or one half of the target each year. Although
frequently making new private equity commitments is certainly necessary to maintain the
desired exposure, the CCK-rule seems somewhat naive. In particular, it does not to take
into account the development of the existing private equity investments in the portfolio
when making new commitments.
Here we examine the first variant of the CCK-rule, setting new commitments equal to
the private equity target times the current market value of the portfolio (the sum of the
portfolio’s NAV and cash) every other year. The annual number of funds that is selected
(randomly) in each round of new commitments is set equal to 16 and the target is set at 100
percent. The average investment degree over 1,000 simulated portfolios is shown in panel
(a) of Figure 6.8 for vintage years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001. Clearly, the private
equity investment degrees are not kept constant at 100 percent over time. Instead, they
remain permanently and substantially above target and fluctuate wildly. It is clear that
the CCK-rule does not succeed in keeping the investment degree constant at the allocation
target. Not taking into account the characteristics of the current portfolio results in a high
and volatile investment degree.
NCM-rule
Nevins et al. (2004)’s commitment strategy, denoted as the NCM-rule, states that an
investor should make new commitments when actual committed capital falls below its
target C∗, equal to the difference between the two. For a 100 percent allocation target
for private equity, the target level of committed capital according to the the NCM-rule is
defined as:
C∗ = 1 +
rDI
rIN
, (6.5)
where rDI is the rate at which distributions are paid from the private equity investments
(expressed as a percentage of the value of invested capital (NAV)) and rIN is the rate at
which capital commitments are invested, expressed as percentage of remaining (not (yet)
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of the investment degree for earlier documented strategies.
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The figure shows the average investment degree of private equity fund portfolios maintained with (a) the
CCK-rule and (b) the NCM-rule for vintage years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001.
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invested) commitments. In case rDI is large, more capital needs to be committed to
compensate for the reduction in investment degree due to large distributions. If rIN is
small, more capital is required for new commitments, because existing commitments are
called relatively slowly. For computing rDI and rIN Nevins et al. (2004) suggest using
information on capital calls and distributions from liquidated funds only, and find that 70
percent overcommitment as a result.12
The NCM-rule rests on two crucial assumptions. First, investors make commitments
according to the computed allocation target for committed capital. Second, the rate of
distributions and investments rDI and rIN in (6.5) are assumed to be constant over time and
across private equity funds.13 When these two assumptions hold, the ratio of committed
capital to invested capital converges to a steady-state level. However, especially the second
part of the second assumption seems to be unrealistic. As discussed in Section 6.2, the rates
of distributions and investments vary over time, while in addition they likely vary across
private equity funds according to characteristics such as size and investment orientation
(Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003b). Of course this dependence will diminish if multiple
private equity funds are combined in a portfolio (or fund-of-funds), but it will not disappear
completely given that the number of included funds is typically fairly small (up to 20, say).
The NCM-rule is assessed using the same framework as before. Investors make new
commitments if the amount of actual committed capital falls short of its target (170 per-
cent), equal to the difference between the two. The average investment degree over 1,000
simulated portfolios is shown in panel (b) of Figure 6.8 for the vintage years 1981, 1986,
1991, 1996, and 2001. Clearly, the investment degrees are not kept constant at 100 percent
over time. For example, the 1981 portfolio starts substantially above target in the 1980s
and falls back to 0.5 in the mid-1990s. In contrast to our strategy III the NCM-portfolios
do not converge to the same investment degree as they mature. The wide range in the
investment ratios for mature portfolios can for example be seen in 2005, where the degrees
range between 0.69 for the 1981 portfolio and 1.15 for the 1996 portfolio. This illustrates
that the NCM strategy is not able to deal with the dynamics of a specific portfolio. Finally,
12Based upon the 536 liquidated funds in our TVE database, rDI is equal to 24.36 percent and rIN is
equal to 20.36 percent. With these figures, the target for committed capital as determined according to
(6.5) is equal to 2.19, which is equivalent to 119 percent overcommitment. We find a percentage in the
same order of magnitude as the 70 percent reported by Nevins et al. (2004) if we only take into account
capital calls during the first six years of the fund’s lifetime for estimating rIN , when nearly all committed
capital is called.
13This assumption is reflected in the way Nevins et al. (2004) estimate rDI and rIN , namely by aggre-
gating the characteristics of the liquidated funds of their dataset on a life cycle basis.
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we remark that excessive commitments are made in 2000 due to the difference between
the actual amount of committed capital and its target, and the value of the total portfolio
(NAV + cash). This could be caused by differences in sample period used to estimate rDI
and rIN , as Nevins et al. (2004) only consider liquidated funds for vintage years between
1980 and 2000.
We conclude that the NCM-strategy is not capable to keep the private equity investment
degree constant at one for a prolonged period. This is most likely due to the fact that the
assumption of constants rates of distribution and investment do not hold in practice.
6.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a (re)commitment strategy for long term institutional investors, such as
insurance companies, pension funds or endowments, which aim to have a constant private
equity exposure in their strategic asset allocation. Investors need this strategy because
private equity is illiquid such that it, in general, cannot be bought instantaneously in the
primary or secondary market. Given the high level of expertise and experience required for
investing, managing and divesting of private equity, most investments take place through
private equity funds. Our heuristic recommitment strategy makes new fund commitments
every quarter and explicitly takes into account characteristics of the existing private equity
portfolio for determining the level of new commitments. Commitments in a particular
quarter are set equal to current distributions plus uncalled capital from commitments made
six years ago, with an dynamice overcommitment percentage determined by the investment
degree of the current portfolio. The reason for recommitting uncalled capital is to prevent
‘leakage’ of capital due to the fact that on average 10 percent of the commitments are not
invested. The investment degree is used to determine an overcommitment percentage to
counter the fact that committed capital is actually invested only gradually, with a delay
that can extend to several years, with distributions already starting to occur before all
commitments are called.
The recommitment strategy is evaluated by means of historical simulations using the
Thomson Venture Economics database. We consider portfolios composed of investments
in 16 private equity funds diversified across venture capital and buy-out capital and across
the US and Europe. Furthermore we use a 30% overcommitment to initialize the portfolio
in the first year. We find that our recommitment strategy is capable of maintaining a stable
investment degree that is close to the target level, while keeping the probability of being
overexposed within reasonable bounds. Sensitivity analyses show that our strategy remains
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successful when the portfolio is restricted to a certain type of private equity capital, to a
specific region or to fund managers with varying experience. Furthermore, we show that
the quality of the strategy can be improved if an investor can use the three-year future
investment degree of the current portfolio to scale up or down her new commitments.
An investor that can permit herself a higher allocation could consider more aggressive
overcommitment as this will bring the portfolio exposure closer to the target, but at the
cost of a higher risk of being overexposed. In addition, we find that the commitment
strategies of Cardie et al. (2000) and Nevins et al. (2004) are both not capable to keep
the investment degree stable for a prolonged period of time. In particular, the investment
degree remains permanently above its target.
The concept of our private equity recommitment strategy can be expanded further to
other illiquid asset classes that involve commitments, like some specific real estate funds or
infrastructure funds. Further research could also consider the use of more accurate interme-
diate valuations of the portfolio investments. Driessen et al. (2007) present a methodology
to estimate the intermediate net asset values by estimating the CAPM beta on the fund’s
cash flows when the fund is matured. We expect that the average exposure to private
equity over time will not be affected much, but that the volatility of the investment degree
will rise because the value of private equity investments will become more volatile. Fur-
thermore, our current strategy is limited to 100% private equity, but it can be expanded
in a straightforward manner to private equity in a broader strategic asset allocation with
e.g. public equity, bonds and hedge funds, taking into account the returns on these asset
classes. Finally more research on cash flow prediction, see Takahashi and Alexander (2002)
and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003b), is necessary to make the recommitment strategy
based on the future investment degree operational.
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Data Appendix
The data set obtained from Thomson Venture Economics contains information on 2,786
private equity funds over the period 1980Q1-2005Q4, and includes the regional focus
(US/Europe), the type of investment (venture capital, buy-out capital, mezzanine finance
and fund-of-funds), the vintage year, quarterly contributions and distributions, and quar-
terly information on the net asset value (NAV). Reported cash flows are given in US dollars
and are net of (management) fees as well as carried interest. In total 168 funds are excluded
on the following grounds:
1. Total commitments: The fund’s cash flows and NAVs are expressed relative to its
total commitment, which makes funds of different sizes comparable. One fund reports
a zero commitment and has been excluded from the data set.
2. Geographic orientation: 1 fund was included in both the European and US sample.
The double counting has been excluded and the fund is characterized as ‘global’.
3. Type of investment: Mezzanine funds (65 funds) are removed, since their structures
differ from private equity funds. As this research focuses on private equity fund in-
vestors, data on fund-of-funds (direct investing (13 funds) and secondaries (7 funds))
are excluded as well.
4. Missing observations: Two funds report cash flows equal to zero over the entire period
and are therefore excluded.
5. Visual inspection: 71 funds are removed on visual inspection of the data.
The Thomson Venture Economics database reports a fund’s contributions, distributions
and estimated NAVs. The contributions and distributions, if any, are assumed to take place
at the end of the month and information on the NAVs is given on a quarterly basis. The
following adjustments were made to these cash flow variables:
1. 157 funds report negative contributions, which have been changed to distributions.
2. Negative distributions of 14 funds have been adjusted by subtracting them from the
fund’s earlier distributions.
3. 8 funds report a negative NAV. As the NAVs of funds are highly unlikely to become
negative, these funds have been removed.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een bundeling van vijf empirische studies naar financie¨le mark-
ten. Iedere studie staat op zichzelf en heeft betrekking op een specifieke markt: opkomende
markten, bedrijfsobligaties, of private equity. Deze Nederlandse samenvatting geeft een
overzicht van de belangrijkste bevindingen.
Opkomende markten
De uitdrukking ‘opkomende markten’ of ‘emerging markets’ is ge¨ıntroduceerd door de In-
ternational Finance Corporation (IFC) van de Wereld Bank. De term ‘opkomend’ verwijst
naar de ontwikkelingsfase van een economie tussen onderontwikkeld en ontwikkeld. De
opkomende markten omvatten landen met lage en midden-inkomens, waarvan de aande-
lenmarkten openstaan voor buitenlandse beleggers, zoals Mexico en Zuid-Afrika. Hiernaast
worden ook ontwikkelde economiee¨n met een hoog politiek risico of beperkte regulering,
zoals respectievelijk Israel en Zuid-Korea, aangemerkt als opkomende markten.
De economiee¨n en financie¨le markten van opkomende landen zijn uitgebreid bestudeerd.
Het onderzoek nam een grote vlucht sinds het begin van de jaren negentig door de beschik-
baarheid van relevante data door onder andere IFC. Een goed overzicht van het onderzoek
naar opkomende markten wordt gegeven door Bekaert en Harvey (2002, 2003). Hiernaast
hebben de hoge rendementen en sterke economische groei sterk bijgedragen aan de interesse
van beleggers voor opkomende markten.
Twee aspecten maken empirisch onderzoek naar opkomende markten interessant. Al-
lereerst bieden deze een natuurlijke test voor gevestigde en nieuwe theoriee¨n die in eerste
instantie meestal worden toegepast op ontwikkelde markten. De studie naar aandelense-
lectiestrategiee¨n in hoofdstuk 2 is hiervan een goed voorbeeld. Ten tweede hebben op-
komende markten hun eigen kernmerken zoals regelmatig terugkerende financie¨le crises en
179
184
180 Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
beperkte reguleringen. Dit rechtvaardigt dan ook specifieke (nieuwe) modellen voor op-
komende markten. De studie in hoofdstuk 3 naar de winstvoorspellingen van analisten in
opkomende markten is hiervan een goed voorbeeld. Uiteindelijk biedt de studie naar de
valuta markt van de opkomende markten in hoofdstuk 4 een nieuw perspectief op valuta
beleggingsstrategiee¨n voor zowel opkomende als ontwikkelde markten.
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt twee tegenstrijdige verklaringen voor de winstgevendheid van
aandelenselectiestrategiee¨n in opkomende markten. De studie laat zien dat de signifi-
cante excess rendementen van aandelenselectiestrategiee¨n, gebaseerd op waarde, momen-
tum en winstrevisie indicatoren, niet verklaard kunnen worden door zowel het marktrisico
als wereldwijde risico factoren. Onze bevindingen voor de waarde en momentum strate-
giee¨n zijn consistent met bestaande resultaten voor ontwikkelde markten die wijzen op
een ‘behavioral’ verklaring. Onze resultaten voor de waarde strategie zijn in overeen-
stemming met overreactie-verklaring omdat we zien dat de winstgroei van deze aandelen
bovengemiddeld blijft na de portefeuilleformatie. Voor de momentum strategie zien we
zowel een onderreactie (kort na portefeuilleformatie) en een overreactie (op langere ter-
mijn). De hoge opwaartse winstrevisies vlak na de portefeuilleformatie wijzen op een
initiele onderreactie-verklaring, terwijl we vijf jaar na de portfefeuilleformatie zien dat het
aandeel zijn sterke performance niet heeft weten vast te houden. Dit laatste wijst op een
overreactie-verklaring. Bovendien vinden we dat de belangrijkste ‘behavioral’ verklaring
voor waarde aandelen gerelateerd is aan de onderschatting van de lange termijn groei
vooruitzichten. Dit blijkt uit de bovengemiddelde afwijkingen in de winstvoorspellingen
en winstrevisies op lange termijn en door de snel verbeterende winstgroeiverwachtingen.
Ten slotte vinden we dat overreactie effecten een beperkte rol spelen voor de winstrevisie
strategie. Hierin verschilt deze strategie van de momentum strategie.
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert empirisch bewijs dat financieel analisten inefficie¨nt gebruik
maken van beschikbare macro-economische informatie in hun winstvoorspellingen voor
bedrijven in opkomende markten. Analisten blijken informatie over de politieke stabiliteit
volledig over het hoofd te zien. Daarentegen verwerken zij economische groeivoorspellingen
wel in hun winstschattingen, maar helaas blijkt uit ons onderzoek dat deze groeivoorspel-
lingen geen relevante informatie voor winstgroei bevat. Het zou dus beter zijn dat analisten
deze informatie niet meenemen in hun winstvoorspellingen. Inflatie voorspellingen blijken
op de juiste manier verwerkt te worden in de winstvoorspellingen. Verder blijkt dat de
transparantie van ondernemingen cruciaal is voor de kwaliteit van winstvoorspellingen in
opkomende markten. Onze resultaten wijzen erop dat analisten de macro-economische
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informatie beter verwerken in hun winstvoorspellingen voor meer transparante bedrijven
dan voor minder transparante bedrijven.
Hoofdstuk 4 meet de economische waarde van macro-economische informatie en technis-
che handelsregels voor de valutamarkten in opkomende landen. Op basis van wisselkoers-
gegevens van 23 opkomende landen met een zwevend wisselkoers regime over de periode
1995-2007 laten we zien dat beide informatiebronnen benut kunnen worden voor winst-
gevende valuta beleggingsstrategiee¨n. In overeenstemming met de conclusies van enqueˆtes
onder valutamarkt professionals betreffende het gebruik van fundamentele en technische
analyse, vinden we dat de combinatie van de informatiebronnen in een beleggingsstrategie
een verbeterd, voor risicogecorrigeerd, rendement laat zien.
Bedrijfsobligaties
Ondernemingen gebruiken doorgaans een combinatie van verschillende financieringsbron-
nen om een optimale kapitaal structuur te bewerkstelligen. Meestal komt dit neer op een
combinatie tussen eigen vermogen en vreemd vermogen. Vandaag de dag halen veel on-
dernemingen, zonder de tussenkomst van banken, zelf geld op in de kapitaalmarkt door
hun eigen obligaties uit te geven. In principe komen deze bedrijfsobligaties neer op een
financie¨le verplichting van de onderneming om rente te betalen op vooraf vastgestelde
data gedurende de looptijd van de obligatie en om aan het eind van de looptijd de hoofd-
som terug te betalen. Vanwege het risico dat een onderneming niet aan deze verplichting
kan voldoen eisen beleggers een hogere rentevergoeding op deze bedrijfsobligaties dan op
staatsobligaties. In het geval van faillissement hebben de houders van bedrijfsobligaties
overigens voorrang boven de claims van aandeelhouders.
In de afgelopen 15 jaar is het onderzoek naar bedrijfsobligaties sterk gegroeid, hoewel
de eerste studie naar bedrijfsobligaties door Fisher (1959) al veel langer teruggaat. De
toegenomen interesse is te danken aan de enorme groei van de markt voor bedrijfsobli-
gaties in zowel de V.S als Europa en aan de introductie van afgeleide instrumenten op
bedrijfsobligaties zoals ‘credit default swaps’. Desalniettemin is het aantal empirische on-
derzoeken vanuit het perspectief van een belegger in bedrijfsobligaties beperkt vanwege het
gebrek aan betrouwbare historische data van rendementen en prijzen. Voor zover bekend,
is hoofdstuk 5 de eerste studie naar anomaliee¨n in bedrijfsobligatierendementen die data
van individuele bedrijfsobligaties met beleggingsfondsen in bedrijfsobligaties combineert.
Voorgaande studies richten zich of alleen op de individuele bedrijfsobligaties (zie bijvoor-
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beeld Gebhardt et al. (2005)) of op beleggingsfondsen in bedrijfsobligaties (zie bijvoorbeeld
Elton et al. (1995) of Huij and Derwall (2007)).
Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat de eerder gedocumenteerde risicofactoren uitstekend in staat
zijn om de dwarsdoorsnede van de rendementen van bedrijfsobligaties met een middel-
lange en lange looptijd te verklaren. De rendementen van korte termijn obligaties worden
echter niet volledig verklaard en onderschat. Een aanzienlijk gedeelte van de rendementen
op korte termijn bedrijfsobligaties is onafhankelijk van de premies voor marktrisico, loop-
tijd en kredietrisico, de dynamiek van de rente curve, liquiditeitsrisico en premies gerela-
teerd aan macro-economische variabelen. Vergelijkbare aanwijzingen voor de korte termijn
bedrijfsobligatie anomalie vinden we ook terug in portefeuilles van bedrijfsobligatie beleg-
gingsfondsen. Dit duidt erop dat deze anomalie opgewassen is tegen belangrijke praktische
beperkingen zoals transactiekosten, ‘short-sell’-restricties en markt impact.
Private Equity
Private equity omvat het gehele spectrum van investeringen in deelnemingen in bedrijven
die geen publieke notering aan een beurs hebben. Pas in de jaren tachtig werd deze beleg-
gingscategorie bekend bij het grote publiek door de zeer grote private equity overnames die
op dat moment plaatsvonden in de V.S. en veelvuldig in het nieuws kwamen. Desalniet-
temin gaat de geschiedenis van private equity in zowel Europa als de VS terug tot de jaren
veertig. Sindsdien is de de private equity markt enorm gegroeid. Deze groei kwam tot
stand door stimuleringsprogramma’s van de overheid in de jaren vijftig, de introductie van
de commanditaire vennootschap in de jaren zeventig en nieuwe regels voor pensioenfondsen
en banken in de jaren tachtig. In deze laatste periode hebben institutionele beleggers, zoals
pensioenfondsen en verzekeringsmaatschappijen, de hoofdrol overgenomen van particuliere
investeerders. Hierdoor heeft private equity een extra impuls gekregen. Natuurlijk heeft
het succes van verschillende bedrijven die oorspronkelijk gefinancierd waren door private
equity investeerders, zoals Microsoft, Google, Starbucks, Apple Computers en Hewlett-
Packard, hier ook aan bijgedragen. Eind jaren negentig zagen we een aanzienlijke groei
van het aantal onafhankelijke private equity firma’s. Dit kan deels verklaard worden door
het succes van de private equity investeringen in internet start-ups aan het begin van de
internet hype en de daaropvolgende succesvolle beursintroducties op de publieke aandelen-
markt. Private equity en speciaal venture capital ondervond een stevige correctie aan het
eind van de internet hype, mede door de samenvallende wereldwijde macro-economische
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baisse. Het daaropvolgende macro-economische herstel leidde ook tot een herstel van de
private equity rendementen. Gedreven door de lage rentes en de grote beschikbaarheid van
liquide middelen ondergingen de buy-outs een sterke groei in de afgelopen drie jaar.
Heden ten dage is de interesse in private equity van institutionele belegger nog steeds
groeiende. Zo blijkt uit een enqueˆte van Cumming and Johan (2007) naar de opvattingen
van Nederlandse institutionele beleggers met betrekking tot private equity dat 29% van de
respondenten al belegt in private equity, terwijl nog eens 6% overweegt om in de komende
twee tot vijf jaar in private equity te gaan beleggen. Verder overwegen de respondenten
die nu al investeren in private equity om hun private equity portefeuille uit te breiden op
de middellange termijn. Ondanks het enthousiasme van institutionele beleggers is er nog
bijzonder weinig onderzoek gedaan naar beleggingsstrategiee¨n voor private equity beleggers
met een lange termijn beleggingshorizon. Hoofdstuk 6 vult deze hiaat.
Hoofdstuk 6 ontwikkelt een herbeleggingstrategie voor institutionele private equity be-
leggers. Deze strategie streeft ernaar om het gewicht van private equity in een beleg-
gingsportefeuille constant te houden en bovendien rekening te houden met het illiquide
karakter van private equity. Onze historische simulaties (1980 - 2005) laten zien dat deze
dynamische strategie in staat is om een constant portefeuillegewicht dicht bij de gewenste
allocatie in stand te houden. Dit resultaat vinden we niet alleen voor portefeuilles zon-
der restricties, maar ook voor portefeuilles die zijn beperkt tot alleen buy-out of venture
capital, een specifieke regio (Europa of de VS), of de ervaring van de fondsmanager. Dit
resultaat is van grote waarde voor institutionele beleggers zoals pensioenfondsen of verze-
keringsmaatschappijen. In hun strategische asset allocatie streven zij immers dikwijls naar
een constante allocatie naar verschillende beleggingscategoriee¨n. De eindige looptijd van
private equity investeringen in samenhang met de onzekere kasstromen maken het noodza-
kelijk dat deze beleggers hun portefeuille constant moeten onderhouden. Onze strategie
kan hierbij van waarde zijn.
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l)EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON FINANCIAL MARKETS:
PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE BONDS AND EMERGING MARKETS
This dissertation consists of five empirical studies on financial markets. Each study can
be read independently and covers a specific subject. The first three studies add to the
literature on emerging markets. There are two aspects that make emerging markets
research interesting. First, they provide a natural `out-of-sample' test for both established
and new theories that initially are tested for developed markets. The study on stock
 selection strategies in emerging markets in Chapter 2 provides an example of this use of
emerging markets data. Second, emerging markets have their own specific characteristics
such as severe crises and limited regulations. The study on analysts' earnings forecasts, in
Chapter 3, clearly looks at the specific characteristics of emerging markets. Finally, the
study on emerging currency markets, in Chapter 4, gives a new perspective on investment
strategies for both emerging as well as developed currency markets. The last two chapters
cover corporate bonds and private equity respectively. To the best of our knowledge,
Chapter 5 is the first study that incorporates both individual corporate bonds and US
corporate bond mutual funds to address anomalous patterns in corporate bond returns.
The last chapter aims providing guidance to institutional investors to maintain a constant
portfolio allocation to private equity. Despite the enthusiasm from institutional investors
for private equity, the formal research into private equity investment strategies for these
investors appears to be limited. Chapter 6 fills this gap.
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